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Web-servers are a dominant medium of modern communication and thus process
vast amounts of highly sensitive, private data. Social networks, online auctions, and
all kinds of cloud services constitute popular examples of online services complying
with this paradigm. Due to many alarming scandals regarding the misuse of private
data, IT security solutions protecting this sensitive data (for example by hiding it
through encryption) are indispensable. Ideally, web-servers should be able to com-
pute on private data without seeing it—we refer to this as the “Secure Outsourcing of
Computation”. Most notably, the cryptographic primitive of Homomorphic Encryp-
tion (HE) enables the web-servers to process data in the encrypted domain, which
thereby hides/protects all private data as it is never available in the clear. More
precisely, HE is a type of encryption that allows for the computation of certain func-
tionalities on encrypted data without knowledge of the decryption key. Depending on
the HE scheme, various functionalities can be evaluated in the encrypted domain,
ranging from additions or multiplications only (Group Homomorphic Encryption,
GHE), to virtually any computable functionality (Fully Homomorphic Encryption,
FHE).
We provide a clean foundational framework for HE that permits security char-
acterizations for a large class of HE schemes and shows strong similarities between
GHE and FHE. We study these characterizations in order to assess the limits of
HE, and show that GHE is obsolete in the quantum world, meaning that any GHE
scheme can be broken by a quantum computer. Together with our newly constructed
universal blueprint that encompasses virtually any GHE scheme, we know exactly
how these schemes must be designed and what the underlying hardness assump-
tions must look like. To some extent, this rounds oﬀ the topic of GHE both in the
standard and quantum model of computation.
In the standard model (which is presently assumed to be the most realistic model
of computation), GHE is still highly attractive as it provides very eﬃcient solutions
to a variety of practical problems. On the basis of our foundational framework,
we construct new GHE schemes with unique features and show their employability
in practical applications. Most importantly, we use the special features of one of
these schemes and develop a novel technique to achieve a practically eﬃcient solu-
tion to the problem of securely outsourcing computations. Our construction allows
multiple users to send encryptions of their private data under their own keys to a
distrusted web-server that can then, on behalf of the users, evaluate any dynam-
ically chosen computable function on these inputs in the encrypted domain (even
across encryptions under diﬀerent public keys) without learning anything at all, and
without interacting with the users.
Zusammenfassung
Ein u¨berwiegender Teil des modernen Datenaustauschs geschieht heutzutage u¨ber
Webserver, welche Unmengen an sensiblen, privaten Daten verarbeiten. Zu den wich-
tigsten Beispielen za¨hlen Online-Dienste, wie soziale Netzwerke, Internet-Auktionen
und alle mo¨glichen Cloud-Dienste. Viele alarmierende Skandale, die den Missbrauch
privater Daten betreﬀen, zeigen die unbedingte Notwendigkeit von Lo¨sungen aus
dem Bereich der IT-Sicherheit, welche diese sensiblen Daten schu¨tzen (zum Beispiel
durch die Benutzung von Verschlu¨sselungsverfahren). Idealerweise sollten Webserver
in der Lage sein mit privaten Daten zu rechnen, ohne diese zu sehen – wir nennen
einen solchen Mechanismus eine
”
sichere Auslagerung von Berechnungen“. In diesem
Zusammenhang ist die Homomorphe Verschlu¨sselung (HV) einer der bedeutendsten
Bausteine der IT-Sicherheit bzw. der Kryptographie. HV ist ein Verschlu¨sselungs-
mechanismus, der es ermo¨glicht bestimmte Berechnungen auf verschlu¨sselten Daten
auszufu¨hren ohne den Entschlu¨sselungsschlu¨ssel zu kennen. Abha¨ngig von dem je-
weiligen HV-Verfahren ko¨nnen verschiedenste Funktionen ausgewertet werden, ange-
fangen bei simplen Additionen oder Multiplikationen (Gruppen-Homomorphe Ver-
schlu¨sselung, GHV) bis hin zu nahezu allen berechenbaren Funktionen (Voll-Homo-
morphe Verschlu¨sselung, VHV).
In dieser Arbeit bescha¨ftigen wir uns zuna¨chst mit den Grundlagen von HV und
geben diverse A¨quivalenzbedingungen an die Sicherheit von HV-Verfahren, sowie
starke A¨hnlichkeiten zwischen GHV- und VHV-Verfahren an. Wir studieren die-
se Bedingungen im Detail, um die Grenzen von HV zu ermitteln und zeigen, dass
GHV in der Quantenwelt obsolet ist, womit gemeint ist, dass jedes solche Verfahren
von einem Quantumcomputer gebrochen werden kann. Zusammen mit einem von
uns neu entwickelten, universellen Konstruktionsentwurf fu¨r GHV, wissen wir dann
genau, wie solche Verfahren konstruiert werden mu¨ssen und, wie die zugrundelie-
genden komplexita¨tstheoretischen Annahmen aussehen mu¨ssen. Zu einem gewissen
Grad rundet dies das Thema GHV sowohl in dem Standard- als auch in dem Quan-
tenberechnungsmodell ab.
Im Standardmodell (welches heutzutage als das realistischste Berechnungsmodell
angesehen wird) ist GHV immer noch ho¨chst attraktiv, da es genutzt wird, um sehr
eﬃziente Lo¨sungen fu¨r eine Vielzahl von praxisrelevanten Problemen bereitzustellen.
Basierend auf unserer Grundlagenforschung zu HV, ko¨nnen wir neue GHV-Verfahren
mit einzigartigen Eigenschaften konstruieren, welche wir dann benutzen, um Pro-
bleme aus der Praxis zu lo¨sen. Von großer Bedeutung ist in diesem Zusammenhang
unsere Erstellung eines besonderen Verfahrens, welches uns erlaubt eine neue Tech-
nik vorzustellen, um das Problem des sicheren Auslagerns von Berechnungen in einer
sehr eﬃzienten Art und Weise zu lo¨sen. Konkret erlaubt es unsere Technik mehreren
Benutzern, Verschlu¨sselungen ihrer privaten Daten unter ihren eigenen Schlu¨sseln
an einen nicht-vertrauenswu¨rdigen Webserver zu schicken, welcher dann im Auftrag
der Benutzer jede beliebige berechenbare Funktion auf diesen verschlu¨sselten Daten
zu berechnen (sogar u¨ber Verschlu¨sselungen unter verschiedenen Schlu¨sseln hinweg)
ohne irgendetwas Sicherheitskritisches zu lernen und ohne mit den Benutzern zu
interagieren.
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Introduction
Outsourcing computations on very sensitive data to a distrusted party in a secure
manner (meaning that the distrusted party learns neither about the underlying
sensitive data nor about the result of the computations) is one of the most central
topics in modern IT security. In fact, ﬁrst approaches already appeared with the
advent of public-key cryptography [35] in 1976. Nowadays, the topic aﬀects everyone
who uses modern online communication being done through central web-servers
which process vast amounts of private data. Examples of online services exploiting
this paradigm are social networks, online auctions, and cloud services to name just
a few. In the recent years, many concerns have been raised regarding data privacy
in these scenarios, and serious privacy breaches have occurred [2, 4, 6, 101].
In order to deal with these privacy threats to sensitive data, several diﬀerent
approaches to securely outsource such computations have been proposed, depending
on the application scenario. In this work, we focus on solutions that are based
on Homomorphic Encryption (HE), which is a type of encryption that allows for
the computation of certain functionalities on encrypted data without being able
to decrypt. However, current practically feasible HE supports only very limited
functionalities (like simple additions) and, hence, does not solve the problem in
all its generality. In order to perform more complex operations, decryption steps
are needed, which require parties holding a secret key, or a share thereof, to be
online and interact in the computations. To realize these steps in a secure way, the
concept of Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) [114] gains increasing importance;
here again, our focus lies on solutions based on HE [28, 70]. In this setting, the
computation is carried out interactively between several participating parties, in
a way that sensitive data is kept hidden (for example encrypted or shared among
protocol participants) and only the desired output of the computation is available.
Note that, depending on the application, the interactive nature of SMC protocols
is not necessarily contradictory to the setting of secure outsourcing (sometimes one
only wants to outsource certain parts of the overall computation, and it is acceptable
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to interact for certain other parts). Overall, this thesis has two main goals:
1. Providing the ﬁrst thorough foundations on HE (encompassing all existing
schemes) to work out the limits of their employability in the secure outsourcing
of computations, both in constructive and restrictive ways.
2. Developing the ﬁrst eﬃcient mechanism (on the basis of the ﬁrst goal), al-
lowing the secure outsourcing of arbitrary computations in the presence of
multiple users, but non-interactively with these users.
Concretely, the contributions of this thesis with respect to these goals are as follows:
Abstract Security Characterizations of HE (Chapter 4)
We identify and formalize the most basic underlying structure of all existing HE
schemes and say that schemes having this structure are of shift-type. This particular
structure alone, which essentially says that encrypting a message amounts to the ad-
dition of random noise, allows us to characterize their IND-CPA security (being the
minimal security requirement on HE schemes) in terms of a certain abstract SubSet
Membership Problem (SSMP). Moreover, for a certain large subclass of HE schemes
called Group Homomorphic Encryption (GHE) schemes where this abstract problem
is considered over groups (which is then called the SubGroup Membership Problem,
SMP) we can even characterize their IND-CCA1 security (the strongest security
requirement on HE schemes) in terms of a variant of the SMP, called the Split-
ting Oracle-Assisted Subgroup Membership Problem (SOAP). GHE schemes work on
plaintext groups, such as ZN for N ∈ N, and allow for the evaluation of arbitrarily
many group operations in the encrypted domain. In the case of ZN such schemes
are called additively homomorphic and form the basis of many practically important
applications, like the outsourcing of computations as we will see later in this work.
Systematic Design Approach to HE: New Constructions (Chapter 5)
Concerning the design of HE schemes it turns out that GHE schemes are, in a certain
sense, bound to the shift-type structure. We prove this by deducing the shift-type
structure from the IND-CPA security of GHE schemes. Furthermore, we construct
a generic GHE scheme that we prove (under certain assumptions) to be employable
as a universal blueprint for GHE schemes, meaning that every such scheme is an
instance of the generic scheme. The security of the original scheme is provably
equivalent to the security of the respective instance of the generic scheme.
Our blueprint allows us to start with an SMP (SOAP, respectively) instance that
we plug into the blueprint, which will then output a GHE scheme. If the SMP
(SOAP, respectively) is hard, the resulting GHE scheme is IND-CPA (IND-CCA1,
3respectively) secure. This gives us an easy way to construct new HE schemes with
unique properties:
1. We consider the k-linear problem [66, 103] as a concrete instance of SMP and
construct the ﬁrst GHE scheme whose IND-CPA security is based on it (see
Section 5.2). This problem has the progressive property of getting weaker with
larger values for k. In addition, we introduce a new k-problem (an instantiation
of SOAP) that we prove to have the same progressive property as the k-linear
problem. This new problem might be of independent interest as it can be used
to construct new cryptographic protocols with unique features. For instance,
we use it in our blueprint to build the ﬁrst GHE scheme on bilinear groups [72]
that is provably secure in terms of IND-CCA1.
2. We revisit the notion of additively homomorphic encryption with a double
decryption mechanism (DD-PKE), which has a master decryption procedure
that can decrypt all properly formed ciphertexts by using a special master
secret. This type of encryption is generally considered as a practical way to
enforce access control in the secure outsourcing of computations in hierachical
organisations. Up to now, only two additively homomorphic DD-PKE schemes
have been proposed: CS-Lite by Cramer and Shoup [29], and a variant called
BCP by Bresson, Catalano and Pointcheval [20].
We argue in Section 5.3 that the two existing schemes only provide partial
solutions for hierarchical organisations. Essentially, this is due to the fact
that the master authority, being in possession of the master secret, has no
control on the validity of given ciphertexts. We say that the master is unable
to “detect invalid ciphertexts”, which limits the employment of such schemes
in practice. Therefore, we propose the ﬁrst additively homomorphic DD-PKE
scheme which allows the master to detect invalid ciphertexts.
Security Analysis of Existing HE and Impossibility Results (Chapter 6)
Our abstract security characterizations (cf. Chapter 4) can be applied to concrete
homomorphic schemes by looking at the according instantiations of SMP and SOAP,
respectively (see Section 6.1). For example, several results such as the IND-CPA
security of ElGamal [107], the IND-CCA1 security of Damg˚ard’s ElGamal [30, 61,
84, 113] and the recently proved IND-CCA1 security of ElGamal [84] can be easily
derived from our characterizations. Additionally, we use our IND-CCA1 characteri-
zation to approach a long standing open question by showing Paillier’s homomorphic
encryption scheme [93] provably secure in terms of IND-CCA1.
Furthermore, we derive two impossibility results from our abstract security char-
acterizations (see Section 6.2):
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1. We show that no GHE scheme where the ciphertexts form a linear subspace
of Fn for some prime ﬁeld F, can be IND-CPA secure. This answers the
open question [51] whether using linear codes as ciphertext spaces yield more
eﬃcient GHE constructions by showing that secure such schemes cannot exist.
2. We prove that once quantum computers reach maturity, the notion of GHE
becomes obsolete. By this we mean that for any given GHE scheme, we can
construct a quantum adversary that eﬃciently breaks its IND-CPA security.
Secure and Eﬃcient Outsourcing of Multiparty Computations (Chapter 7)
Finally, we show that our foundational work on HE (Chapters 4–6) has important
consequences on the secure and practically eﬃcient outsourcing of arbitrary mul-
tiparty computations. For the ﬁrst time, we propose a solution that tackles the
following problem scenario:
1. A set of n mutually distrusting clients P1, . . . , Pn (the number n may change
dynamically over time), each having its own public and private key pair, en-
crypt data under their respective public keys and store these encryptions on a
server C.
2. Any dynamically chosen function (i.e., the function does not need to be spec-
iﬁed at the time data is encrypted) should be computed by C on the clients’
data, while all inputs and intermediate results remain private.
3. Due to the fact that clients are not always online in practice, C needs the
ability to compute these functions without any interaction of the clients. In
particular, this also concerns the clients’ retrieval of results.
4. Once online, individual clients can retrieve the result while the server learns
nothing at all.
Previous attempts to construct a protocol for this scenario were either ineﬃcient,
relied heavily on client interaction, or required the inputs to be encrypted under the
same public key—drawbacks making the employment in practice very limited.
Our general-purpose construction avoids all these drawbacks: it is eﬃcient, it
requires no user interaction whatsoever (except for data up- and download), and
it allows evaluating any dynamically chosen function on inputs encrypted under
diﬀerent independent public keys. Our solution assumes the existence of two non-
colluding but untrusted servers that jointly perform the computation by means of
a cryptographic protocol. This protocol is proven to be secure in the semi-honest
model, meaning that all protocol participants follow the protocol description, but
may try to gather information about other parties’ inputs, intermediate results, or
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overall outputs just by looking at the transcripts. We demonstrate the applicability
of our result in two real-world scenarios from diﬀerent domains: Privacy-Preserving
Face Recognition and Private Smart Metering. Finally, we give a performance anal-
ysis of our general-purpose construction to highlight its practicability.
1.1. Related Work
Since the introduction of public-key encryption [35], a long-lasting sequence of papers
have been (and are still being) published on the topic of securely outsourcing compu-
tations. Most importantly, we mention the signiﬁcant series of works on IND-CPA
secure GHE schemes, starting with ElGamal [36] in 1984, followed by Damg˚ard’s El-
Gamal [30], Paillier [93], and Cramer-Shoup [29] to name just a few (our own scheme
of Section 5.3 being the most recent). For a rather complete list of GHE schemes,
we refer the reader to [41]. Simultaneously to these developments, beginning in
2008, researchers started to look at relaxations of GHE, where only limited group
operations are possible to evaluate [88]. Such relaxations are particularly interest-
ing for certain practical applications, when considering additively HE schemes with
plaintext group ZN for N ∈ N [28]. More importantly, additionally requiring such
an additively HE scheme to allow for the evaluation of multiplications as well, led
to the design of Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) schemes, allowing the evalu-
ation of virtually any function. The ﬁrst such scheme was presented by Gentry [52]
in 2009, preceding a large body of follow-up works [16–19,53–55,57,58,85,110].
To analyze the power and the limits of HE schemes, characterizing them in terms
of their security and their design has always been in the focus of active research [29,
40, 52, 59, 60, 65]. In contrast to our work (Chapters 4–5), all previous approaches
only encompass small, special-purpose classes of HE schemes and only deal with
IND-CPA security (excluding IND-CCA1 security). We stress that such restricted
characterizations are insuﬃcient in many ways, for instance in order to achieve our
general impossibility results on the use of linear codes or post-quantum hardness
assumptions in GHE scheme (Chapter 6).
Currently1, GHE schemes are still the most eﬃcient schemes among all the existing
HE schemes and are therefore of great importance in the design of eﬃcient and
secure system for the outsourcing of multiparty computations. As we explained
before, additively HE schemes can be employed to realize the evaluation of more
complex functions (than just addition operations) if one accepts interactivity with
the data owners. All solutions (even the ones that are not based on HE) which have
been suggested in the past rely heavily on interactivity with the data owners [16,18,
19, 51, 56, 73], are too ineﬃcient to be practically relevant [85], reveal the result of
1January 14, 2013
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the computations to everyone [64], or require all inputs to be encrypted under the




We recall standard deﬁnitions, notation, and basic facts on groups and elliptic curves,
which we will need in the course of this work.
2.1. Deﬁnitions and Notation
We write x ←− X if X is a random variable or distribution and x is to be chosen
randomly from X according to its distribution. In the case where X is solely a set,
x
U←− X denotes that x is chosen uniformly at random from X. If we sample an
element x from X by using a speciﬁc distribution D, we write x D←− X (or x ←− X
when there is no doubt about the distribution D). For an algorithm A we write
x ←− A(y) if A outputs x on ﬁxed input y according to A’s distribution. Sometimes,
we need to specify the randomness of a probabilistic algorithm A explicitly. To this
end, we interpret A in the usual way as a deterministic algorithm A(y; r), which has
access to values r ←− Rnd that are randomly chosen from some randomness space
Rnd.
Moreover, two distribution ensembles X = {Xκ}κ∈N and Y = {Yκ}κ∈N taking
values in a ﬁnite set Sκ (indexed by a parameter κ) are said to be computationally
indistinguishable, if for all probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithms A there
exists a negligible function negl such that
AdvX,YA (κ) :=
∣∣∣∣ Prx←−Xκ [A(x) = 1]− Pry←−Yκ [A(y) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ negl(κ).
We sometimes call such an algorithm A a distinguisher and say that the distribution
ensemble X is negligibly close to Y . We denote the latter by X
c
= Y . Furthermore,
we deﬁne the variational distance as
|X − Y | (κ) :=
∑
z∈Sκ
∣∣∣∣ Prx←−Xκ [x = z]− Pry←−Yκ [y = z]
∣∣∣∣ .
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We say that X and Y are statistically indistinguishable if and only if |X − Y | is
negligible in κ. It is clear that if X and Y are statistically indistinguishable, then
in particular they are computationally indistinguishable.
Next, we recall some basic facts about ﬁnite groups [78]. For a group G, we denote
the neutral element by 1, and denote the binary operation on G by “·”, meaning
that G is written in multiplicative notation. Throughout this work, we assume all
groups G to be ﬁnite. If the group operation is commutative, we say that the group
is Abelian. We recall that a subgroup H of a group G (denoted by H ≤ G) is said to
be normal if g ·h ·g−1 ∈ H for all g ∈ G,h ∈ H. In particular, this means that if G is
an Abelian group, then every subgroup H is normal. Even in the non-Abelian case,
if H is a non-trivial, proper normal subgroup of G, and R ⊆ G is a ﬁxed system of
representatives of G/H, we have the following fact:
Fact 1 Let τ denote the restriction to R of the canonical surjection G −→ G/H,
g −→ g · H. Since R is a system of representatives of G/H, every g ∈ G can be
uniquely written as g = r · h with r ∈ R and h ∈ H. Therefore, τ is a bijection
and there is a group structure on R that is inherited from G/H: For r, r′ ∈ R, we
deﬁne r  r′ := τ−1(τ(r) · τ(r′)). We denote the element in R that corresponds to
the neutral element in G/H by 1. It is easy to verify that with the deﬁned operation
, R becomes a group with neutral element 1. In addition, we know that R∩H = 1
as R ⊆ G is a system of representatives of G/H.
If f : G → G′ is a group homomorphism between two groups G and G′, we write
dom(f) = G for the domain of f , im(f) for its image, and ker(f) := {g ∈ G |
f(g) = 1} for the kernel of f . Note that im(f) is a subgroup of G′ and that
ker(f) is a subgroup of G. In addition, we write f |H for the restriction of f to
a subgroup H ⊆ G, meaning that f |H : H → G′ with f |H(h) := f(h) for all
h ∈ H. We remark that f |H is a group homomorphism itself. If f is surjective, we
write f−1(g′) := {g ∈ G | f(g) = g′} for the preimage of g′ under f for g′ ∈ G′.
Surjective group homomorphisms are called group epimorphisms, while injective
homomorphisms are called group monomorphisms.
By a description of a group G we mean an eﬃcient sampling algorithm (where
sampling is denoted by g ←− G), the neutral element 1 ∈ G, an eﬃcient algorithm
for performing the group operation on G, and one for the inversion of group elements.
We abuse notation and write G both for the description and for the group itself.
Furthermore, for elements g1, . . . , gk ∈ G, we write 〈g1, . . . , gk〉 for the subgroup (of
G) generated by g1, . . . , gk.
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2.2. Elliptic Curves over Rings
Let R be a commutative unital ring with R∗ denoting its group of units. We say
that for a, b ∈ R the equation
E : y2z = x3 + axz2 + bz3 (2.1)
deﬁnes an elliptic curve E over R if the discriminant Δ := 16(4a3+27b2) is a unit in
R, so Δ ∈ R∗. For all triples (x, y, z) ∈ R3 that satisfy (2.1), we say that (x, y, z) is
equivalent to (x′, y′, z′) if there exists ν ∈ R∗ such that νx = x′, νy = y′ and νz = z′.
Indeed this deﬁnes an equivalence relation (denoted by ∼) on all such triples and
we denote equivalence classes by (x : y : z). This relation allows us to deﬁne the
set of R-valued points of E (denoted by E(R)) as the set of all equivalence classes
(x : y : z) with x, y, z ∈ R satisfying (2.1) such that the ideal I generated by x, y, z
is R, that is I = {rx+ sy + tz | r, s, t ∈ R} = R.
It can be shown (see [81, Section 3]) that the usual chord and tangent process on
elliptic curves over ﬁelds (cf. [106, Chapter III]) yields a group law on E(R) with
identity element O∞ := (0 : 1 : 0) if R has the property that every projective R-
module of rank one is free. For our work, it suﬃces to consider this case, since we
will only work over ﬁnite rings which have this property. Therefore, we will from
now on restrict our attention to ﬁnite rings R.
It should be noted that there are explicit and eﬃcient formulae to perform the
group law on E(R) [42,46,81]). Furthermore, we recall that the Chinese Remainder
Theorem on ZN (where N = pq is the product of two odd, distinct primes p and
q) implies natural reduction maps from E(ZN ) to E(Zp) and E(Zq). It follows that
E(ZN ) ∼= E(Zp)× E(Zq) (see [46]).
There are a few other facts in the case where R = ZN2 that are of particular
interest to us, which follow from the p-adic theory of elliptic curves, and we refer
the reader to [46] and [106] for details:
1. #E(ZN2) = N#E(ZN ) = N#E(Zp)#E(Zq).
2. Pi := (Ni : 1 : 0) ∈ E(ZN2) with mPi = Pmi for all m ∈ ZN .
3. NP1 = O∞.
As in the case when working with elliptic curves over ﬁelds, we can deﬁne bilinear
mappings, called pairings [44], on elliptic curves over ZN2 by taking the pairings
over the respective curves over Zp and Zq (using the Chinese Remainder Theorem)
and then clueing their outputs together [48]. If the resulting pairing is eﬃciently
computable given the factorization of N , we call such an elliptic curve over ZN2
pairing-friendly. By the deﬁnition of such pairings, we have to evaluate the Chi-
nese Remainder Theorem, which is only possible when the factorization of N is
known [48].
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2.3. Computationally Hard Problems
We describe computational problems P through experiments ExpPA,G(κ) for given
probabilistic algorithms A and G that run in time polynomial in a given parameter
κ. The output of ExpPA,G(κ) is always deﬁned to be a single bit. We then say
that problem P is hard (relative to G) if for all probabilistic polynomial time (PPT)
algorithms A there exists a negligible function negl such that∣∣∣∣Pr [ExpPA,G(κ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ negl(κ).
One of the most famous problems is the Decisional Diﬃe-Hellman Problem (DDH)
which is deﬁned as follows: Let GGen be a PPT algorithm (in κ) that outputs a cyclic
group G with generator g ∈ G of order p. We consider the following experiment for
GGen and PPT adversary A:
Experiment ExpDDHA,GGen(κ):
1. (G, g) ←− GGen(κ)
2. Choose b
U←− {0, 1} and a, b U←− Zp. If b = 1: Compute z := gab. Otherwise:
z := gc for c
U←− Zp
3. d ←− A(G, g, z) where d ∈ {0, 1}
4. The output of the experiment is deﬁned to be 1 if d = b and 0 otherwise.
This experiment deﬁnes the Decisional Diﬃe-Hellman Problem. Similarly, this prob-
lem is deﬁned on elliptic curves over ZN2 for an RSA-modulus N : Given a random
point Q of large order k (meaning that k has about the same size as N), points
rQ, sQ and tQ (r, s, t ∈ Zk), it is computationally infeasible to decide whether
t = rs mod k or not. We denote this DDH-variant on such curves by DDHZN2 .
We state that if the factorization of N is not known, the Decisional Diﬃe-Hellman
Problem is believed to be hard for elliptic curves over ZN2 [46].
3
Homomorphic Encryption (HE)
This chapter gives an introduction to homomorphic encryption (HE) schemes, the
fundamental concept of this thesis. Roughly speaking, such encryption schemes
allow for the evaluation of certain functionalities over encrypted data without being
able to decrypt. Therefore, if Alice A wants to outsource the computation of a
functionality (that is supported by the HE scheme) on A’s sensitive data to Bob
B, she can do so by simply encrypting all her data and sending everything to B. B
can then use the homomorphic property of the encryption scheme to perform the
computations in such a way that all of A’s data remains hidden (encrypted) from B.
3.1. Group Homomorphic Encryption (GHE)
We recall the notion of public-key group homomorphic encryption (cf. [65]), which
roughly can be described as usual public-key encryption where the decryption algo-
rithm is a group homomorphism.
Deﬁnition 1 (Group Homomorphic Encryption (GHE)) A public-key encryp-
tion scheme E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is called group homomorphic, if for every output
(pk, sk) of KeyGen(κ), the plaintext space P and the ciphertext space Ĉ are non-trivial
(multiplicatively written) groups such that
• the set of all encryptions C := {Encpk(m; r) | m ∈ P, r ∈ Rnd} is a non-trivial
subgroup of Ĉ
• the decryption Decsk is a group homomorphism on C, i.e.
Decsk(c · c′) = Decsk(c) · Decsk(c′), for all c, c′ ∈ C.
There exist some GHE schemes [30] where the decryption algorithm outputs an error
⊥ on inputs in Ĉ \ C.
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Deﬁnition 2 (GHE Scheme with Decryption Error) For a GHE scheme E =
(KeyGen,Enc,Dec), we say that E has a decryption error, if the decryption algorithm
Decsk(c) outputs the error symbol ⊥ iﬀ c ∈ Ĉ \ C.
Since GHE schemes are public-key encryption schemes by deﬁnition, we have the
standard security notions of indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attack (IND-
CPA), indistinguishability under (non-adaptive) chosen-ciphertext attack (IND-CCA1)
and indistinguishability under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2). We
recall these three notions along the lines of [11, Deﬁnition 2.1] and afterwards explain
their role in the group homomorphic case.
For i ∈ {1, 2}, let Oi(·) denote an oracle function, where Oi(·) = ε means that
the oracle always returns the empty string ε on any input. Now, for a GHE scheme
E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec), atk ∈ {cpa, cca1, cca2}, a given algorithm A = (A1,A2)
and security parameter κ, we consider the following experiment:
Experiment Expind-atkA,KeyGen(κ):
1. (pk, sk) ←− KeyGen(κ)
2. (m0,m1, s) ←− AO1(·)1 (pk) where m0,m1 ∈ P and s is a state of A1
3. Choose b
U←− {0, 1} and compute the challenge c ←− Encpk(mb)
4. d ←− AO2(·)2 (m0,m1, s, c) where d ∈ {0, 1}
5. The output of the experiment is deﬁned to be 1 if d = b and 0 otherwise,
whereas
{ if atk = cpa then O1(·) = ε and O2(·) = ε
if atk = cca1 then O1(·) = Decsk(·) and O2(·) = ε
if atk = cca2 then O1(·) = Decsk(·) and O2(·) = Decsk(·).
If atk = cca2, we further require that A2 is not allowed to ask its oracle to de-
crypt the challenge ciphertext c.
We say that E is IND-ATK secure (relative to KeyGen) if the advantage∣∣∣∣Pr [Expind-atkA,KeyGen(κ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ is negligible for all PPT algorithms A,
where ATK ∈ {CPA, CCA1, CCA2}. Bellare et al. [11] show that IND-CCA2 is
strictly stronger than IND-CCA1, which in turn is strictly stronger than IND-CPA.
For reasons of completeness, we prove the following well-known result.
Lemma 1 (No IND-CCA2 Security for GHE Schemes) Every GHE scheme
E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is insecure in terms of IND-CCA2.
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Proof: On input the public key pk, the adversary A1 outputs two randomly cho-
sen plaintexts m0,m1 ∈ P with m0 = m1. The challenger chooses a random bit
b ∈ {0, 1} and computes the challenge ciphertext c ←− Encpk(mb). Upon receiv-
ing the challenge, A2 computes ci ←− c · Encpk(m−1i ) for i ∈ {0, 1}, and asks the
decryption oracle for the decryptions of c0 and c1. By deﬁnition, one of these decryp-
tions is 1, and A2 outputs the index d ∈ {0, 1} of the decryption that corresponds
to 1. Therefore, the advantage of A in the IND-CCA2 game is 12 , which is non-
negligible. 
Due to this Lemma, we know that IND-CCA1 is the strongest of the three security
notions for GHE schemes. We remark that there exist three additional, standard
security notions: Non-malleability with respect to CPA, CCA1 and CCA2. For details
on these, we refer to [11] and note that, for obvious reasons, no GHE scheme can be
secure in terms of these notions. Therefore, we do not consider these non-malleability
notions. Also, we note that non-standard variants, as deﬁned in [22,100], lie outside
of the scope of this paper.
Already from the deﬁnition of GHE, we can deduce some ﬁrst facts (see [65] for
similar thoughts), but before we do this, we require the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3 (The Set of All Encryptions of a given Plaintext) For a given
GHE scheme E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) and message m ∈ P, we deﬁne the set of all
(fresh) encryptions of m as
Cm = {c ∈ C | Decsk(c) = m} .
With this deﬁnition, the IND-CPA security of a given GHE scheme E is equivalent to
saying that the distribution on Cm0 (induced by the encryption algorithm Encpk(m0))
is negligibly close to the (induced) distribution on Cm1 for any two messages m0 and
m1, i.e., Cm0 c= Cm1 [62, Ch. 5.2].
Lemma 2 For a GHE scheme E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec), we have
1. Cm = Encpk(m; r) · C1 for all m ∈ P and all r ∈ Rnd,
2. C1 is a proper normal subgroup of C such that |C1| = |Cm| for all m ∈ P.
It follows that the set {Encpk(m; r) | m ∈ P} for a ﬁxed r is a system of representa-
tives of C/C1.
Proof:
1. We ﬁx a random r and m ∈ P. Let c ∈ Cm and set c1 := c · Encpk(m, r)−1.
Then, Decsk(c1) = m ·m−1 = 1, i.e., c1 ∈ C1. Therefore, c = Encpk(m, r) · c1 ∈
Encpk(m, r) · C1. Conversely, let c1 ∈ C1. Then, Decsk(Encpk(m, r) · c1) =
m · 1 = m, i.e., Encpk(m, r) · c1 ∈ Cm. The ﬁrst statement of the lemma follows
immediately.
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2. With respect to the second claim, we show by contradiction that C1 = C.
Therefore, assume that C1 = C. Since the decryption Dec∗sk is surjective,
this means that P is a trivial group, which contradicts the deﬁnition of a
homomorphic scheme. Now, by looking at the deﬁnition of C1, we see that
C1 = ker(Dec∗sk). Therefore, C1 is a normal subgroup of C (see [79, p. 13]). The
last claim is an immediate consequence of the equality Cm = Encpk(m, r) · C1.

As a ﬁnal remark of this section, we want to point out that a GHE scheme is called
additively homomorphic, if the plaintext group is ZN for a given natural number
N ∈ N.
3.2. Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SWHE) and
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)
3.2.1. Deﬁnitions
Recall that the notion of GHE requires an encryption scheme to be able to evaluate
an unbounded number of group operations. This requirement can be relaxed as
described in the next deﬁnition (following [69, Deﬁnition 5] and [52, Deﬁnition 1]).
Deﬁnition 4 (Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SWHE)) A public-key
encryption scheme E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is called homomorphic for a set of circuits
C = C[κ] (that depends on the security parameter κ), if there exists a PPT algorithm
Eval (that outputs a ciphertext and takes as input public keys pk from the output of
KeyGen, circuits C ∈ C(κ) and ciphertexts (c1, . . . , cr) with ci ←− Encpk(mi) for
some mi ∈ P, i = 1, . . . , r) such that for every output (pk, sk) of KeyGen(κ) it holds
that ( correctness condition)
Decsk(Evalpk(C, c1, . . . , cr)) = C(m1, . . . ,mr),
except with negligible probability (in κ) over the random coins in Eval. We also call
such schemes Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SWHE) schemes.
The security notions for SWHE schemes are exactly the same as for GHE schemes,
while IND-CPA is the minimal security requirement and IND-CCA1 is the strongest.
Sometimes it is required that, even if the secret key is known, the output of Eval
does not reveal any information about the circuit that it evaluates, except for the
output value of that circuit. This requirement is captured in the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 5 (Circuit Privacy) An SWHE scheme E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec,Eval),
that is homomorphic for a set C = C[κ] of circuits, is said to be (computationally)
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circuit-private on C, if for every keypair (pk, sk) ←− KeyGen(κ), any circuit C ∈
C, and any ﬁxed tuple of fresh encryptions (c1, . . . , cr) with ci ←− Encpk(mi) for
plaintexts mi ∈ P and i = 1, . . . , r, the following distributions (over the random
coins in Enc and Eval) are (computationally) indistinguishable:
Encpk(C(m1, . . . ,mr))
c
= Evalpk(C, c1, . . . , cr).
Now, informally, an SWHE scheme that is homomorphic for all circuits is called a
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) scheme. But to rule out trivial FHE schemes
E , e.g., where Eval simply outputs its input circuit C together with its input cipher-
texts and Dec takes circuits C as input as well and simply outputs the evaluation of
C on the decryptions of the plugged-in ciphertexts, we require the additional prop-
erty of compactness (cf. [51, Deﬁnition 2.1.2]). Informally this means that the size
of the output of Eval does not depend on the size of the circuit it evaluates.
Deﬁnition 6 (Compactness) Let E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec,Eval) be an encryption
scheme that is homomorphic for a set of circuits C = C[λ]. E is called compact, if
Dec can be expressed as a circuit of size at most p(κ) for some polynomial p.
With this deﬁnition in mind, we can formalize the notion of FHE:
Deﬁnition 7 (Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)) An encryption scheme
E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec,Eval) that is homomorphic for all circuits and compact is
called fully homomorphic.
Moreover, an FHE scheme is called circuit-private, if it is circuit-private for all
circuits.
In between SWHE schemes and FHE schemes, there are schemes that are homo-
morphic for all circuits up to a certain depth. We call such schemes Leveled FHE
schemes.
Deﬁnition 8 (Leveled FHE [52]) We call a family {E(d) | d ∈ Z+} of schemes
leveled fully homomorphic, if they all use the same decryption circuit, E(d) is ho-
momorphic for all circuits of depth at most d, and the computational complexity
of E(d)’s algorithms is polynomial in κ, d, while Eval(d)’s runtime additionally is
polynomial in the size of its input circuit C.
3.2.2. Gentry’s Bootstrapping Technique
We brieﬂy want to recall some facts about Gentry’s bootstrapping technique [52]
on how to construct FHE schemes. Roughly speaking, Gentry constructs a homo-
morphic encryption scheme for circuits of any depth from an underlying encryption
scheme that is homomorphic for “just a little more than its own decryption circuit”.
We formalize the term in double quotes momentarily (see also [52, Deﬁnition 4]),
but ﬁrst need to do some more deﬁnitional work.
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Deﬁnition 9 Let E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec,Eval) be an encryption scheme in which
Dec is implemented by a circuit that does only depend on the security parameter
κ. For every output (pk, sk) of KeyGen(κ), we let Γ be a set of gates with inputs
and output in plaintext space P including the identity gate (input and output are
the same). For gate g ∈ Γ, the g-augmented decryption circuit consists of a g-
gate connecting multiple copies of Dec (the number of copies equals the number of
inputs to g), where Dec takes the secret key sk and a ciphertext as input formatted
as elements of P(κ), where (κ) is some polynomial in κ. We denote the set of all
g-augmented decryption circuits, g ∈ Γ, by Dec[κ](Γ).1
The most important property of an encryption scheme to be of any use in Gentry’s
approach is that of bootstrappability.
Deﬁnition 10 Let E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec,Eval) be a homomorphic encryption scheme
for a set of circuits C = C[κ]. E is called bootstrappable for a set of gates Γ, if
Dec[κ](Γ) ⊆ C[κ] for all security parameters κ.
A boostrappable SWHE scheme is already suﬃcient to construct FHE schemes as
the following result of [52] shows:
Theorem 1 There is an eﬃcient and explicit transformation that for any given
bootstrappable scheme E for a set of gates Γ and parameter d = d(κ) outputs another
encryption scheme E(d) that is
1. compact and whose decryption circuit is identical to that of E
2. homomorphic for all circuits with gates in Γ of depth at most d.
In the transformation of Theorem 1, there are some particular facts about the result-
ing scheme E(d) that will become very important in the course of this work (see [52]
for more details).
Fact 2 1. The plaintext space P of E(d) is the same as that of E.
2. The key generation algorithm of E(d) uses the key generator KeyGen of E (d+1)-
times to produce d + 1 public and secret key pairs (pki, ski), i = 0, . . . , d. Let
ski1, . . . , ski be the representation of ski as elements of P with  = (κ) as in
Deﬁnition 9. The key generator of E(d) then computes skij ←− Encpki−1(skij)








1We sometimes make Dec’s dependency on κ obvious by writing Dec[κ] instead of just Dec.
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3. Encryption of a message m ∈ P in E(d) is done by computing a ciphertext
c ←− Encpkd(m), i.e., an encryption of m under pkd by using the encryption
algorithm Enc of E.
Concerning the security of the resulting scheme E(d), Gentry proves the following
theorem.
Theorem 2 Let E be a bootstrappable scheme for a set of gates Γ. For all param-
eters d = d(κ), we have that the output E(d) of the transformation from Theorem 1
applied to E and d is IND-CPA secure if E is.
Unfortunately, the resulting scheme E(d) after applying the transformation is not
yet a “pure” FHE scheme as it is only homomorphic for all circuits with gates in Γ
of depth at most d (i.e., it is leveled fully homomorphic). However, in [52], Gentry
shows how to modify the previously described technique to get “pure” FHE schemes
(see [51, Section 4.3] for details).
Theorem 3 There is an eﬃcient and explicit transformation that for any given
bootstrappable scheme E for a universal2 set of gates Γ outputs another encryption
scheme E∗ that is fully homomorphic and whose decryption circuit is identical to
that of E.
Proof: In the key generation step of Theorem 1 (this is step 2), E∗ uses the key
generator KeyGen of E only once (instead of (d + 1)-times) to compute a key pair
(pk, sk) and outputs the secret key sk∗ := sk and public key pk∗ := (pk, sk1, . . . , sk)
where ski ←− Encpk(ski) and sk1, . . . , sk is the representation of sk as elements of
P. This is the only modiﬁcation and the rest works exactly as in the transformation
of Theorem 1. 
There is a similar proof of security for the resulting scheme E∗ as in the leveled FHE
case. However, in the “pure” FHE case, there is the additional assumption that the
underlying bootstrappable scheme E is circular secure:
Deﬁnition 11 (Circular Security [52]) For a bootstrappable encryption schemes
E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec,Eval), we consider the following experiment for a given algo-
rithm A and security parameter κ:
Experiment ExpcircularA,KeyGen(κ):
1. Compute (pk, sk) ←− KeyGen(κ)
2This is a set of gates by which any circuit can be expressed, e.g., a NAND-gate when considering
boolean circuits.
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2. Choose b
U←− {0, 1}. If b = 0, then compute skj ←− Encpk(skj) for all j =
1, . . . ,  where sk1, . . . , sk is the representation of sk as elements of P with
 = (λ) as in Deﬁnition 9. If b = 1, then compute skj as encryptions of some
ﬁxed element 0 ∈ P, unrelated to pk, for all j = 1, . . . , 
3. d ←− A (pk, sk1, . . . , sk) where d ∈ {0, 1}
4. The output of the experiment is deﬁned to be 1 if d = b and 0 else.
This experiment deﬁnes circular security for bootstrappable encryption schemes E.
Gentry [52] proves the following theorem about the security of the resulting FHE
scheme of Theorem 3:
Theorem 4 Let E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec,Eval) be a bootstrappable scheme for a uni-
versal set of gates Γ. We have that the resulting scheme E∗ of the transformation
from Theorem 3 applied to E is IND-CPA secure, if E is circular secure.
3.3. Secure Two-Party Computation based on Additively
Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption, as deﬁned in the previous two sections, allows for the
secure outsourcing of computations of certain functionalities (or all functionalities
in the case of FHE) from a single party to another party. Several applications,
however, require the ability to securely outsource computations between multiple
parties. We say that we want to securely outsource multiparty computations. To this
end, it is often useful to consider the topic of Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC).
SMC enables a set of parties to jointly evaluate any kind of functionality on their
respective inputs while keeping these inputs hidden throughout the computations.
In general, SMC can be realized by using garbled circuits [115], secret sharing [26],
or homomorphic encryption [28]. In this work, we will only deal with SMC based on
homomorphic encryption and refer the interested reader for the other approaches to
the relevant literature in the ﬁeld [26,115]. Moreover, for the purposes of this thesis
it suﬃces to restrict our attention to the following two-party setting (while pointing
to [28] for a more general treatment):
Alice A holds a public and secret key pair (pk, sk) of some IND-CPA secure ad-
ditively homomorphic encryption scheme. Furthermore, B knows two encryptions
ca = Encpk(a), cb = Encpk(b) (of unknown plaintexts a and b) and is to compute
the evaluation on a and b of an arbitrary 2-input function f .3 Here, we assume
that the function f is represented as an arithmetic circuit over the plaintext space
3The generalization to more than two inputs is straightforward and we refer to [28] for details.
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of the additively homomorphic encryption scheme. Obviously, B cannot compute
the function f on his own if f involves multiplication gates, since the encryption
scheme is additively homomorphic and only allows for the evaluation of addition
gates. Therefore, whenever a multiplication gate needs to be evaluated, B requires
the help of A in an interactive protocol: First, B chooses two random plaintexts ra
and rb, computes ca · Encpk(−ra) and cb · Encpk(−rb), and sends this to A. A knows
the secret key sk and decrypts the received information. Since the original plain-
texts are blinded with the random values ra and rb, A does not see what B wants
to compute. Then, A performs the multiplication in the clear, encrypts the result
(denoted by cd), and sends it back to B. B, in turn, computes c−rarb = Encpk(−rarb)
and
c = cd · crba · crab · c−rarb .
This is an encryption of a · b as the decryption of c shows:
Decsk(c) = (a− ra) · (b− rb) + rba+ rab− rarb = ab.
Concerning the security of the protocol, it can be shown [28] that neither A nor
B learn anything about the original inputs a and b, when they behave according
to the protocol description. More formally, the security of the overall protocol is
deﬁned in the “real-vs.-ideal” framework [62, Ch. 7]: there is an ideal model where
all computations are performed via an additional trusted party and it is then shown
that all adversarial behavior in the real model (where there is no trusted party) can
be simulated in the ideal model. We say that the protocol is secure in the semi-honest
model. Due to the Composition Theorem for the semi-honest model [62, Theorem
7.3.3], we can deal with the addition and multiplication protocols individually. All
of this is standard material in any introductory course on cryptography and we refer
to [62] for details.

4
Characterization of Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption schemes form one of the most important cryptographic
primitives for the secure outsourcing of computations. Understanding their inherent
structures is therefore a major research goal in the analysis of protocols for the
secure outsourcing of computations. We provide the ﬁrst universal framework for
group homomorphic encryption schemes that allows us to characterize their IND-
CPA and IND-CCA1 security through certain abstract subgroup problems. Later in
this thesis, we will see how our characterizations can be used to derive impossibility
results and to analyze the security of existing schemes. Moreover, we show that our
framework also applies to the current approach on the design of FHE schemes.
4.1. Subgroup and Subset Problems
4.1.1. The Splitting Problem and the Subgroup Membership Problem
In [59], Gjøsteen introduces a computational problem, called Splitting Problem, to-
gether with a related decisional problem, called Subgroup Membership Problem. We
recall these two problems, while extending Gjøsteen’s original deﬁnitions to a more
general setting.
Let Ĝ be a ﬁnite (not necessarily Abelian) group, G a non-trivial subgroup of
Ĝ, H a non-trivial, proper normal subgroup of G, and R ⊆ G a ﬁxed system of
representatives of G/H. Additionally to the standard sampling algorithms contained
in the description of a group, we assume here that there is an algorithm that allows
for the eﬃcient sampling from G \H.
We recall that every g ∈ G can be uniquely written as g = r · h with r ∈ R and
h ∈ H and that there is a natural group structure on R that is inherited from G/H
(cf. Fact 1). Moreover, we notice that the following map is a bijection:
R×H −→ G given by (r, h) −→ r · h.
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We denote its inverse by σ and call σ the splitting map for (G,H,R).
Informally, the Splitting Problem (SP) for (G,H,R) is to compute σ(g) for a
randomly given g ∈ G. Before we give a formal deﬁnition of SP, we note that our
deﬁnition extends Gjøsteen’s in that it considers a system of representatives that
need not be a subgroup of G, while Gjøsteen always assumes it to be a subgroup. In
addition, we allow G to be a non-Abelian group, while Gjøsteen only considers the
Abelian case. Now let GGen be a PPT algorithm that takes a security parameter κ
as input and outputs (G,H,R) where G,H and R are descriptions of the respective
groups deﬁned above. Consider the following experiment for given algorithms GGen,
A and parameter κ:
Experiment ExpSPA,GGen(κ):
1. (G,H,R) ←− GGen(κ)
2. (r, h) ←− A(G,H,R, g) where r ∈ R,h ∈ H and g U←− G
3. The output of the experiment is deﬁned to be 1 if z = r · h and 0 otherwise.
This experiment deﬁnes the Splitting Problem, SP, (relative to GGen).
Next, we recall the Subgroup Membership Problem (SMP). Let GGen′ be a PPT
algorithm that takes a security parameter κ as input and outputs descriptions (G,H)
of a non-trivial, proper subgroup H of a (not necessarily Abelian) ﬁnite group G.
Consider the following experiment for a given algorithm GGen′, algorithm A and
parameter κ:
Experiment ExpSMPA,GGen′(κ):
1. (G,H) ←− GGen′(κ)
2. Choose b
U←− {0, 1}. If b = 1: g ←− G \H. Otherwise: g ←− H.
3. d ←− A(G,H, g) where d ∈ {0, 1}
4. The output of the experiment is deﬁned to be 1 if d = b and 0 otherwise.
This experiment deﬁnes the Subgroup Membership Problem, SMP, (relative to GGen′)
which, informally, states that given (G,H, g) where g ←− G, one has to decide
whether g ∈ H or not.
It is easy to see that if one can eﬃciently solve the Splitting Problem for (G,H,R),
one can also solve the Subgroup Membership Problem for (G,H): Let g ∈ G be
the challenge of the SMP for (G,H). By using the SP-solver, we can compute
σ(g) = (r, h) and we have the relation that g ∈ H if and only if r = 1. So deciding
whether g ∈ H amounts to deciding whether r = 1 which is easy since the neutral
element 1 of R is always included in the description of R (cf. Section 2.1).
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4.1.2. The Splitting Oracle-Assisted Subgroup Membership Problem
We introduce the Splitting Oracle-Assisted Subgroup Membership Problem (SOAP),
which is situated in the same setting as the Splitting Problem (recall the groups
Ĝ,G,H,R) and consists of two phases. In the ﬁrst phase the adversary is given ac-
cess to an oracle OĜ,G,H,RSP (·) that either solves the Splitting Problem for (G,H,R)
or outputs the special symbol ⊥ if the input was not an element of G. In the sec-
ond/challenge phase, the adversary has to solve the Subgroup Membership Problem
for (G,H). Formally, we let GGen be a PPT algorithm that takes a security param-
eter κ as input and outputs descriptions (Ĝ,G,H,R) of a non-trivial, proper normal
subgroup H of a group G that is itself a subgroup of a ﬁnite group Ĝ and a system
of representatives R ⊆ G of G/H. As before, we assume that the descriptions also
contain an eﬃcient algorithms for sampling from G \H. We consider the following
experiment for a given algorithm GGen, algorithm A = (A1,A2) and parameter κ:
Experiment ExpSOAPA,GGen(κ):
1. (Ĝ,G,H,R) ←− GGen(κ)
2. s ←− AO
̂G,G,H,R
SP (·)
1 (Ĝ,G,H,R) where s is a state of A1
3. Choose b
U←− {0, 1}. If b = 1: g ←− G \H. Otherwise: g ←− H
4. d ←− A2(Ĝ,G,H,R, s, g) where d ∈ {0, 1}
5. The output of the experiment is deﬁned to be 1 if d = b and 0 otherwise.
This experiment deﬁnes the Splitting Oracle-Assisted Subgroup Membership Problem
(relative to GGen), denoted by SOAP. We note that the splitting oracle OĜ,G,H,RSP (·)
does not solve a random instance of SP, but rather solves the Splitting Problem for
(G,H,R) which are the parameters of the corresponding SMP the adversary has
to solve in the challenge phase. Therefore, we say that the splitting oracle solves
the static Splitting Problem (SSP), while “static” in this context refers to the SMP
instance the adversary has to solve in the SOAP game. In fact, a very special case
of SOAP occured in [84], where Lipmaa introduces a dedicated notation. We follow
his approach and sometimes denote SOAP by SMPSSP.
4.1.3. The Subset Membership Problem
The Subset Membership Problem (SSMP) was introduced by Cramer and Shoup
in [29] and is a generalization of the SMP. Let SGen be a PPT algorithm that takes
a security parameter κ as input and outputs descriptions (S,N ) where N is a non-
trivial, proper subset of a ﬁnite set S. As in the setting of SMP, we assume that the
descriptions contain an eﬃcient algorithm for sampling from the set S \N . Consider
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the following experiment for a given algorithm SGen, algorithm A and parameter κ:
Experiment ExpSSMPA,SGen(κ):
1. (S,N ) ←− SGen(κ)
2. Choose b
U←− {0, 1}. If b = 1: z ←− S \N . Otherwise: z ←− N .
3. d ←− A(S,N , z) where d ∈ {0, 1}
4. The output of the experiment is deﬁned to be 1 if d = b and 0 otherwise.
This experiment deﬁnes the Subset Membership Problem SSMP (relative to SGen)
which, informally, states that given (S,N , z) where z ←− S, one has to decide
whether z ∈ N or not.
4.2. Characterizing IND-CPA Security
4.2.1. Group Homomorphic Encryption
Let E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be a GHE scheme with the group C of all encryptions
and the subgroup C1 of all encryptions of the neutral element 1. We want to show
a necessary condition for E to be IND-CPA secure. More precisely, we show that
if E is IND-CPA secure, then the SMP is hard for (C, C1) (i.e., relative to KeyGen).
The sampling algorithms for the groups C and C1 are the ones inherited from the
encryption algorithm of E . In particular, sampling an element c from C\C1 is done by
choosing a random message m ∈ P with m = 1 and then computing c as Encpk(m; r)
for r ←− Rnd. First, we prove the following helpful result.
Lemma 3 If E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is a GHE scheme, we have for any two mes-
sages m,m′ ∈ P and ρ ∈ Rnd:
Cmm′ = Encpk(m; ρ) · Cm′ (as sets) (4.1)
Proof: “⊃”: Recall that Cmm′ = {c ∈ C | Decsk(c) = mm′} by deﬁnition. Now, for
c′ ∈ Cm′ , we have that Decsk(Encpk(m; ρ) · c′) = mm′ since E is group homomorphic.
This implies that Encpk(m; ρ) · c′ ∈ Cmm′ , which shows the ﬁrst inclusion.
“=”: By the ﬁrst inclusion, we know that Cmm′ ⊃ Encpk(m; ρ) · Cm′ . But Lemma 2
tells us that |Cmm′ | = |Cm′ | which equals |Encpk(m; ρ) · Cm′ |. This, however, yields
the set equality Cmm′ = Encpk(m; ρ) · Cm′ .

The next Theorem shows the aforementioned necessary condition for a GHE scheme
to be IND-CPA secure.
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Theorem 5 (Necessary Condition on IND-CPA Security) For a GHE scheme
E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) we have:
E is IND-CPA secure =⇒ SMP is hard (relative to KeyGen).
Proof: We prove the Theorem by contradition and show that if we have a PPT
algorithm A that breaks the hardness of SMP with non-negligible advantage Γ(κ),
we can construct (in PPT) an algorithm B that breaks the IND-CPA security with
non-negligible advantage. To this end, we ﬁx an SMP-adversary A and construct
an IND-CPA-adversary B = (B1,B2).
We start by letting B1 choose m0 = 1 ∈ P and a random message m1 ←− P
with m = 1. Next, B1 sends the two messages m0,m1 to the IND-CPA-challenger.
The challenger chooses a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and returns the ciphertext c ←−
Encpk(mb). Then, B2 simply relays the ciphertext c to the SMP-adversary A who
will output a bit d ∈ {0, 1}, which in turn is forwarded by B2 to the IND-CPA-
challenger.
It remains to be shown that d = b with a non-negligible advantage, i.e., that∣∣∣∣Pr [Expind-cpaB,KeyGen(κ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ is non-negligible.
By the assumption on A, we know that A’s advantage is non-negligible, namely
Γ(κ). Moreover, the ciphertext c is formatted as in SMP so A behaves as in the
SMP-game (it is either a fresh encryption of 1 or of a random message diﬀerent from
1), meaning that d = b with advantage
∣∣∣Pr [ExpsmpA,KeyGen(κ) = 1]− 12 ∣∣∣, i.e.,∣∣∣∣Pr [Expind-cpaB,KeyGen(κ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣Pr [ExpsmpA,KeyGen(κ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ = Γ(κ).
This concludes the proof of the Theorem. 
The converse of this Theorem, however, does not hold in general as the following
example shows.
Example (SMP Hard  IND-CPA Security) We construct a GHE scheme
that is not IND-CPA secure, but whose corresponding SMP is hard. To this end,
let E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be an IND-CPA secure GHE scheme with a plaintext
group P that is exponentially large in the security parameter such that the sam-
pling algorithm contained in the description of P that samples according to the
uniform distribution—for instance, this property is satisﬁed by the ElGamal cryp-
tosystem [36]. By Theorem 5, we know that the SMP relative to KeyGen is hard.
Now, the idea is to slightly modify E such that the corresponding SMP remains hard
but the IND-CPA security can be easily broken. Therefore, we ﬁx a public value
r∗ ∈ Rnd, a public message m∗ ∈ P, and construct a scheme E∗ which is exactly the
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same as E , except for the encryption algorithm. We denote the encryption algorithm
of E∗ by Enc∗ and deﬁne it as follows:
Encryption. Enc∗ takes the public key pk, a message m, and a random value




∗) , if m = m∗
Encpk(m; r) , otherwise.
Recall that r∗ ∈ Rnd and m∗ ∈ P are ﬁxed and public values corresponding to E∗.
Our new scheme E∗ certainly is not IND-CPA secure: Assume an adversary
chooses two messages m0,m1 ∈ P where m0 = m∗. Upon the retrieval of an encryp-
tion c of either of the two messages, the adversary checks whether c = Encpk(m; r
∗).
If so, she knows that m0 was encrypted, while otherwise, c encrypts the message
m1.
On the other hand, we see that the SMP corresponding to E∗ is still hard: Recall
that in the SMP game, the challenger ﬂips a coin b ∈ {0, 1}. If b = 1, the challenger
samples a randomly chosen message m
U←− P with m = 1 (recall that sampling
from P is done according to the uniform distribution) and sends c = Enc∗pk(m) to an
SMP-adversary. If b = 0, the challenger simply sends c = Enc∗pk(1) to the adversary.
It is obvious that this SMP instance (using Enc∗) behaves exactly in the same way as
our orginial SMP game (with Enc) corresponding to E if b = 0. But also if b = 1, it is
clear that the advantage of an adversary in the SMP with Enc∗ is negligibly close to
the advantage of an adversary in the SMP with Enc. This is due to the fact that the
plaintext space is exponentially large in the security parameter and the particular
message m∗ will only be chosen with a negligible probability. Therefore, the two
games SMP with Enc∗ and SMP with Enc are computationally indistinguishable,
and so our SMP corresponding to E∗ is hard.
4.2.2. Shift-Type Group Homomorphic Encryption
We have seen in the previous section that, in general, we cannot achieve an equiv-
alence between the IND-CPA security of a given GHE scheme and the hardness of
SMP. Therefore, we restrict our attention to a certain large subclass of GHE schemes
where we are actually able to prove such an equivalence.
Deﬁnition 12 (Shift-Type GHE) A GHE scheme E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is said
to be of shift-type, if the ﬁrst component of the output of KeyGen (i.e., any public
key pk) contains a description of an eﬃcient injective homomorphism ϕ : P −→ Ĉ
such that for all plaintexts m ∈ P, we have:
Encpk(m; r) = ϕ(m) · Encpk(1; r).
Moreover, we require that an eﬃcient description of the inverse of ϕ on im(ϕ) is
also contained in the public key pk, while we denote this inverse on im(ϕ) by ϕ−1.
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Theorem 5 tells us that if a shift-type GHE scheme is IND-CPA secure, then the
corresponding SMP is hard. We show that the converse holds as well.
Theorem 6 (Characterization of IND-CPA Security) For a shift-type GHE
scheme E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) we have:
E is IND-CPA secure ⇐⇒ SMP is hard (relative to KeyGen).
Proof: “⇐”: Assume that E is not IND-CPA secure, i.e., there exists a PPT algo-
rithm Acpa = (Acpa1 ,Acpa2 ) that breaks the security with non-negligible advantage
f(κ). We derive a contradiction by constructing a PPT algorithm Asmp that suc-
cessfully solves SMP with advantage 12f(κ).
Since SMP and IND-CPA are both considered relative to KeyGen, Asmp can simply
forward the public key pk of the output of KeyGen(κ) to Acpa1 . Next, Acpa1 outputs
two messages m0,m1 ∈ P and sends them to Asmp. The SMP challenger chooses
a bit b
U←− {0, 1} and sends the challenge c ∈ C to Asmp, who then chooses a bit
d
U←− {0, 1} and sends the challenge cd := ϕ(md) · c to Acpa2 . Now, Acpa2 outputs a
bit d′ and sends it back to Asmp which sends b′ := d⊕ d′ to the SMP challenger.
We have the following relations: If b = 0, then c ∈ C1 and cd ∈ Cmd (a fresh
encryption of md) by deﬁnition. Hence, Acpa2 makes the right guess with advantage
f(κ), i.e., Pr [b′ = b|b = 0] ≥ 12 + f(κ). If b = 1, then c ∈ C \ C1, meaning that it is a
fresh encryption of some random message m = 1 (by deﬁnition of the set C). But ϕ
is a homomorphism and so cd is a fresh encryption of (the random message) md ·m.




























“⇒”: This direction was proven in Theorem 5. 
4.2.3. Somewhat and Fully Homomorphic Encryption
Similarly to the group homomorphic case, we deﬁne the notion of shift-type for
SWHE schemes and can actually show a similar IND-CPA security characterization.
Deﬁnition 13 (Shift-Type Homomorphic Encryption) A SWHE scheme E =
(KeyGen,Enc,Dec,Eval) is of shift-type, if for every output (pk, sk) of KeyGen(κ),
the plaintext space P and the ciphertext space Ĉ are (multiplicatively written) non-
trivial groups such that the public key pk contains a description of a subset N ⊆ Ĉ
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and an eﬃcient injective homomorphism ϕ : P −→ Ĉ so that for all plaintexts
m ∈ P,
Encpk(m) outputs ϕ(m) · n, where n ←− N .
Moreover, we require that an eﬃcient description of the inverse of ϕ on im(ϕ) is
also contained in the public key pk, while we denote this inverse on im(ϕ) by ϕ−1.
As for shift-type GHE schemes, we denote the set of all encryptions by
C := {Encpk(m) | m ∈ P} ⊆ Ĉ
and sometimes call its elements fresh ciphertexts/encryptions. Since ϕ is a homo-
morphism, we know that N is actually a subset of C. Moreover, we use the notation
Cm := {c ∈ C | Decsk(c) = m}
to denote the set of fresh ciphertexts decrypting to m ∈ P. In particular, we have
N = C1 in this notation. We are now in a position to prove a characterization of
IND-CPA security of shift-type SWHE schemes. More precisely, we show that if a
shift-type SWHE scheme E is IND-CPA secure, then the SMP is hard for (C, C1)
(i.e., relative to KeyGen), and vice versa. The sampling algorithms for the sets C
and C1 are the ones inherited from the encryption algorithm of E . In particular,
sampling an element c from C \ C1 is done by choosing a random message m ∈ P
with m = 1 and then computing c as Encpk(m; r) for r ←− Rnd.
Theorem 7 (IND-CPA Security of Shift-Type Schemes) For a shift-type ho-
momorphic encryption scheme E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec,Eval) we have:
E is IND-CPA (rel. to KeyGen) ⇐⇒ SSMP is hard (rel. to KeyGen)
Proof: “⇐”: Assume that E is not IND-CPA secure, i.e. there exists a PPT algo-
rithm Acpa = (Acpa1 ,Acpa2 ) that breaks the security with non-negligible advantage
f(κ). We derive a contradiction by constructing a PPT algorithm Assmp that suc-
cessfully solves SSMP with advantage 12f(κ).
Since SSMP and IND-CPA are both considered relative to KeyGen, Assmp can
simply forward the public key pk of the output of KeyGen(κ) to Acpa1 . Next, Acpa1
outputs two messages m0,m1 ∈ P to Assmp. The SSMP challenger chooses a bit
b
U←− {0, 1} and sends the challenge c ∈ C to Assmp, who then chooses a bit d U←−
{0, 1} and sends the challenge cd := ϕ(md) · c to Acpa2 . Now, Acpa2 outputs a bit d′
and sends it back to Assmp which sends b′ := d⊕ d′ to the SSMP challenger.
We have the following relations: If b = 0, then c ∈ N = C1 and cd ∈ Cmd (a fresh
encryption of md) by deﬁnition. Hence, Acpa2 makes the right guess with advantage
f(κ), i.e., Pr [b′ = b|b = 0] ≥ 12 + f(κ). If b = 1, then c ∈ C, meaning that it is a
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fresh encryption (by deﬁnition of the set C) of some random message m. But ϕ is
a homomorphism and so cd is a fresh encryption of (the random message) md ·m.




























“⇒”: For the converse, we assume that there is a PPT algorithm Assmp that solves
SSMP with advantage f(κ). Similarly to what we have done above, we construct a
PPT algorithm Acpa = (Acpa1 ,Acpa2 ) that successfully breaks the IND-CPA security
with advantage f(κ).
Again as above, Acpa1 forwards the output of KeyGen(κ) to Assmp. Next, Acpa1
outputs two random messages m0,m1 ∈ P. The IND-CPA challenger chooses a bit
b
U←− {0, 1} and sends the challenge cb ←− Encpk(mb) to Acpa2 , who then computes
c := ϕ(m−10 ) · cb ∈ C and sends the challenge c to Assmp. Now, Assmp returns a bit
d′ to Acpa2 that then outputs b′ := d′ to the IND-CPA challenger.
We have the following relations: If b = 0, then c ∈ C1 = N and Assmp guesses b
with advantage f(κ), i.e., Pr [b′ = b|b = 0] ≥ 12 + f(κ). If b = 1, then c is a random
element in C and Assmp guesses b again with advantage f(κ), i.e., Pr [b′ = b|b = 1] ≥
1










b′ = b|b = β] · Pr [b = β]
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Recall that leveled FHE schemes are based on bootstrappable SWHE schemes (cf.
Section 3.2). The previous Theorem characterizes all shift-type SWHE schemes,
meaning that Theorem 2 shows that if the underlying bootstrapple scheme is of
shift-type and the corresponding SSMP is hard, then the resulting leveled FHE
scheme is IND-CPA secure. In fact, we show that the converse holds as well.
Theorem 8 Let E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec,Eval) be a bootstrappable scheme for a set
of gates Γ. For parameter d = d(λ), let E(d) denote the output of the transformation
from Theorem 1 applied to E and d. For all parameters d, it holds:
E(d) is IND-CPA secure ⇐⇒ E is IND-CPA secure.
In particular, if E is of shift-type, we have:
E(d) is IND-CPA secure ⇐⇒ SSMP is hard (rel. to KeyGen).
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Proof: For the ﬁrst part of the Theorem, we have:
“⇐”: This is Theorem 2.
“⇒”: If A is a PPT adversary that successfully breaks the IND-CPA security of E ,
then A can also be used to break the IND-CPA security of E(d). By looking at the
details of the tranformation of Theorem 1 (see Fact 2), we know that in the IND-
CPA security game for E(d), A receives the public key pkd, outputs two messages
m0,m1 ∈ P and gets the ciphertext c ←− Encpkd(mb) as the challenge ciphertext,
where b
U←− {0, 1}. Due to the initial assumption on A, A can guess the bit b with
non-negligible advantage.
The second part of the Theorem follows immediately by the ﬁrst part together with
Theorem 7. 
For “pure” FHE schemes, the situation is a bit more involved due to the circular
security that the underlying bootstrappable scheme must satisfy. At least we can
show the following:
Theorem 9 Let E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec,Eval) be a bootstrappable scheme for a uni-
versal set of gates Γ. If the resulting scheme E∗ of the transformation in Theorem 3
is circuit-private, it holds that
E∗ is IND-CPA secure ⇐⇒ E is circular secure.
Proof: “⇐”: This is Theorem 4.
“⇒”: We assume that E is not circular secure, i.e., there exists a PPT algorithm
Acircular that breaks the security of E with non-negligible advantage f(κ). We derive
a contradiction by constructing a PPT algorithm Acpa = (Acpa1 ,Acpa2 ) that success-
fully breaks the IND-CPA security of E∗ with advantage f(κ).
First, the adversary Acpa1 receives the public key pk∗ = (pk, sk1, . . . , sk) where
ski ←− Encpk(ski) and sk1, . . . , sk is the representation of the secret key sk as ele-
ments of P. Then, Acpa1 chooses messages 0 = m0 ∈ P and m1 := 0 together with
circuits Ci such that Ci(m0, ski) = ski and Ci(m1, ski) = m1 for all i = 1, . . . , . For
instance, if we consider all boolean circuits and assume that P = {0, 1}, Acpa1 could
simply choose m0 = 1,m1 = 0 and Ci as a single AND-gate for all i = 1, . . . , .
Now, the IND-CPA challenger chooses a random bit b
U←− {0, 1} and sends the chal-
lenge c ←− Encpk(mb) to Acpa2 . Since E∗ is fully homomorphic, Acpa2 can compute
σi ←− Evalpk(Ci, c, ski) for all i = 1, . . . , . Due to the correctness condition on E∗,
this means for all i = 1, . . . , :
σi := Decsk(σi) = Ci(mb, ski). (4.2)
Next, Acpa2 sends (pk, σ1, . . . , σ) to Acircular that returns a bit d ∈ {0, 1} which in
turn is the output b′ of Acpa2 , i.e., b′ = d.
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We have the following relations: If b = 0, then σi is computationally indis-
tinguishable (since E∗ was assumed to be circuit-private) from a fresh encryp-
tion of ski, meaning in particular that σi = ski for all i = 1, . . . ,  due to equa-
tion (4.2). Hence, Acircular makes the right guess on b with advantage f(κ), i.e.,
Pr [b′ = b|b = 0] ≥ 12 + f(κ). If b = 1, then σi is computationally indistinguishable
from a fresh encryption of 0, unrelated to pk, for all i = 1, . . . , . Hence, Acircular
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Remark 1 We would like to stress that Theorem 9 actually holds in a more general
context as well. Looking at the proof, one notices that there is no need for E∗ to
be circuit-private for all circuits. The circuit privacy is only needed for the special
circuits Ci used in the proof. In particular, in the case when only boolean circuits
are considered and the plaintext space is P = {0, 1}, the circuits Ci are all the same,
namely a aingle AND-gate.
When dealing with the construction of “pure” FHE schemes, one usually assumes
that the IND-CPA security of the underlying bootstrappable SWHE scheme already
implies the circular security. Making this assumption allows us to characterize shift-
type, circuit-pricate FHE schemes by their corresponding SSMP.
Corollary 1 Let E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec,Eval) be a shift-type bootstrappable scheme
for a universal set of gates Γ. If the resulting scheme E∗ of the transformation
in Theorem 3 is circuit-private and assuming that the IND-CPA security of E is
equivalent to its circular security, then it holds that
E∗ is IND-CPA secure ⇐⇒ SSMP is hard (rel. to KeyGen).
Proof: This is an immediate consequence of Theorems 7 and 9. 
4.3. Characterizing IND-CCA1 Security
We have seen in Section 3.1 that homomorphic encryption schemes cannot be IND-
CCA2 secure, meaning that IND-CCA1 is the strongest security notion for such
schemes. In this section, we want to analyse the IND-CCA1 security notion of GHE
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schemes in detail. In fact, we will give a characterization of the IND-CCA1 security
in terms of the splitting-oracle assisted subgroup membership problem, SOAP (cf.
Section 4.1.2) in the case of shift-type GHE with decryption error (see Deﬁnition 2).
We note that similar characterizations for general GHE schemes as well as for SWHE
schemes are not known but also unlikely to exist. For the latter, this is due to the
missing group theoretic structure in SWHE schemes, which would lead to a non-
meaningful characterization. For non-shift-type GHE schemes, the problem is that,
in general, we have no eﬃcient splitting of the group C of all encryptions into C1 and
some other group R (i.e., we cannot eﬃciently compute a system of representatives
of C/C1).
Recall that for a given shift-type GHE scheme E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec), a public
key pk includes (Ĉ, C, C1,P, ϕ, ϕ−1). But for any plaintext m ∈ P, we have that
ϕ(m) ∈ Cm, i.e., im(ϕ) is a system of representatives of C/C1 by Lemma 2. Therefore,
the public key pk (with R = im(ϕ)) is a valid input to the SOAP experiment and
we can consider SOAP relative to KeyGen in this way.
Theorem 10 (Characterization of IND-CCA1 Security) For every shift-type
GHE scheme E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) with decryption error, we have:
E is IND-CCA1 secure ⇐⇒ SOAP is hard (relative to KeyGen)
Proof: “⇐”: We assume that E is not IND-CCA1 secure, i.e., there exists a PPT
algorithm Acca1 = (Acca11 ,Acca12 ) that breaks the security with non-negligible ad-
vantage f(κ). We derive a contradiction by constructing a PPT algorithm Asoap =
(Asoap1 ,Asoap2 ) that successfully solves SOAP with advantage 12f(κ).
Since SOAP and IND-CCA1 are both considered relative to KeyGen, Asoap1 can
simply forward the public key pk of the output of KeyGen(κ) to Acca11 . If Acca11
queries the decryption oracle for a decryption of some ciphertext c ∈ Ĉ, Asoap1 asks
the oracle OĈ,C,C1,RSP (c) on input c (with R = im(ϕ)) which outputs the element
σ(c) = (r, n) ∈ R × C1 if c ∈ C and ⊥ otherwise. In the former case, it is readily
seen that m := ϕ−1(r) is the correct decryption of c, since E is of shift-type. Asoap1
forwards this plaintext m to Acca11 . In the latter case, Asoap1 simply forwards ⊥ to
Acca11 .
After the query phase of Acca11 is over, Acca11 outputs two messages m0,m1 ∈ P to
Asoap2 . The SOAP challenger chooses a bit b U←− {0, 1} and sends the challenge c ∈ C
to Asoap, who then chooses a bit d U←− {0, 1} and sends the challenge cd := ϕ(md) · c
to Acca12 . Now, Acca12 outputs a bit d′ and sends it back to Asoap2 which sends
b′ := d⊕ d′ to the SOAP challenger.
We have the following relations: If b = 0, then c ∈ C1 and cd is a correct encryption
of the message md. Hence, Acca12 makes the right guess with advantage f(κ), i.e.
Pr [b′ = b|b = 0] ≥ 12 + f(κ). If b = 1, then c ∈ C \ C1 and cd is an encryption of a
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random message. Hence, Acca12 guesses d with no advantage, i.e. Pr [b′ = b|b = 1] =
1




























“⇒”: For the converse, we assume that there is a PPT algorithm Asoap = (Asoap1 ,Asoap2 )
that solves SOAP with advantage f(κ). Similarly to what we have done above, we
construct a PPT algorithm Acca1 = (Acca11 ,Acca12 ) that successfully breaks the IND-
CCA1 security with advantage f(κ).
First, Acca11 forwards the part (Ĉ, C, C1, R = im(ϕ)) of the output of KeyGen(κ)
to Asoap1 . If Asoap1 queries the oracle OĈ,C,N ,RSP (c) on input c ∈ Ĉ, Acca11 asks the
decryption oracle for a decryption of c that outputs the plaintext m := Decsk(c)
if c ∈ C and ⊥ otherwise. In the former case, we notice that ϕ(m) ∈ R and so
Acca11 sends the correct Splitting Problem solution (ϕ(m), ϕ(m) · c−1) to Asoap1 . In
the latter case, Acca11 simply forwards ⊥ to Asoap1 . After the query phase of Asoap1
is over, Acca11 outputs two randomly chosen messages m0,m1 ∈ P. The IND-CCA1
challenger chooses a bit b
U←− {0, 1} and sends the challenge cb ←− Encpk(mb) to
Acca12 , who then computes c := cb ·ϕ(m0)−1 ∈ C and sends the challenge c to Asoap2 .
Now, Asoap2 returns a bit d′ to Acca12 that then outputs b′ := d′ to the IND-CCA1
challenger.
We have the following relations: If b = 0, then c ∈ C1 and Asoap2 guesses b with
advantage f(κ), i.e. Pr [b′ = b|b = 0] ≥ 12 + f(κ). If b = 1, then c ∈ C \ C1 and Asoap2
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Construction of Homomorphic Encryption
While the previous chapter was concerned with the characterization of the security
of homomorphic encryption schemes, we next want to characterize such schemes in
terms of their design and to give new constructions. Hence, we start this chapter by
providing a universal blueprint for shift-type GHE schemes with decryption error.
This means that any such scheme is an instatiation of our blueprint and so we know
exactly how to construct a new scheme—we just have to put the proper parameters
into our blueprint. Essentially, our result says that we can take any hard instance of
SMP (or SOAP, respectively) and our blueprint will output an IND-CPA (or IND-
CCA1, respectively) secure GHE scheme. Later on, we will use this to construct
new GHE schemes with unique properties that turn out to be very beneﬁcial in
outsourcing computations as we will see in Chapter 7.
5.1. Universal Blueprint for Shift-Type Group Homomorphic
Encryption with Decryption Error
We give a universal blueprint for the design of shift-type GHE schemes with decryp-
tion error. More precisely, we ﬁrst deﬁne an abstract public-key encryption scheme
that we show to be shift-type group homomorphic. Then, we prove that any given
shift-type GHE scheme with decryption error is an instance of our abstract scheme.
Due to its generality, we call our abstract scheme the Generic shIFt-Type (GIFT)
scheme.
Deﬁnition 14 (GIFT Scheme) GIFT is deﬁned as a public-key encryption scheme
EGIFT = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) with
Key Generation: KeyGen takes a security parameter κ as input and outputs a tuple
(pk, sk) where pk is the public key that contains descriptions of
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• a non-trivial group P of plaintexts and a non-trivial group Ĉ of ciphertexts
together with a non-trivial subgroup C ≤ Ĉ that will act as the set of
encryptions
• a non-trivial, proper normal subgroup N of C such that |C/N| = |P|
• an eﬃcient isomorphism ϕ : P −→ R where R ⊆ C (not necessarily a
subgroup but certainly a group, cf. Fact 1) is a system of representatives
of C/N (ϕ−1 is eﬃciently computable as well),
and sk is the secret key that contains
• an eﬃcient description of the epimorphism ν : C −→ R such that ν(c) is
the unique representative r ∈ R with c = r · n for some n ∈ N .
• an eﬃcient function δ : Ĉ −→ {0, 1} such that δ(c) = 1 ⇐⇒ c ∈ C.
Encryption: Enc takes the public key pk and a message m ∈ P as input and outputs
the ciphertext c := ϕ(m) · n ∈ C where n ←− N .
Decryption: Dec takes the secret key sk and a ciphertext c ∈ Ĉ as input. If δ(c) = 0,
it outputs ⊥, otherwise it outputs the plaintext ϕ−1(ν(c)) ∈ P.
Remark 2 In GIFT we know that 1 ∈ N ,1 so
C1 = {c ∈ C | ϕ−1(ν(c)) = 1} = {c ∈ C | ν(c) = 1}
= {c ∈ C | c−1 · 1 ∈ N} = N ,
i.e., N is the group of all encryptions of 1.
Next, we prove that GIFT indeed is a shift-type GHE scheme with decryption error,
and that every such scheme can be described in terms of GIFT.
Theorem 11 (Generality) Any shift-type GHE scheme with decryption error can
be described in terms of GIFT, and vice versa.
Proof: We start by proving that the GIFT scheme EGIFT = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is a
shift-type GHE scheme with decryption error. By the deﬁnition of EGIFT, it is easy
to see that Encpk has the shift-type structure and that the scheme has a decryption
error (as there is a decision function δ). Therefore, it suﬃces to show the correctness
of the scheme and that Decsk is a group epimorphism on C.
The correctness can be readily seen, since we know by deﬁnition that ν(r) = r for
all r ∈ R, which implies that ν(ϕ(m)) = ϕ(m) and ν(n) = 1 for all m ∈ P and all
n ∈ N . Using that ν and ϕ are homomorphisms, this yields for all m ∈ P :
ϕ−1(ν(ϕ(m) · n)) = ϕ−1(ν(ϕ(m)) · ν(1)) = ϕ−1(ϕ(m) · 1) = m.
1Recall that we denoted the representative in R of 1 · N by 1 (see Fact 1).
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Clearly, Decsk|C = ϕ−1 ◦ ν is an epimorphism since it is the composition of two
epimorphisms with im(ν) = dom(ϕ−1).
Conversely, let E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be an arbitrary shift-type group homomor-
phic scheme and let (pk, sk) be an output of KeyGen(κ). We deﬁne N := C1, which
is a proper normal subgroup of C by Lemma 2 and we set R := im(ϕ). Now, by
Lemma 2, we know that R is a system of representatives of C/N . Then, we also
know that |P| = |R| = |C/N|. Since N is deﬁned as C1, sampling from N is done by
computing Encpk(1; r) for some random r ∈ Rnd. Therefore, the shift-type property
of E ensures that the encryption algorithm Enc is a form as required in our GIFT
scheme.
All remaining compontents of GIFT are given as follows: By considering ν : C → R
as ν := ϕ ◦ Decsk|C , one easily sees that Decsk(c) = ϕ−1(ν(c)), if c ∈ C. Otherwise,
i.e., if δ(c) = 0, we have Decsk(c) = ⊥. In particular, when deﬁning ν in this way, ν
is an epimorphism. Hence, we have successfully described E in terms of GIFT. 
We have the following immediate consequence:
Corollary 2 If we denote the GIFT instantiation (according to Theorem 11) of a
given shift-type GHE scheme E with decryption error by GIFT(E), we have that
1. E is IND-CPA secure ⇐⇒ GIFT(E) is IND-CPA secure,
2. E is IND-CCA1 secure ⇐⇒ GIFT(E) is IND-CCA1 secure.
Proof: The ﬁrst part is Theorem 6, while the second is Theorem 10. 
In total, we have shown that, concerning shift-type GHE schemes with decryption
error, we can always restrict our attention to their GIFT instantiations.
5.2. Weakening the Underlying Assumption: The k-Linear
Problem
We use our universal blueprint in order to construct the ﬁrst IND-CPA secure GHE
scheme that is provably secure under the decisional k-linear (DLINk) assumption,
for k ∈ N. Basing cryptographic tools on this assumption is of great value for a
couple of reasons [66,103]:
1. It is a natural generalization of DDH (in particular: DLIN1 = DDH),
2. DLINk is provably hard in the generic group model, and
3. even if DLINk is easy, DLINk+1 remains provably hard in the generic group
model.
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The ﬁnal point means that the k-linear assumption is getting weaker with larger
values for k. So by choosing the parameter k for the GHE scheme we construct in
this section, we can weaken the underlying assumption for the scheme’s security. In
other words, we can make the scheme more secure in this sense.
Moreover, we introduce a new assumption with provably the same characteristics
in the generic group model as DLINk, under which we show the IND-CCA1 security
of our proposed scheme. We start by recalling some basics about DLINk.
The k-Linear Problem
Fix k ∈ N. Let Ĉ := C := Gk+1 where G is a cyclic group of prime order
p, generated by g. Furthermore, we choose ai
U←− Z∗p for i = 1, . . . , k and set
N := {(ga1r1 , . . . , gakrk , g
∑k
i=1 ri) | ∀i = 1, . . . , k : ri ∈ Zp} and R := 〈1〉k × G.
Clearly, |N | = pk, |R| = p and N ∩R = {(1, . . . , 1)}. Therefore, R is a system of rep-
resentatives of C/N (the isomorphism is given by (1, . . . , 1, gr) → (1, . . . , 1, gr) · N ).
The splitting map σ : C → R×N for (C,N , R) is given by
(c1, . . . , ck+1) →













Now, the computational k-linear problem (CLINk) is deﬁned as the SP for (C,N , R)
while the decisional k-linear problem (DLINk) is deﬁned as the SMP for (C,N ). As
a new problem, we deﬁne DLINSCLINkk as the SOAP for (Ĉ, C,N , R) where SCLINk
is the static-CLINk, i.e. it is deﬁned with respect to the public parameters of the
underlying DLINk problem in DLIN
SCLINk
k .
Theorem 12 (On the Hardness of DLINSCLINkk ) We have:
1. If DLIN
SCLINk+1
k+1 is easy, then so is DLIN
SCLINk
k , and
2. DLINSCLINkk is hard in the generic group model.
Proof: The ﬁrst statement is trivial, while the second holds since DLINSCLIN11 is hard
in the generic group model [84], and so DLINSCLINkk is hard in the generic group
model by using the ﬁrst statement. 
Additionally, we have the following result.
Theorem 13 (DLINSCLINkk in the Generic Group Model) In the generic group
model, we have the following Progressive Property:
If DLINSCLINkk is easy, then DLIN
SCLINk+1
k+1 is still hard.
5.2. Weakening the Underlying Assumption: The k-Linear Problem 39
Proof: Let G be a cyclic group of prime order p. Similarly to Shacham’s proof [103] of
the progressive property of DLINk, we prove an even stronger result than Theorem 13
by using multilinear maps [15]. We call an eﬃcient map ek : G
k → GT k-multilinear,
if ek(z
r1
1 , . . . , z
rk
k ) = ek(z1, . . . , zk)
∏k
i=1 ri for all z1, . . . , zk ∈ G and r1, . . . , rk ∈ Zp.
In what follows, we show that in generic groups featuring a (k + 1)-multilinear
map DLINSCLINkk is easy, but DLIN
SCLINk+1
k+1 is hard. This result implies Theorem
13.
We make extensive use of Shacham’s paper [103], starting with a trivial conse-
quence of one of his results. In Lemma B.1 of [103] it is shown that when given a
(k + 1)-multilinear map, there is an eﬃcient algorithm for deciding DLINk. Imme-
diately, this yields:
Corollary 3 Given a (k + 1)-multilinear map, there is an eﬃcient algorithm for
solving DLINSCLINkk .
Next, we give an upper bound on the success probability of an DLINSCLINkk -adversary
in the presence of a k-multilinear map. We proof this results along the lines of [103]
(wherein a similar results is proven for DLINk).
Lemma 4 If a q-step (q ≥ 2k) adversary A solves DLINSCLINkk in the generic
group model (featuring a k-multilinear map), then its success probability is at most
q·(q+2k+4)2
2p .
Proof: First, we stress that the computational k-linear problems are all equivalent
to each other [103], and we can therefore restrict our attention to the problem
DLINSCDHk . Now, let g0 be a generator of G, and a1, . . . , ak, y
U←− Zp. We set
gi := g
ai
0 for i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and g := gy0 . Furthermore, let r1, . . . , rk, s U←− Zp and
d
U←− {0, 1}, and set Td := gy
∑k
i=1 ri
0 and T1−d := g
s
0. The adversary A is ﬁrst










0 , . . . , g
akrk
0 , T0, T1. (5.1)
Upon reception, A outputs a bit d′ and wins, if d′ = d.
Let Q ≤ q be the number of queries made by the adversary to the SCDH oracle.
In the generic group model, the SCDH oracle is equivalent to the multiplication with
the element y (cf., [84]). So in the challenge phase, the adversary A does not only
get the opaque representations for the elements in (5.1), but also representations of
gy
2
0 , . . . , g
yQ+1
0 . As usual in the generic group model [87], we have an algorithm B
that, internally, keeps track of elements handled by A as polynomials in the ring
Zp[A1, . . . , Ak, Y,R1, . . . , Rk, S] and, externally, describes these as arbitrary opaque
strings in some suﬃciently large domain. It maintains these two representations in
two lists {(Fi, ξi)} and {(FT,i, ξT,i)} for elements of G and GT , respectively. We
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assume that the domain for external representations is large enough so that, except
with negligible probability, A can only query for elements it previously obtained from
B, and B never outputs the same opaque representation for two diﬀerent elements.
Now, in the challenge phase, A is provided with elements that B internally repre-
sents by the following polynomials:
g0 : F = 1, g1 : F = A1, . . . , gk : F = Ak, g : F = Y, . . . , g
yQ+1 : F = Y Q+1
and gr11 : F = A1R1, . . . , g
rk
k : F = AkRk, T0 : F = T0, T1 : F = T1.
On these elements to which A is given opaque representations, A can perform the
following operations by using B:
• Group Action: On input two elements of G, internally represented as F1 and
F2, B adds F ′ := F1+F2 to the representation list of G (if not already there),
and outputs with the corresponding external representation. The group action
for GT is handled analogously.
• Inversion: On input an element of G, internally represented as F , B adds F ′ :=
−F to the representation list of G (if not already there), and outputs with
the corresponding external representation. The inversion for GT is handled
analogously.
• Multilinear Map: On input k elements ofG (internally represented as F1, . . . , Fk)
B adds F ′ := ∏ki=1 Fi to the representation list of GT (if not already there),
and outputs with the corresponding external representation.
We see that for all F on the representation list for G, we have deg(F ) ≤ q, while for
all FT on the representation list for GT , we have deg(FT ) ≤ 2k. After placing the
remaining q −Q queries (recall that A is allowed to make q steps in total) to these
operations, it outputs its guess d′ for d.
Now, B chooses a1, . . . , ak, y, r1, . . . , rk, s U←− Zp. If we set
A1 := a1, . . . , Ak := ak, Y := y, R1 := r1, . . . , Rk := rk, (5.2)
Td := y ·
∑k
i=1 ri, T1−d := s, (5.3)
the simulation engineered by algorithm B is consistent with these values unless there
are two distinct polynomials F1 and F2 on the representation list for G or two distinct
polynomials FT,1 and FT,2 on the representation list for GT that take on the same
value under the assignment above. It remains to show that A cannot construct such
a collision independently of the choice of the random values and that the probability
that the choice of random values produces a collision is bounded. We recall that A
additionally has the opaque representations of y2, . . . , yQ+1 due to the SCDH oracle.
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The probability that there are at least two equal values among y, y2, . . . , yQ+1
is negligible in p, and since all the random values are independent of each other,
except for the value of Td = y ·
∑k
i=1 ri, the adversary A must produce a mul-
tiple of Y ·∑ki=1Ri, say F = XY ∑ki=1Ri for some non-zero X, only by using
the terms in (5.2) and (5.3). Clearly, any monomial that can be produced from
A1, . . . , Ak, Y, . . . , Y
Q+1, A1R1, . . . , AkRk, Td, T1−d by using the above described op-
erations is divisible by Ai if it is divisible by Ri for each i = 1, . . . , k. Furthermore,
for every i, each monomial in the expansion of XY Ri in F = XY
∑k
j=1Rj must be
divisible by Ai, hence Ai | X (a formal proof of this fact is given in [103]). There-
fore, F is divisible by the k + 2 monomials A1, . . . , Ak, Y and Ri for some i. Since
A only knows Y and its powers Y 2, . . . , Y Q+1, and since no term AaAb is known
to A for any a, b, forming F would require taking the product of at least k + 1 of
the polynomials available to the adversary. But the multilinear map only allows for
forming the product of at most k terms. Thus, A cannot produce F and is hence
unable to cause a collision.
Finally, we give an upper bound for the probability that a random choice of the
values a1, . . . , ak, y, r1, . . . , rk, s causes the same value on two distinct polynomi-
als. Since the degrees of the polynomials in the representation list of G are upper
bounded by q, the probability that two such polynomials have the same evaluation
for some random values is at most qp (over the choice of values) (cf., [105, Lemma
1]). Analogously, this probability is at most 2kp for polynomials in the representa-
tion list of GT since the degrees of these are upper bounded by 2k. In the challenge
phase, the two representation lists consist together of 2k +Q+ 4 values. When the
adversary A does its remaining q −Q queries, the lists contain at most q + 2k + 4
values, and the success probability of A is bounded by(









In particular, constant success probability requires q = Ω( 3
√
p) steps. 
Therefore, we have proven Theorem 13 by taking Corollary 3 and Lemma 4 to-
gether. 
The Cryptosystem and Its Security
Let Ĉ, C, N , R, g and the ai’s be as in the previous section, and let δ : Ĉ −→ {0, 1}
be deﬁned as δ(c) = 1 for all c ∈ Ĉ = C. Furthermore, we set P := G. We have the
isomorphism ϕ : P → R given by m → (1, . . . , 1,m) and the epimorphism ν : C →
R given by (c1, . . . , ck+1) →
(






. We have successfully
deﬁned all the ingredients for GIFT for a ﬁxed k ∈ N. The resulting cryptosystem
can be summarized as follows:
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Key Generation: Input. Security parameter κ. Output. sk = (a1, . . . , ak) and
pk = (p, g, g1 := g
a1 , . . . , gk := g
ak ) where ai
U←− Z∗p for i = 1, . . . , k and g is a
generator of a cyclic group G of prime order p such that κ is the length of the
binary representation of p.
Encryption: Input. Public key pk and plaintext m ∈ G. Output. Ciphertext c with
c := (gr11 , . . . , g
rk
k ,m · g
∑k
i=1 ri) where ri
U←− Zp for i = 1, . . . , k.
Decryption: Input. Secret key sk and ciphertext c = (c1, . . . , ck+1) ∈ Gk+1. Output.





When instantiated with k = 1 the above cryptosystem is ElGamal (cf. Seciont 6.1.1),
while for k = 2 it is the linear encryption scheme introduced in [13]. For the security
of the introduced cryptosystem, Theorems 6 and 10 yield:
Corollary 4 The above cryptosystem is IND-CPA secure (resp. IND-CCA1 secure)
if and only if DLINk (resp. DLIN
SCLINk
k ) is hard.
5.3. Dedicated Homomorphic Encryption: The Double
Decryption Mechanism
There are certain application scenarios, where a dedicated type of homomorphic
encryption is needed. Here, we consider a concrete example taken from practice
that involves a company having many employees (e.g., an insurance company) with
a certain hierarchy among them, and in particular with some master authority (e.g.,
the head of the company) that sits at the top of this hierarchy. Most of the company’s
data is stored on some central servers where hierachical access control is enforced
by using encryption. But it happens occasionally that some employees leave the
company or new people are being employed, and so every employee should get her
own public and corresponding private keys. In this scenario, the company should be
concerned with the following challenges:
• To avoid expensive key management, employees should be able to generate
their own key pairs without getting in touch with the master authority.
• If an employee leaves the company or loses her keys (this concerns both the
public and the private key), the master authority still wants to be able to
recover all data. Hence, the master authority needs some master secret (in-
dependent of the employees’ individual private keys) that allows to decrypt
any data stored on the company’s servers. Moreover, the master authority
should be able to check whether a ciphertext has been encrypted under a
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given employee’s public key. This is relevant, for instance, in the following
case: Assume an unavailable employee (for whatever reason, maybe due to
quitting) left some important data on the server, e.g., an encryption of an
important decision (1 for ‘yes’ and 0 for ‘no’). The master authority needs
to know this decision, but at the same time needs to verify whether it was
encrypted by the respective employee, i.e., under her public key. In fact, an
encryption under the wrong employee’s public key might lead the master to a
wrong decision.
• Additionally, in practice there is often the requirement that the used cryp-
tosystem has a certain malleability property or is even homomorphic.
The just described scenario is a typical application of so-called additively homo-
morphic encryption schemes with a double decryption mechanism (DD-PKE) [49]
which combine all the above properties in just one cryptosystem. Roughly speak-
ing, such schemes have two independent, additively homomorphic decryption proce-
dures. Currently2, there exist two homomorphic DD-PKE schemes in the literature:
CS-Lite by Cramer and Shoup [29] and a variant called BCP by Bresson, Catalano
and Pointcheval [20]. Looking at these two schemes in detail, one notices two major
weaknesses:
1. In the BCP cryptosystem, in order for the master authority to decrypt a given
ciphertext, it has to know the employee’s public key under which it was created.
This fact contradicts to the requirement that the company does not want to
do any complex key management (and in fact simply does not see the public
keys in general).
2. Furthermore, both cryptosystems have the drawback that the master authority
is unable to check whether a given ciphertext was encrypted under a given
public key. This also contradicts the requirements of the above scenario. We
note here that the authors of [20] left such “ciphertext validity checks” of the
master authority as an open question.
In this section, we propose the ﬁrst additively homomorphic DD-PKE scheme that
avoids both just mentioned drawbacks: It is User-Independent (i.e., the master
decryption procedure is independent of the public keys of the employees/users) and
it allows the master to detect invalid ciphertexts (i.e., given a ciphertext and a user’s
public key the master can check whether the ciphertext was encrypted under the
given public key).
Our solution is based on elliptic curves over rings ZN2 where N = pq is some
RSA-modulus, and we prove its semantic security under a Decisional Diﬃe-Hellman
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(DDH) related assumption on such curves. We refer the reader to Section 2.2 for
the necessary background on elliptic curves over rings. Finally, we discuss diﬀerent
possible choices of elliptic curves in the setup of our cryptosystem. Since these
choices might have an eﬀect on the security of our scheme, we also consider randomly
chosen curves (which we require to have an order with at least two large prime
factors). For this, one has to rely on a conjecture by Galbraith and McKee [47]
about the likelyhood of hitting on such curves. Therefore, we made a substantial
number of experiments to get an idea on the eﬃciency of our setup algorithm for
randomly chosen curves. Since there are only a few experimental results on this
matter in the literatue, our results might be of independent interest.
Related Work
Since the ﬁrst eﬃcient, additively homomorphic encryption scheme was proposed by
Paillier [93] a lot of follow-up papers appeared in this area (see [41] for a survey). In
particular, there were many approaches to construct such schemes by using elliptic
curves (see Galbraith’s elliptic-curve-based Paillier scheme [46] and the references
therein). While we are only interested in additively homomorphic encryption (i.e.,
it is possible to evaluate the addition of plaintexts over their encryptions without
knowledge of the private key), much attention is recently being devoted to the topic
of fully homomorphic encryption [18, 52], which allows for the evaluation of any
circuit over encrypted data without being able to decrypt.
Besides the great many of works on homomorphic encryption, there are several
constructions of (non-homomorphic) DD-PKE schemes [49,116]. In this regard, we
note that although identity-based encryption [14,104] is related to DD-PKE, therein
the master secret is essential in order to generate the users’ private keys (in DD-PKE
only some publicly known master information is needed, so there is no interaction
between the users and the master).
Finally, we mention the only two existing schemes [29] and [20] which are both
additively homomorphic and have a double decryption mechanism.
5.3.1. The Notion of (User-Independent) Double Decryption
We start by recalling what it means for an encryption scheme to have a double de-
cryption mechanism. We do this along the lines of Galindo and Herranz’s work [49].
Deﬁnition 15 A public key encryption scheme with a double decryption mecha-
nism (DD-PKE) is a tuple (Setup,KeyGen,Enc,Dec,mDec) of PPT algorithms such
that
Setup: Setup(κ) takes a security parameter κ as input and outputs a tuple (PP,MK)
where PP contains the public system parameters (particularly includes descrip-
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tions of the plaintext space P and the ciphertext space Ĉ), and MK is the master
secret key which is only known to the master entity.
Key Generation: KeyGen(PP) takes the system’s public parameters PP as input and
outputs a pair of public/private keys (pk, sk) to a user.
Encryption: Enc(PP,pk)(m) takes the public parameters PP, a user’s public key pk
and a message m ∈ P as input and outputs a ciphertext c ∈ C.
User Decryption: Dec(PP,sk)(c) takes the public parameters PP, a user’s secret key
sk and a ciphertext c ∈ Ĉ as input and outputs either a plaintext m ∈ P or the
special symbol ⊥.
Master Decryption: mDec(PP,MK,pk)(c) takes the public parameters PP, the master
secret key MK, a user’s public key pk and a ciphertext c ∈ Ĉ as input and
outputs either a plaintext m ∈ P or the symbol ⊥.
For such schemes, we require the usual correctness condition in public key encryption
schemes both for the user decryption and the master decryption. It should be noted
that by combining the system’s public parameters in the user’s public keys, we can
think of a DD-PKE scheme as being a usual encryption scheme that additionally
has a master decryption procedure (that uses the master secret key). Also, we stress
that the notion of semantic security is exactly the same as that for usual public-key
encryption schemes. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the key generation algorithm
KeyGen does not get the master secret MK as input.
Next, we introduce the notion of User Independence in the context of such DD-
PKE schemes, which basically means that the master entity can decrypt any given
ciphertext even without knowing the corresponding receiver (i.e., the user’s public
key under which it has been encrypted). In other words this means that the master
decryption is independent of the users.
Deﬁnition 16 A DD-PKE scheme is user-independent (UI-DD-PKE) if the master
decryption does not get the user’s public key as an input, i.e., it only gets the system’s
public parameters, the master secret and a ciphertext as input.
5.3.2. Our Construction
We introduce a new public key cryptosystem with a simple structure that combines
a couple of unique properties in a single scheme. Due to its many properties, we
will restrict our attention to the scheme’s formal deﬁnition and proof of correctness
in this section, and deal with its properties in the next section. In order to formally
deﬁne our cryptosystem, we need the following two facts:
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Proposition 1 If N = pq is some RSA-modulus, i.e., p and q are primes of about
the same bit length κ, then there is an eﬃcient construction of elliptic curves E :
y2z = x3 + axz2 + bz3 over ZN2 such that M := lcm(#E(Zp),#E(Zq)) has at least
two large (of about the same size as p and q) prime factors.
Proof: There are three diﬀerent methods to construct such elliptic curves, which
have direct inﬂuence on the system’s eﬃciency and applicability. We therefore put
the proof of this proposition in a section on its own (see Section 5.3.5). 
Lemma 5 As in Proposition 1, let M ∈ N have at least two large prime factors
(of about κ bits). If π(M) denotes the product of all small prime factors (including




[gcd(s,M) = 1] is negligible in κ,
where Π(M) := {s ∈ ZN2 \ {0} | gcd(s, π(M)) = 1}.




i be the product (r ≥ 2) of all large (of about κ
bits) prime factors in M , i.e., M = π(M) · L(M). By deﬁnition, we have that
Pr [gcd(s,M) = 1 for s ∈ Π(M)] = Pr
[
s ∈ ZL(M) \ Z∗L(M)
]
. But if ϕ denotes Eu-
ler’s totient function, we have
#Z∗L(M) = ϕ(L(M)) =
r∏
i=1











However, the fractions 1pi are negligible in κ, and so the product of all these is
negligibly close to 1. Therefore, we have
Pr
[





= 1− (1− negl(κ)) = negl(κ),
where negl(κ) denotes a negligible function in κ. 
Deﬁnition 17 (Our Cryptosystem) Our cryptosystem is deﬁned as follows:
Setup: Setup(κ) computes an RSA-modulus N = pq where p and q are primes of
about the same bit length κ and constructs an elliptic curve E : y2z = x3 +
axz2+ bz3 over ZN2 such that E has the properties as described in Proposition
1. Furthermore, it chooses a point Q = (x : y : z) ∈ E(ZN2) whose order
divides M = lcm(#E(Zp),#E(Zq)).3
It outputs the public parameters PP := (N,π(M), a, b,Q) and the master secret
key MK := M . The plaintext space is P = ZN and the ciphertext space is
Ĉ = 〈Q〉 × 〈Q,P1〉.
3This can be done by taking a random point Q′ = (x′ : y′ : z′) ∈ E(ZN2) and setting Q := NQ′.
See also Section 5.3.5.
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Key Generation: KeyGen(PP) chooses s ∈ Z∗M at random and computes R := sQ.
This can be done by sampling s ∈ Π(M) (which is possible as π(M) is included
in PP), since then s ∈ Z∗M holds with overwhelming probability by Lemma 5.4
It outputs the user’s public key pk := R and secret key sk := s.
Encryption: Enc(PP,pk)(m) chooses a random value r ∈ ZN2 and computes the ci-
phertext (A,B) as
A := rQ and B := rR+ Pm.
5










Concerning the correctness of both decryption procedures, we see that
Dec(PP,sk)(Enc(PP,pk)(m)) =







M−1 mod N = m
by using the fact that ordQ divides M , so MR = sMQ = O∞.
Remark 3 1. We stress that the knowledge of M is polynomial-time equivalent
to the knowledge of the factorization of N (cf. [92, Theorem 10]). Therefore,
it is computationally infeasible to compute the master secret key MK from the
public parameters PP.
2. It is also computationally infeasible to compute the user’s secret key from its
public key under the assumption that the Discrete Logarithm Problem is hard
in E(ZN2).
3. Without knowledge of the factorization of N it is computationally infeasible
to ﬁnd a point Q′ on the curve (that diﬀers from linear combinations of the
publicly known points Q,R and P1), because one would need to solve polynomial
equations in ZN2.
4We note that by using Hasse’s bound on #E(Zp) and #E(Zq), we have M ≤ #E(Zp)#E(Zq) ≤
N2.
5We note that if we forget about the first component A of our ciphertexts, then the encryption
looks very similar to Galbraith’s elliptic-curve-based Paillier scheme [46].
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4. We notice that the users’ public keys are not needed in the master decryption
algorithm, and so we have successfully deﬁned a UI-DD-PKE scheme.
5. Finally, we note that the master decryption never fails on a given ciphertext
c ∈ Ĉ, and so it always outputs a message m ∈ P. This is diﬀerent for the
user decryption. It will output ⊥ if x(B − sA) is not divisible by N . We will
show in the next section (Property 2) that this happens if and only if the given
ciphertext is invalid, which users can eﬃciently detect.
5.3.3. Properties of the Cryptosystem
We start with two properties of the cryptosystem that are independent of the choice
of elliptic curves in the setup algorithm as long as these curves satisfy the properties
of Proposition 1.
Property 1 The cryptosystem is additively homomorphic, i.e.,
Dec(PP,sk)(Enc(PP,pk)(m1) + Enc(PP,pk)(m2)) = m1 +m2.
Together with item 4 of Remark 3 this means that the scheme is an additively ho-
momorphic UI-DD-PKE scheme.
Proof: Let m1,m2 ∈ ZN be two plaintexts encrypted as (A1, B1) and (A2, B2),















Property 2 Users can detect invalid ciphertexts.
Proof: By deﬁnition (see also item 3 of Remark 3), a ciphertext c is of the form
(A,B) = (rQ, tQ + Pm) ∈ 〈Q〉 × 〈Q,P1〉 (recall that mP1 = Pm and ordP1 | N ;
cf. Section 2.2). If s denotes a user’s private key, we know that a ciphertext c is
valid if and only if t = rs mod ordQ, which in turn is equivalent to saying that
B − sA = Pm (recall that Pm ∈ 〈Q〉 for all 0 = m ∈ ZN ). 
There are a couple of interesting properties of the cryptosystem that depend on the
actual choice of the elliptic curve in the setup algorithm. We start with the detection
of invalid ciphertexts for the master entity.
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Property 3 If DDHZN2 is hard in E(ZN2) (even when the factorization of N
is known), then the master entity, when given a user’s public key, cannot decide
whether a given ciphertext is a valid encryption under this public key or not.
Proof: Assume that the master can detect invalid ciphertexts which are, by deﬁni-
tion, of the form (A,B) = (rQ, tQ+Pm) ∈ 〈Q〉×〈Q,P1〉. Then we can use this detec-
tion algorithm to solve DDHZN2 as follows: Given a DDHZN2 -tuple (Q, rQ, sQ, tQ),
we just check the ciphertext (A,B) = (rQ, tQ) for validity under the public key sQ.
Clearly, we have:
(A,B) is valid ⇐⇒ (Q, rQ, sQ, tQ) is a valid DDHZN2 -tuple.

There are applications where the master entity should be able to check ciphertexts
for validity as well. This is where pairings come into play. We will see that our
cryptosystem is actually a nice application of hidden pairings – a notion introduced
by Dent and Galbraith [34]. Therein, they present an identiﬁcation scheme as a
cryptographic application which was the only interesting application known until
now. Unfortunately, since our scheme uses elliptic curves with certain properties in
a non-black-box way, we cannot use the construction of a “hidden pairing”-group
of [34] directly, but need to construct our own. Our construction is given in the
following result that we prove in Section 5.3.5:
Lemma 6 There is an eﬃcient construction of an elliptic curve E over ZN2 with
properties as in Proposition 1 together with a point Q ∈ E(ZN2) of large order
dividing M such that
1. if Q1 and Q2 denote the natural reductions of Q to E(Zp) and E(Zq), respec-
tively, we have that ordQ = lcm(ordQ1, ordQ2)
2. we can eﬃciently compute the ‘reduced’ Tate pairings τp and τq on E over Zp
and Zq, respectively.
Since the Tate pairings τp and τq can only be computed if the factorization of N is
known, they are called hidden pairings. Concerning the security of elliptic curves
with properties as in the Lemma, we refer the reader to [48] and [34]. This Lemma
has an interesting consequence on our cryptosystem:
Property 4 Let Q be a point on an elliptic curve E over ZN2 as in Lemma 6. If
our cryptosystem uses E and Q in its public parameters, then the master entity can
detect invalid ciphertexts under a given user’s public key.
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Proof: Let R = sQ be a user’s public key and let (A,B) = (rQ, tQ + Pm) ∈
〈Q〉 × 〈Q,P1〉 be a ciphertext. In order to check the validity of (A,B) under R,
the master entity ﬁrst uses the master secret M to compute the plaintext m (by
using mDec). Since the master knows the factorization of N , it can now compute
the reductions modulo p of Q,R,A and T := B − Pm = tQ in E(Zp) which we
denote by Q1, R1, A1 and T1, respectively. Additionally, let Q2, R2, A2, T2 ∈ E(Zq)
be the respective reductions modulo q. Since the master can eﬃciently compute the
‘reduced’ Tate pairings τp and τq, respectively, it can check whether (Q1, R1, A1, T1)
and (Q2, R2, A2, T2) are valid DDH-tuples in E(Zp) and E(Zq), respectively, in
the usual way (see [45] and [89]). We have the relation that (Q1, R1, A1, T1) is a
valid DDH-tuple in E(Zp) if and only if t = sr mod ordQ1. An analogous relation
holds for the prime q. Together, the Chinese Remainder Theorem over ZordQ yields
that (Q1, R1, A1, T1) and (Q2, R2, A2, T2) are valid DDH-tuples over their respective
prime ﬁelds if and only if t = rs mod ordQ which in turn holds if and only if (A,B)
is a valid ciphertext under R. 
5.3.4. IND-CPA Security
Considering the fact that our cryptosystem is an additive variant of the ElGamal
cryptosystem, it is rather obvious that it is IND-CPA secure under the DDHZN2 -
assumption. Proving the IND-CPA security of additively homomorphic cryptosys-
tems boils down to proving that a random encryption is computationally indistin-
guishable from an encryption of 0 (cf. Section 4.2.2). In our cryptosystem, a random
encryption has the form (rQ, rR+Pm) with randomness r ∈ ZN2 and random mes-
sage m ∈ ZN . An encryption of 0, on the other hand, has the form (rQ, rR) for
randomness r ∈ ZN2 . Now, if we write X = rQ and S = rR + Pm for random-
ness r ∈ ZN2 and random message m ∈ ZN , we see that the IND-CPA security
states: Given points X,R ∈ 〈Q〉 and given a random point S, decide whether
logQ(S) = logQ(X) logQ(R). This problem is the DDHZN2 -problem, except that S
is chosen from a larger group (and not only from 〈Q〉). However, DDHZN2 reduces
to this more general problem.
In practice, from an adversary’s point of view the situation is even worse, since
without knowledge of the factorization of N it is extremely hard to ﬁnd a point
Q′ on the curve at all (that diﬀers from linear combinations of the publicly known
points Q,R and P1), because one would need to solve polynomial equations in ZN2 .
It should be mentioned though that the security highly depends on the order of
the point Q. Therefore, one should always take great care in the setup of the
cryptosystem that the point Q really has large order (of about the same size as the
prime factors of N).
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Finally, we note that concerning the size of the security parameter of our scheme,
we need to ensure that the bit length of the primes p and q is roughly 512 (at
least). This yields a 1024 bit RSA-modulus and so we can assume that factoring
such a large number is indeed hard in practice. Since solving discrete logarithms
on elliptic curves over prime ﬁelds is assumed hard if the bit length of the order of
the underlying prime ﬁeld is about 180, having 512 bits here makes it reasonable to
assume that the DLP is indeed hard on our chosen curves. Such a parameter setting
is similar to the settings of [46] and [34], where it is argued that one can assume
a high level of security while having eﬃcient group operations on the curve at the
same time.
5.3.5. Concrete Setup of the System’s Parameters
The basic goal of this section is to prove Proposition 1 and Lemma 6, i.e., to give
eﬃcient constructions of elliptic curves with the properties as described in the re-
spective claim. Since curves satisfying Lemma 6 will also satisfy Proposition 1, we
start with the latter (Method 1) and then look at which of these curve additionally
satisfy the Lemma (Methods 2 and 3).
Method 1: Random Curves.
Given a security parameter κ (which in practice will be of size 512), the fundamental
idea is to choose two distinct, random primes p and q of about κ bits (so N = pq is
our RSA-modulus) together with two random elliptic curves E1 and E2 over Zp and
Zq, respectively. We require that both E1(Zp) and E2(Zq) have at least one large
prime factor (of about κ bits) – so we discard all curves not having this property and
repeat choosing random curves until we ﬁnd two suitable elliptic curves. Then, by
using standard techniques (i.e., considering E1 and E2 over Zp2 and Zq2 , respectively
(cf. Lemma 7), and then using the Chinese Remainder Theorem), we construct an
elliptic curve E over ZN2 such that M := lcm(#E(Zp),#E(Zq)) has at least two
large prime factors.
We remark that concerning the security of our cryptosystem, this way of con-
structing the elliptic curves prevents an attacker to exploit any particular structure
of the used elliptic curve.
Likelyhood of hitting on such curves. One problem with this approach concerns
the likelyhood of hitting on such curves by random sampling given a prime p. Since
there is no ﬁnal answer to this question in theory, we have to rely on a conjecture by
Galbraith and McKee [47]: First, let us only consider elliptic curves E with prime
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order. It is conjectured that
Pr [#E(Zp) is prime] is asymptotic to cp
1
log p















(l + 1)(l − 2)
)
and the probability is over all random primes p and (a, b)
U←− Z2p \ {(a, b) ∈ Z2p |
4a3+27b2 = 0}. We ran some numerical tests ourselves (see Table 5.1) which conﬁrm
the conjecture in practice.
Bit length of p 64 128 192 256
Pr [#E(Zp) is prime] 1.17 % 0.58 % 0.38 % 0.27 %
Table 5.1.: Numerical probability of hitting on a curve with prime order
As we have discussed before, we actually do not need the curve to have a large
prime order, but only a nearly prime order. Therefore, we can optimize our search
for elliptic curves by using a result by Lenstra [80] that small prime factors appear
with a high probability. The idea is to ﬁx a set S of small primes and allow #E(Zp)
to be divisible by powers of s ∈ S. This increases the probability to hit on a curve
with a large prime dividing the order by a huge factor (e.g., for orders of the form
2k·prime this factor is about 3, while for orders of the form 2k · 3l·prime the factor
is about 5.5 in our numerical results). This was also conjectured by Galbraith and
McKee in [47] and our numerical tests give evidence for this conjecture (cf. Table
5.2).








k · 3l · prime] 6.58 % 3.06 % 2.23 % 1.45 %
Table 5.2.: Numerical probability of hitting on a curve with nearly prime order
Concerning the eﬃciency of constructing curves as in Proposition 1, our experiments
show that for an RSA-modulus of 512 bits (i.e., two primes of about 256 bits) it
takes roughly 15 minutes using MAGMA on a single core of an Intel Xeon running
at 2.5 GHz. For an 1024 bit RSA-modulus, it takes approximately 13 hours per
curve. Allowing primes of up to three dividing the group order, we were able to
generate ﬁve pairs of elliptic curves in approximately two days, while allowing prime
factors of up to 13, this time halves (cf. Table 5.3). Since the Setup algorithm of our
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cryptosystem needs to be run only once, such an eﬃciency is reasonable in practice.
S = {2, 3} S = {2, 3, 5} S = {2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13}
Time 2d 6h 4m 20s 23h 15m 10s 1d 4h 43m 17s
Tested Curves 1298 552 687
Table 5.3.: Numerical results for the runtime of the Setup algorithm for log p = 512 and 5
keys generated, where S := {prime p | p is allowed to divide #E(Zp)}
Performing our cryptosystem’s setup. Recall that for a high level of security
it is not enough to ﬁnd suitable elliptic curves, we should also choose the point
Q ∈ E(ZN2) in the setup to be of large order dividing M = lcm(#E(Zp),#E(Zq))
(cf. Section 5.3.4). The following two lemmata can be used in order to do this:
Lemma 7 For a prime p > 3 and an elliptic curve E over Zp, we can eﬃciently
construct an elliptic curve E′ over Zp2 such that E′(Zp2) has order #E(Zp) · p and
the reduction from Zp2 to Zp induces a group homomorphism from E
′(Zp2) to E(Zp).
Proof: Let E be given by the short Weierstrass equation y2z = x3 + axz2 + bz3
over Zp. The existence of E
′ such that it reduces to E is simple, because it is
suﬃcient to deﬁne E′ by the same Weierstrass equation. Since the discriminant of
E is invertible modulo p it also is modulo p2, thus E′ is an elliptic curve. Due to
the geometric deﬁnition of the elliptic curve group law, the existence of the induced
group homomorphism is obvious. It is left to be proven that this homomorphism is
surjective.
Fix any ﬁnite point P = (x0 : y0 : 1) ∈ E(Zp), then y0 is a solution to the
polynomial equation 0 = y2 − (x30 + ax0 + b). In the case y0 ≡ 0 (mod p) there is
a unique integer 0 ≤ k < p such that (y0 + kp)2 − (x30 + ax0 + b) ≡ 0 (mod p2) by
Hensel’s lifting lemma. The new point (x0 : y0 + kp : 1) obviously reduces to the
initial point. In the case y0 ≡ 0 (mod p) we know that x0 has been a solution for
0 = x3+ax+b (mod p). Since this polynomial cannot have any double roots we can
ﬁnd a solution x0 + kp for the same equation modulo p
2. This proves surjectivity.
To compute the order of E′(Zp2) it is suﬃcient to compute the kernel of the
reduction to E(Zp). Obviously there are exactly p points (kp : 1 : 0) for 0 ≤ k < p on
E′(Zp2) that reduce to the point at inﬁnity on E(Zp). Thus #E′(Zp2) = #E(Zp) · p
holds due to the homomorphism theorem. 
Lemma 8 Let p > 3 be a prime, E be an elliptic curve deﬁned over Zp and P ∈
E(Zp) a point with gcd(ordP, p) = 1. Then the curve E
′(Zp2) constructed as in
Lemma 7 contains a point P ′ of order ordP .
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Proof: Let Q′ be any preimage of P under the reduction map (Q′ can be constructed
following the proof of Lemma 7). By the homomorphism theorem, we have ordP |
ordQ′. Multiplying both points with p permutes the subgroup generated by P on
E(Zp) and P
′ := pQ′ has order ordP ′ = ord pP = ordP since the order of P is
coprime to p. 
Now, the construction of a point Q ∈ E(ZN2) with large order dividing M , where E
is a random curve such thatM has at least two large prime factors (as in Proposition
1), works as follows:
1. Choose a random RSA-modulus N = pq and random elliptic curves E1(Zp),
E2(Zp) with nearly prime order as described before.
2. Pick points P1 ∈ E1(Zp) and P2 ∈ E2(Zq) of high order coprime to p and q.
3. Apply Lemma 7 and 8 to construct elliptic curves E′1 and E′2 with points
P ′1 ∈ E′1(Zp2) and P ′2 ∈ E′2(Zq2) of high order.
4. Use the Chinese Remainder Theorem to merge E′1 and E
′
2 to a single curve E




2 has order lcm(ordP1, ordP2)
and is the point used for the public parameters PP.
Method 2: Supersingular Curves.
A more eﬃcient way to construct elliptic curves that satisfy Proposition 1 is by
using supersingular curves E and particular RSA-moduli N = pq. For such curves
it is known that over a prime ﬁeld Zp we have #E(Zp) = p + 1. We note that the
following discussion can be done for arbitrary supersingular elliptic curves, however,
we restrict our attention to the following family of curves:
Lemma 9 (see [76]) Let p be an odd prime with p ≡ 2 (mod 3) and let 0 = b ∈ Zp.
Consider the elliptic curve E : y2 = x3 + b. Then, E(Zp) is cyclic and #E(Zp) =
p+ 1.
So if we start with a strong prime p (i.e., p + 1 is not smooth) with p ≡ 2 (mod 3)
and setting E to be the curve given by the equation y2 = x3+b for some 0 = b ∈ Zp,
we ensure a large factor in #E(Zp) = p+1. To construct a strong prime p fulﬁlling
the congruence condition it is possible to take a prime p′ of the desired bit length κ
such that p := 6p′ − 1 is also prime.
Now, by using Lemmas 7 and 8, we can construct an elliptic curve together with
a point Q of high order suitable for our cryptosystem in exactly the same way as
we did in Method 1 (items 2 – 4 in the construction therein). We remark that
constructing the elliptic curves in this way gives a very fast and easy setup of our
system.
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Additional property: Hidden pairing. Since supersingular elliptic curves have an
embedding degree of at most k = 6, they allow for an eﬃcient evaluation of the
‘reduced’ Tate pairing, which can then be used to solve DDH-challenges [45, 89].
Therefore, our just constructed elliptic curve E over ZN2 has a hidden pairing [34],
and we can eﬃciently solve DDH if the factorization of N is known. This proves
Lemma 6.
Method 3: Complex Multiplication.
The CM method [10] allows us to construct elliptic curves E together with primes p
and q such that E satisﬁes Proposition 1. Even more, by using extended algorithms
[44], it is possible to construct E over ZN2 such that it has a small embedding
degree over the prime ﬁelds Zp and Zq. This yields another construction satisfying
Lemma 6.
5.3.6. Comparison to CS-Lite and BCP
We recall the two existing group homomorphic DD-PKE schemes CS-Lite [29] and
BCP [20] and compare them with our cryptosystem presented in Section 5.3.2.
Deﬁnition 18 (CS-Lite) CS-Lite is deﬁned as follows:
Setup: Setup(κ) computes an RSA-modulus N = pq in the safe prime setting, i.e.,
p and q are primes such that p = 2p′ + 1 and q = 2q′ + 1 where p′ and q′ are
also prime (the bit length of p is κ). Furthermore, it chooses a random element
μ ∈ Z∗N2, and computes g := −μ2N mod N2. It outputs the public parameters
PP := (N, g) and the master secret key MK := (p, q). The plaintext space is
P = ZN and the ciphertext space is Ĉ = 〈g〉 × 〈g〉.
Key Generation: KeyGen(PP) chooses a ∈ ZordN2/2 at random and computes h :=
ga mod N2. It outputs the user’s public key pk := h and secret key sk := a.
Encryption: Enc(PP,pk)(m) chooses a random value r ∈ ZN/4 and computes the ci-
phertext (A,B) as
A = gr mod N2 and B = hr(1 +mN) mod N2.
User Decryption: Dec(PP,sk)(A,B) outputs
m =
B/(Aa)− 1 mod N2
N
.
Master Decryption: mDec(PP,MK,pk)(A,B) computes
m =
Bcmf(N) − 1 mod N2
N
· π mod N,
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where π denotes the inverse of cmf(N) modulo N .6
The correctness of the scheme can be easily veriﬁed and it is semantically secure
under the DDH Assumption in Z∗N2 (see [29] for details).
Deﬁnition 19 (BCP) BCP is deﬁned as follows:
Setup: Setup(κ) computes an RSA-modulus N = pq in the safe prime setting, i.e.,
p and q are primes such that p = 2p′ + 1 and q = 2q′ + 1 where p′ and q′ are
also prime (the bit length of p is κ). Furthermore, it chooses a random element
g ∈ Z∗N2 of order pp′qq′ such that gp
′q′ mod N2 = 1+kN for k ∈ {1, . . . , N−1}.
It outputs the public parameters PP := (N, k, g) and the master secret key
MK := (p′, q′). The plaintext space is P = ZN and the ciphertext space is
Ĉ = 〈g〉 × 〈g〉.
Key Generation: KeyGen(PP) chooses 0 = a ∈ ZN2 at random and computes h :=
ga mod N2. It outputs the user’s public key pk := h and secret key sk := a.
Encryption: Enc(PP,pk)(m) chooses a random value r ∈ ZN2 and computes the ci-
phertext (A,B) as
A = gr mod N2 and B = hr(1 +mN) mod N2.
User Decryption: Dec(PP,sk)(A,B) outputs
m =
B/(Aa)− 1 mod N2
N
.
Master Decryption: mDec(PP,MK,pk)(A,B) computes the partial discrete logarithms







= 1 +mcmf(N)N mod N2,
and outputs
m =
D − 1 mod N2
Ncmf(N)
mod N.
The correctness of the scheme is an immediate consequence of the correctness of
CS-Lite, and the scheme is also semantically secure under the DDH Assumption in
Z∗N2 (cf. [20, Section 6.1]). The following remark compares the two schemes with
ours:




i is the prime factorization of an
odd number N , cmf(N) equals lcm(pv1−11 (p1 − 1), . . . , pvr−1r (pr − 1)).
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Remark 4 Comparison of the properties of CS-Lite, BCP and our scheme:
1. “Users can detect invalid ciphertexts”
CS-Lite: Yes (see [20, Remark 7]).
BCP: Yes (see [20, Remark 7]).
Our Scheme: Yes (Property 2).
2. “The master entity can detect invalid ciphertexts”
CS-Lite: No. This is only shown by giving a counterexample though (see [20,
Remark 7]).
BCP: No. Same example as for CS-Lite.
Our Scheme: Either yes or (provably) no. The party who runs the cryp-
tosystem’s setup algorithm can decide: If a pairing-friendly elliptic curve is
used, then the master can detect invalid ciphertexts, not only for a small class
(Property 4). Otherwise, we proved (under DDHZN2 ) that the master cannot
detect invalid ciphertexts (Property 3).
3. “User-Independent Double Decryption”
CS-Lite: Yes. This is easily seen in Deﬁnition 18.
BCP: No. The master decryption uses the user’s public key h in an essential
way as it ﬁrst computes the partial discrete logarithm a mod N of h.
Our Scheme: Yes (Item 4 of Remark 3).

6
Security Analysis of Homomorphic Encryption and
Impossibility Results
6.1. Analyzing Existing Schemes
Currently1, there does not exist a single IND-CPA secure homomorphic encryption
scheme that deviates from the shift-type structure as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 13. There-
fore, our results have a strong impact on the security analysis of all existing schemes.
In order to show how our results can be applied to existing schemes, we want to give
a few examples taken from the class of GHE schemes and of FHE schemes.
6.1.1. ElGamal Encryption
In GIFT (cf. Section 5.1), we let Ĉ = C = G × G be the direct product of a cyclic
group G (multiplicatively written) of prime order p with generator g. Since Ĉ = C,
there is a trivial decision function δ : Ĉ → {0, 1} that always outputs 1. We set
P := G and let N = 〈(g, h)〉 be a subgroup of C generated by (g, h) ∈ C where
h := ga for a secret a
U←− Zp. Since N ∩R = {(1, 1)} where R := 〈(1, g)〉 ≤ C with
|R| = p, we know that R is a system of representatives of C/N (the isomorphism is
given by (1, gr) → (1, gr)·N ). Trivially, we have the eﬃcient isomorphism ϕ : P → R
given by gr → (1, gr). Also, we deﬁne an eﬃcient epimorphism ν : C → R given by
(gr, gs) → (1, gs · g−ar). We have successfully deﬁned the ingredients of the public
key pk and the secret key sk as required in GIFT. Clearly, this instantiation of GIFT
is ElGamal [36].
Next, we look at the three subgroup problems for this particular instantiation.
First, recall that a triple of elements (g1, g2, g3) = (g
a, gb, gγ) ∈ G3 is called a Diﬃe-
Hellman triple if γ = a · b. Furthermore, one can easily check that (g2, g3) ∈ N if
and only if (h, g2, g3) is a Diﬃe-Hellman triple. The Splitting Problem for (C,N , R)
is the computational Diﬃe-Hellman (CDH) problem for (h, c1), since the splitting
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map σ : C → R × N is given by (c1, c2) → ((1, c2 · c−a1 ), (c1, ca1)). The Subgroup
Membership Problem for (C,N ) is the decisional Diﬃe-Hellman (DDH) problem
for (h, c1, c2), and SOAP for (Ĉ, C,N , R, δ) is the problem DDHSCDH where SCDH
denotes the static computational Diﬃe-Hellman problem (cf. [84]).
In the ElGamal instantiation, we see that Theorem 6 states that ElGamal is IND-
CPA secure if and only if DDH is hard, while Theorem 10 states that it is IND-CCA1
secure if and only if DDHSCDH is hard. The former characterization was proven
in [107], while the latter was proven in [84], which are both trivial consequences of
our general results.
6.1.2. Damg˚ard’s ElGamal Encryption
Again, we look at a concrete instantiation of GIFT. Here, we let Ĉ = G3 be the
direct product of a prime ordered cyclic group G with generator g, and set P :=
G. Furthermore, we choose random secrets a, b
U←− Zp, compute the values h :=
ga, s := gs and set C := 〈(g, h)〉 × G. For a ciphertext c = (c1, c2, c3) ∈ Ĉ we
see that c ∈ C ⇐⇒ c2 = ca1. Therefore, we have found an eﬃcient decision
function δ : Ĉ → {0, 1}. Next, we set N := 〈(g, h, s)〉 and R := 〈(1, 1, g)〉. Since
N ∩ R = {(1, 1, 1)} and |R| = p, we see that R is a system of representatives
of C/N (the isomorphism is given by (1, 1, gr) → (1, 1, gr) · N ). We immediately
derive an eﬃcient isomorphism ϕ : P → R given by gr → (1, 1, gr) and deﬁne the
map ν : C → R by (gr, hr, gt) → (1, 1, gt · g−br). We have successfully deﬁned the
ingredients of the public key pk and the secret key sk as required in GIFT and easily
see that this instantiation is Damg˚ard’s ElGamal [30].
By considering the Splitting Problem for (C,N , R) in this particular instantiation,
we see that the splitting map σ : C → R × N is given by (c1, c2, c3) → ((1, 1, c3 ·
c−b1 ), (c1, c2, c
b
1)). Therefore, this Splitting Problem coincides with the CDH problem
with parameters (g, s, gr) for random r
U←− Zp. In [84], this problem is denoted by
CDEG. The Subgroup Membership Problem for (C,N ) is the DDH problem with
parameters (g, s, gr , gt) for random r
U←− Zp and t ∈ Zp; In [84], this problem
is denoted by DDEG. Finally, SOAP for (Ĉ, C,N , R, δ) is the problem DDEGSCDEG
where SCDEG is the static CDEG (cf. [84]).
For this instantiation, i.e. for Damg˚ard’s ElGamal, Theorem 6 states that it is
IND-CPA secure if and only if DDEG is hard, while Theorem 10 states that it is
IND-CCA secure if and only if DDEGSCDEG is hard. The former characterization
was proven in [30], while the latter was very recently proven in [84]. Again, we see
that both results are immediate given our general characterizations.
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6.1.3. Paillier Encryption
We brieﬂy recall Paillier’s homomorphic encryption scheme [93] by plugging the
appropriate parameters into GIFT. Therefore, let N = pq be an RSA-modulus and
set Ĉ := C := Z∗N2 , P := Zn and N := {rN mod N2 | r ∈ Z∗N}. Recall the following
homomorphism
Eg : ZN × Z∗N −→ Z∗N2 with Eg(x, y) := gx · yN mod N2
for an element g ∈ Z∗N2 . It is known that Eg is an isomorphism if g = 1+N [23] or,
more generally, if g is a multiple of N [93]. In these cases, there is a unique tuple
(x, y) ∈ ZN×Z∗N for each ω ∈ Z∗N2 with Eg(x, y) = ω. The value x is called the N -th
residuosity class of ω (with respect to g), denoted by ωg. The problem of computing
ωg for given ω ∈ Z∗N2 and g is called the Computational Composite Residuosity
(CCR) problem. Paillier showed that when the factorization of N is known, it is
easy to compute ωg given ω and g. The problem of deciding whether x = ωg,
given ω, g and x, is called Decisional Composite Residuosity (DCR) problem.
In the following, we ﬁx g ∈ Z∗N2 such that Eg is an isomorphism and consider the
subgroup R := 〈h〉 of C generated by h := 1 +N . In [29, Section 8.2.1], it is shown
that R = {1 + aN mod N2 | a ∈ ZN} with |R| = N = |C/N| (in particular, we can
eﬃciently solve discrete logarithms in R due to this simple structure). In fact, R is
a system of representatives of C/N :
Lemma 10 Let π : C → C/N be the canonical epimorphism, i.e. π(c) := c · N .
Then, the map ρ := π|R : R → C/N is an isomorphism, i.e. R is a system of
representatives of C/N .
Proof: Since ρ, as the restriction of π, is a homomorphism and |R| = |C/N|, it
suﬃces to show that ρ is injective. Therefore, let ha mod N2 ∈ ker(ρ) = N ∩R for
some a ∈ ZN , i.e. there exists z ∈ Z∗N such that ha ≡ zN (mod N2). But N is a
group and so there exists an element y ∈ Z∗N such that yN · zN ≡ 1 (mod N2), i.e.
ha ·yN ≡ 1 (mod N2). This in turn implies that Eh(a, y) ≡ 1 (mod N2). But Eh is an
isomorphism, i.e. (a, y) = (0, 1) ∈ ZN × Z∗N which implies ha mod N2 = 1 mod N2
and so ρ is injective. 
Trivially, we have the isomorphism ϕ : P → R given by m → 1 +mN mod N2. By
[93, Lemma 1 and Lemma 2], we know that the “class function” ·g : Z∗N2 → ZN is a
group epimorphism and so the mapping ν : C → R given by c → hcg mod N mod N2
is a group epimorphism. It can be eﬃciently computed when the factorization of N is
known [93, Theorem 1]. Since we can solve discrete logarithms in R very eﬃciently,
computing ν(c) is equivalent to computing cg.
We have successfully deﬁned the public key pk = (N, g) and the secret key
sk = (p, q) in GIFT. The resulting scheme is Paillier’s homomorphic encryption
62 6. Security Analysis of Homomorphic Encryption and Impossibility Results
scheme [93]. Observe that the splitting map σ : C → R × N is given by ω →
(ωg, ω · g−ωg ). We immediately see that the SP in this instantiation is the CCR
problem. Furthermore, N contains by deﬁnition all elements rN mod N2 for r ∈ Z∗N .
Therefore, the SMP for (C,N ) is the DCR problem. As a consequence of Theo-
rems 10 and 6, we get the following characterizations of the security of Paillier’s
scheme:
Theorem 14 (Security Characterization of Paillier) Paillier’s scheme is IND-
CCA1 (resp. IND-CPA) secure if and only if DCRSCCR (resp. DCR) is hard.
We note that DCRSCCR is a new (though naturally arising) problem and so a thor-
ough analysis of its hardness is advisable. However, assuming its hardness seems
reasonable and gives the ﬁrst proof of the IND-CCA1 security of Paillier’s scheme.
Damg˚ard and Jurik proposed an extension of Paillier’s scheme to a generalized
group structure [33]. We stress that we can achieve a similiar characterization of
the IND-CCA1 security of their scheme by applying similar thoughts as the above.
6.1.4. vDGHV Encryption
We brieﬂy recall the SWHE scheme by van Dijk et al. [110] and show that it is
shift-type homomorphic, meaning that we can apply our IND-CPA security char-
acterization of Theorem 7, which then also extends to its FHE transformation by
Theorem 8 (resp. Corollary 1). To get rid of a very voluminous and confusing in-
troduction of parameters, we will ﬁx a particular setup of parameters in the key
generation phase and note that all of the following can be done in a more general
fashion (see [110]). Also, we will focus here on the encryption algorithm only and
refer the reader to [110] for details on the remaining algorithms for decryption and
evaluation. For the security parameter κ, we ﬁx:
ρ := κ, ρ′ := 2κ, η ∈ ρ′ ·Θ(κ log2 κ), γ ∈ ω(η2 log κ) and τ := γ + κ.
The secret key sk of the scheme is p
U←− (2Z + 1) ∩ [2η−1, 2η) and we deﬁne the
following eﬃciently sampleable distribution
Dγ,ρ(p) :=
{
x = pq + r | q U←− Z ∩ [0, 2γ/p), r U←− Z ∩ (−2ρ, 2ρ)
}
.
With this notation, we let pk = (x0, . . . , xτ ) be the public key with xi
U←− Dγ,ρ(p)
for all i = 0, . . . , τ whereas the xi’s are relabeled such that x0 is the largest (if x0 is
even or x0 mod p is odd, then restart). The plaintext space is {0, 1}.
The encryption algorithm takes the public key pk and a plaintext m ∈ {0, 1} as
input and outputs a ciphertext c := [(m + 2r + 2
∑
i∈S xi) mod x0] whereas S is
a random subset of {1, . . . , τ} and r U←− Z ∩ (−2ρ′ , 2ρ′). In the notation of the
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xi) mod x0 | r ∈ Z ∩ (−2ρ′ , 2ρ′), S ⊆ {1, . . . , τ}
}
.
The injective homomorphism ϕ is given by m → m mod x0, which is even a ring
homomorphism. Encryption is then given by ϕ(m) + n where n ∈ N . Concerning
the homomorphic property in Deﬁnition 13, we need to make more eﬀort:
It is shown in [110, Lemma 3.3] that the scheme is homomorphic for Boolean
circuits with the property that for any α ≥ 1 and any set of integer inputs all less
than 2α(ρ
′+2) in absolute value, it must hold that the output of the generalized circuit
(same circuit where the ADD- and MULT-gates are applied to integers instead of
bits) has absolute value at most 2α(η−4). Furthermore, it is shown in [110, Lemma
3.5] that if f(x1, . . . , xt) is the multivariate polynomial of degree d computed by the
generalized circuit of a given boolean circuit C with t inputs, then the scheme is
homomorphic for C if |f¯ | · (2ρ′+2)d ≤ 2η−4, where |f¯ | is the l1 norm of the coeﬃcient
vector of f . In respect of the homomorphic property of Deﬁnition 13, it suﬃces to
show that the scheme is homomorphic for the boolean circuit CADD that consists of
a single ADD-gate only. Clearly, the multivariate polynomial that is computed by
the generalized circuit of CADD is f(x1, x2) = x1 + x2 and has degree d = 1 with
|f¯ | = 2. Therefore, the scheme is homomorphic for this circuit if we have
2ρ
′+3 ≤ 2η−4, which in turn is fulﬁlled if η ≥ ρ′ + 7.
This ﬁnal condition holds as η ∈ ρ′ · Θ(κ log2 κ). In total we have shown that the
above scheme indeed is shift-type homomorphic.
6.2. Impossibility Results on Group Homomorphic
Encryption
Let GGen be a PPT algorithm that takes a security parameter κ as input and outputs
descriptions (G,N ) where N is a non-trivial, proper subgroup of a ﬁnite group G
with an additional algorithm for the eﬃcient sampling from G\N (cf. Section 4.1.1).
Now, assume that for any such algorithm GGen, we can construct an algorithm A
that breaks the hardness of SMP relative to GGen. In particular, for a given group
homomorphic encryption scheme E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) this means that we have
an algorithm A that breaks the hardness of SMP relative to KeyGen. However, by
Theorem 5, this implies that we can construct an algorithm that breaks the IND-
CPA security of E . Since we had no restriction on the encryption scheme E , this
would imply that any group homomorphic encryption scheme E is insecure in terms
of IND-CPA.
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In this section, we ﬁrst show that if a GHE scheme is instantiated with a linear code
as the ciphertext group, it is insecure in terms of IND-CPA. We show this by giving
an attack on the corresponding SMP. Secondly, we show that any GHE scheme is
insecure in the quantum world, at least for the Abelian case. More precisely, we
construct a quantum algorithm that breaks any instance of SMP, if G is Abelian.
In the following, we consider outputs (G,N ) of GGen in the case where G is
Abelian. Before we prove our impossibility results, we need some results on the
sampling of a set of generators of N .
6.2.1. Sampling Group Generators Uniformly at Random
We start this section by assuming that the sampling algorithm for N samples uni-
formly at random. In this case, we can obtain a set of generators for N by sampling
polynomially (in the base-2 logarithm of the order of N ) many times from N . In
order to show this, we need the following technical Lemma.







Proof: We set f(k) := 1 −∏k−1j=0 (1− 2j−k). Now, it is obvious that if k = 1, then
f(k)k+1 = 14 . We prove the Lemma by showing that the function f(k)
k+1 is strictly
monotonically decreasing. We do so by showing that the ﬁrst derivative of this
function is strictly smaller than 0. Therefore, we start by looking at the derivative
of f(k). A sequential application of the product rule yields:
d(f(k))
dk









While using the chain rule on f(k)k+1 yields
d(f(k)k+1)
dk
= f(k)k · d(f(k))
dk
· (k + 1) + ln(f(k)) · f(k)k+1.
But, since 0 < f(k) < 1, we have that the second summand is < 0, while the ﬁrst
summand is < 0 as well, since d(f(k))dk < 0. In total, this shows that f(k)
k+1 indeed
is monotonically decreasing, which proves the Lemma. 
We use Lemma 11 to compute the probability of sampling a small set of generators
for the group Zk2 :
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Proof: Notice that a generating set for Zk2 must contain at least k elements. If
we sample k elements at random, they generate Zk2 if and only if they are linearly
independent as vectors over GF(2). We do the following easy combinatorial thought:
• for k = 1 we only have two elements (0 and 1), so the success probability (i.e.,
the probability of generating Z12 by sampling just one element) is
1
2 ;
• for k = 2 we succeed in spanning all the group if and only if the ﬁrst element is
nonzero (probability 1− 14), and the second element is not linearly dependent
to the ﬁrst, i.e., it does not belong to the subgroup spanned by the ﬁrst element
(which has 2k−1 = 2 elements over a total of 2k = 4 elements in the group,








• analogously, for k = 3 the probability of generating all Z32 by sampling at





















= k + 1 possible diﬀerent
subsets of k elements. The probability that all k+1 elements do not span the whole





and the Theorem follows from Lemma 11. 
This Theorem immediately gives us a lower bound on the probability of sampling a
generating set of an arbitrary group.




[〈x1, . . . , xk+1〉 = G] ≥ 3
4
.
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Proof: We prove this along the lines of [94, Theorem 2.1] and consider the following
random process: Pick a uniform group element x1 ∈ G. If H1 = 〈x1〉 = G, pick a
uniform group elenwnt x2 ∈ G. If H2 = 〈x1, x2〉 = G, pick another group element,




[Hi = Hi+1] = 1− |Hi||G| .
In this case, it holds that |Hi+1|/|Hi| ≥ 2, with an equality when G ∼= Zk2 . Therefore,
if (in the above random process) τ denotes the ﬁrst time we generate the whole group




[〈x1, . . . , xτ 〉 = G] is minimized if G = Zk2.
But by Theorem 15, we know that this probability is ≥ 3/4 if G = Zk2 and τ ≥ k+1,
ﬁnishing the proof. 
We stress that it is well-known that polynomially many samples suﬃce to get a
generating set of Zk2. Our lower bound on the probability, however, improves all
previously known bounds [94].
6.2.2. Breaking the SMP with Uniform Sampling
As in the previous section, we assume that the sampling algorithm for N samples
with the uniform distribution.
Linear Codes
Let F be a prime ﬁeld. Recall that a linear code of length n and rank k is a linear
subspace C ⊆ Fn of the vector space Fn such that dim(C) = k. We want to show
that if G is a linear code, then the SMP (with uniform sampling) is always easy to
break.
Theorem 16 Let (G,N ) be an output of GGen such that the sampling algorithm of
N samples uniformly at random and N is a k-dimensional linear subspace of Fn.
Then, there exists a PPT algorithm A that breaks the SMP for (G,N ).
Proof: We construct a generating set (h1, . . . , hs) of N as follows: We sample s :=
k + 1 times uniformly at random from N . If (h1, . . . , hs) is linearly dependent, we
sample again until we get a linearly independent tuple. This process terminates
after polynomially many steps by Corollary 5. These vectors h1, . . . , hs of N are
vectors in Fn. Therefore, when given an arbitrary element g ∈ G, we can eﬃciently
compute the rank r of the matrix (g, h1, . . . , hs). If r = k, we know that g ∈ N ,
otherwise g ∈ N . 
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This Theorem proves that GHE schemes with a linear code as a ciphertext group
and where the output distribution of the encryption algorithm is the uniform distri-
bution, cannot be IND-CPA secure.
Corollary 6 Let E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be a GHE scheme such that the set of
encryptions C is a k-dimensional linear subspace of Fn and such that the output
distribution of the encryption algorithm is the uniform distribution. Then, E is
insecure in terms of IND-CPA (relative to KeyGen).
In particular this holds if C (or the ciphertext space Ĉ)2 is a linear code.
Proof: By Theorem 5, it suﬃces to break the SMP relative to KeyGen. But this is
exactly what Corollary 6 does. 
We remark that the same attack also works in the following settings, making the
impossibility result more general:
1. If E is also homomorphic with respect to the scalar multiplication in V = Fn
(i.e. decryption is F-linear), we do not need the restriction that F is a prime
ﬁeld.
2. Corollary 6 also holds for arbitrary n-dimensional F-vector spaces V , if there
is a (publicly known) eﬃciently computable isomorphism from V to Fn (the
inversion must be eﬃciently computable as well). We note that this is not
always the case, as is seen by considering the ElGamal encryption scheme (see
Section 6.1.1):
Certainly, the ciphertext group C = G × G of ElGamal is a 2-dimensional
Fp-vector space, where G is an additive cyclic group of prime order p. In
addition, it is easily seen that the group C0 of all encryptions of 0 is in fact
an Fp-subspace of C. So, if there would be a publicly known and eﬃciently
computable isomorphism F : C → F2p, Corollary 6 would break ElGamal.
Fortunately, we can prove that no such isomorphism can exist:
Claim. If there exists an eﬃcient isomorphism F : C → F2p, we can eﬃciently
solve discrete logarithms in G (which is supposed to be hard in the setting of
ElGamal).
Proof: Assume that F : C → F2p is an eﬃciently computable isomorphism. Let
0 = g ∈ G be an arbitrary element of G, i.e., G = 〈g〉. Now, for a given h ∈ G,
we can compute logg(h) by computing logF (g,g)(F (h, h)). This works since F
2F is a prime field and so the notion of subgroups coincides with the notion of F-subspaces (see [78,
Theorem 2.1.8(b)]). Since we assume C to be a subgroup of Ĉ, it follows that if Ĉ is a linear
code, then C is a linear code as well.
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is Fp-linear (i.e., F (h, h) = logg(h)·F (g, g) and so logF (g,g)(F (h, h)) = logg(h))
and solving discrete logarithms in the additive group F2p is easy. 
The Quantum World
It is well-known that Watrous’ modiﬁcation [112] of the famous order-ﬁnding quan-
tum algorithm can eﬃciently ﬁnd the order of an Abelian group, given that we have
its description by a set of generators.
Theorem 17 (Quantum Order-Finding Algorithm with Generators [112])
Let G be a ﬁnite Abelian group with k = log2(|G|). Then, there exists a quantum
algorithm which, given a generating set of G and an error probability ε as an input,
outputs the order of G with probability at least 1− ε in time o(poly(k+ log2(1/ε))).
This Theorem already is suﬃcient to break the hardness of SMP (relative to GGen),
if the description of N contains a set of generators, as the next Theorem shows.
Lemma 12 (Quantum Attack on SMP with Generators) Let (G,N ) be the
output of GGen(κ), for some security parameter κ, such that N contains a set of
generators g1, . . . , gr. Since GGen is a PPT algorithm, this implies that k = k(κ) =
log2(|N |) is a polynomial in κ. There exists a quantum algorithm which, given
g1, . . . , gr (i.e., the description of N ), breaks the hardness of SMP with probability
at least (1− ε)2 in time o(poly(k + log2(1/ε))).
Proof: Let z denote the challenge in the SMP game, i.e., z ∈ G \ N if b = 1, and
z ∈ N otherwise. Since N contains a set of generators g1, . . . , gr, we can run the
quantum algorithm in Theorem 17 twice: the ﬁrst time on the generating set and
the second time on the generating set plus the element z. Provided that both runs
succeed, we have that z ∈ N (i.e., b = 0) if and only if the two subgroup orders,
obtained from the two algorithm runs, are the same. But both runs succeed with
probability (1− ε)2. This proves the Lemma. 
Together with Corollary 5, this Lemma gives us a way to break the SMP if the
sampling algorithm for N samples uniformly at random.
Theorem 18 Let (G,N ) be the output of GGen(κ) with k = log2(|N |), for some
security parameter κ, such that the sampling algorithm in the description of N
samples uniformly at random from N . Then, there exists a quantum algorithm which
breaks the hardness of SMP with probability at least 34 (1− ε)2 in time o(poly(k +
log2(1/ε))), and by sampling only k + 1 times from N .
Proof: This is Lemma 12 together with Corollary 5. 
This gives the following impossibility result for GHE schemes.
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Corollary 7 Let E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be an IND-CPA secure group homomor-
phic encryption scheme with Abelian plaintext and ciphertext groups, such that the
distribution on C1 is the uniform distribution. Then, there exists a quantum PPT
algorithm that breaks the security of E with non-negligible probability.
Proof: This is implied by Theorem 18 and Theorem 5. 
6.2.3. Breaking the SMP with Arbitrary Sampling
We show an extension of the previous section to the general case, where the de-
scription of N only contains a sampling algorithm for N with unknown/arbitrary
distribution D. The main observation to make this extension work (we prove this in
Lemma 13) is that in order to break the SMP for (G,N ) we actually do not have
to sample a generating set for the whole group N , but rather for the “computation-
ally observable” subgroup Ncomp of N . This subgroup is the largest subgroup of N
such that when sampling polynomially many elements from N according to D, these
elements generate the subgroup Ncomp with high probability.
Deﬁnition 20 (Computationally Observable Subgroup) For a ﬁnite Abelian
group N (generated in PPT, with parameter κ, and sampling algorithm with distri-
bution D), we deﬁne the computationally observable subgroup Ncomp of N as the
largest subgroup J of N such that:
∃ p = poly(κ) : Pr
x1,...,xp
D←−N
[〈x1, . . . , xp〉 = J ] is non-negligible in κ.
We say that N is computationally observable iﬀ N = Ncomp.
Note that, for the SMP to be hard, the order of Ncomp is required to be exponentially
large in κ. We show that if we modify the original SMP game by sampling from
Ncomp instead of the whole group N , the diﬀerence between the winning probability
of the resulting game and of the original game is upper bounded by some negligible
function in κ. In order to prove this, we deﬁne a new distribution Dcomp obtained
by D by ‘cutting away’ any occurrence of elements which are in N but not in Ncomp
(by deﬁning the probability on these elements as zero).
Deﬁnition 21 (Computationally Observable Distribution) Let D = (πx)x∈N
be an arbitrary distribution on N , where πx = Pr
z
D←−N
[z = x]. Then we deﬁne the
computationally observable distribution Dcomp as Dcomp := (π′x)x∈N , where
π′x :=
{
0 if x ∈ N \Ncomp,
πx +
σD
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Then we show that the new distribution is statistically indistinguishable from the
original one:
Lemma 13 The variational distance between D and Dcomp is negligible.
Proof: First we compute the variational distance between the two distributions, and
then we show that this distance is negligible in κ:
|D − Dcomp| =
∑
x∈N








Now, assume σD is non-negligible in κ and sample p elements in N from distribution
D (where p is a polynomial from Deﬁnition 20). By deﬁnition of Ncomp there exists




[〈x1, . . . , xp〉 = Ncomp] ≥ μ. (6.1)





[xp+1 ∈ N \Ncomp] ≥ σD, (6.2)




[〈x1, . . . , xp+1〉 = T with T  Ncomp] ≥ μσD.
which is non-negligible. This is a contradiction, since Ncomp was deﬁned as the
largest subgroup of N with such a property. 
Now, by deﬁnition of Ncomp, we ﬁnd a generating set of Ncomp with non-negligible
probability in a polynomial number of calls to the sampling algorithm by deﬁnition,
hence in probabilistic polynomial time.
Linear Codes
As a trivial Corollary of Lemma 13 and Theorem 16, we have:
Corollary 8 Let (G,N ) be an output of GGen such that N is a k-dimensional
linear subspace of Fn. Then, there exists a PPT algorithm A that breaks the SMP
for (G,N ).
This in turn immediately implies our general impossibility result on the use of linear
codes as ciphertext spaces.
Theorem 19 Let E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be a GHE scheme such that the set of
encryptions C is a k-dimensional linear subspace of Fn. Then, E is insecure in terms
of IND-CPA (relative to KeyGen). In particular this holds if C (or the ciphertext
space Ĉ) is a linear code.
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The Quantum World
Additionally, we can also extend our quantum results. An easy consequence from
Lemma 13 and Theorem 12 is the following result.
Corollary 9 (Quantum Attack on SMP with Arbitary Sampling) Let (G,N )
be the output of GGen(κ) with k = log2(|N |), for some security parameter κ. We
denote the distribution of the sampling algorithm contained in the description of N
by D. Then, there exists a polynomial p(κ) and a quantum algorithm which breaks the
hardness of SMP with probability at least 34 (1− ε)2 in time o(poly(k + log2(1/ε))),
and by sampling only p(κ) times from N .
Finally, this Theorem (together with Theorem 5) implies our main result.
Theorem 20 (General Impossibility of GHE in the Quantum World) Let
E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be an IND-CPA secure GHE scheme with Abelian plaintext
and ciphertext groups. Then, there exists a quantum PPT algorithm that breaks the
security of E with non-negligible probability.
We point out that Theorem 17 actually holds for general solvable groups [112], which
is why we believe that also Theorem 20 can be extended to this more general case
as well. However, we do not see any practical relevance of such an extension since
one usually requires some form of commutativity in practical applications.

7
Secure and Eﬃcient Outsourcing of Multiparty
Computations
In this chapter, we consider the following scenario:
1. A set of n mutually distrusting clients P1, . . . , Pn (the number n may change
dynamically over time), each having its own public and private key pair, en-
crypt data under their respective public keys and store these encryptions on a
server C.
2. Any dynamically chosen function (i.e., the function does not need to be spec-
iﬁed at the time data is encrypted) should be computed by C on the clients’
data, while all inputs and intermediate results remain private.
3. Due to the fact that clients are not always online in practice, C needs the
ability to compute these functions without any interaction of the clients. In
particular, this also concerns the clients’ retrieval of results.
4. Once online, individual clients can retrieve the result while the server learns
nothing at all.
For the ﬁrst time, we present a simple and eﬃcient solution to this scenario, meaning
that we give a general-purpose cryptographic protocol (with no client interaction)
that allows outsourcing of any multi-party computation of inputs encrypted under
multiple unrelated public keys. Our solution employs two non-colluding, semi-honest
but untrusted servers C and S. All steps in our protocol rely on no interaction with
the clients whatsoever. These clients only initially store their encrypted inputs on the
(main) server C who in turn can compute any dynamically chosen n-input function
on n given (encrypted) inputs in an SMC protocol together with the second server S.
We show our protocols secure in the semi-honest model, meaning that all protocol
participants follow the protocol description, but may try to gather information about
other parties’ inputs, intermediate results, or overall outputs just by looking at the
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transcripts. For performance reasons, this is the predominant security model used in
practical implementations of SMC [12,24,37,38,50,82,99], which particularly makes
sense in our setting where the servers (performing the computations) are business
driven parties in practice, and cheating would cause negative publicity and harm
their reputation.
Assuming the existence of two non-colluding servers in order to perform the secure
computations is very common both in the theoretical (e.g., [27,32]) and the practical
community (e.g., [24, 38]). In fact, according to [111], a completely non-interactive
solution in the single server setting can be proven to be impossible to realize (drawing
on the impossibility of program obfuscation). Hence, if complete non-interaction of
the clients is required (as in our case), we need at least two servers and so our solution
is the best we can hope for in this regard. Moreover, several real-world applications
relied on the assumption of multiple non-colluding servers in the past [12, 24]. For
instance when considering cloud computing scenarios, the multiple servers could be
diﬀerent cloud providers [86].
We make extensive use of the BCP cryptosystem by Bresson, Catalano and
Pointcheval [20] which is both additively homomorphic (i.e., it allows addition of
plaintexts in the encrypted domain) and oﬀers two independent decryption mecha-
nisms (cf. Section 5.3). The successful usage of the second decryption mechanism
depends on a master secret key that is stored on the second server S in our proposal.
With this in mind, the basic idea of our construction consists of three steps:
1. After collecting the individually encrypted inputs, the main server C runs an
SMC protocol with S in order to transform the given inputs (encrypted under
the clients’ public keys) into encryptions under the product of all involved pub-
lic keys (ensuring that all clients need to participate in a successful decryption)
without changing the underlying plaintexts.
2. With these transformed ciphertexts (under the same public key), we can run
traditional addition and multiplication SMC protocols by using the additively
homomorphic property of the underlying cryptosystem, allowing to compute
any function represented by an arithmetic circuit.
3. Once the result (encrypted under the product of all keys) is ready, C runs a ﬁnal
SMC protocol with S in order to transform this result back into encryptions
under the clients’ respective public keys.
Finally, we show the applicability of our framework to two application scenarios
taken from diﬀerent domains. Recently, SMC protocols have been used to construct
privacy-preserving protocols for face recognition [37,102]. We show how our general-
purpose protocols can be leveraged here in order to get rid of interaction with the
users of such systems. To highlight the real-world applicability of our construction,
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we elaborate on several scenarios in the area of social networks where face recognition
is used for image tagging services [5] or in order to help law enforcement agencies to
prosecute suspected persons [3]. Since social network users usually access their pro-
ﬁles via resource-constrained mobile devices that are not always online, a completely
non-interactive solution is crucial for such systems to work in practice. We adapt
the privacy-preserving face recognition protocol presented in [37] to our construc-
tion and show its practicability by giving an implementation together with a detailed
performance analysis. Similarly, privately collecting sensor readings from smart me-
ters has been an important application of SMC protocols recently [50, 77, 82]. We
show that certain variants of our original proposal can be used to eﬃciently enhance
privacy in smart grids. For instance, we design a protocol to privately aggregate
sensor readings with very low computational costs at the smart meters due to our
non-interactive construction. Additionally, we can realize privacy-preserving billing
under complex policies.
Related Work
Previous papers on SMC protocols were concerned with interactive solutions where
all parties are actively involved in computing an arbitrary function on their respec-
tive inputs in a privacy-preserving manner [25, 63, 83, 99, 114]. Since we strive for
a non-interactive solution, these constructions are not applicable in our scenario.
To reduce computational costs at the clients’ side, SMC has been considered in the
client/server model (as we do) [12, 32, 39, 68, 73, 91], but again with interaction of
the clients during the computations. Furthermore, Choi et al. [27] give a solution
with minimal interaction of the clients, while relying on two non-colluding servers
(as in our construction). Their solution, however, is mostly of theoretical interest
both for eﬃciency reasons and because clients are bound to encrypt their private
inputs under a single public key that is shared between the two servers (so clients
do not have individual private keys). Therefore, in order to eﬃciently deal with
modern star-like communication patterns where clients store their data on a central
server (encrypted under their own associated public keys), Halevi et al. [64] proposed
a solution in which, although being non-interactive, the server is entitled to learn
the result of the computation which contradicts our setting where only clients are
allowed to learn the output.
In [51], Gentry proposes to leverage Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) to
solve the problem statement in our setting. Unfortunately, besides the lack of eﬃ-
ciency of recent FHE schemes [16, 18, 19, 56], the main drawback is that all clients
need to run an interactive setup and an interactive decryption phase after the server
computed the result.
Very recently, Lo´pez-Alt et al. [85] introduced the notion of On-the-Fly SMC as
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the ﬁrst solution to a similar scenario as ours, yet still relying on an interactive
decryption phase. They implement this by using a novel primitive called Multikey
FHE that allows computation on data encrypted under multiple unrelated public
keys, having similar eﬃciency shortcomings as all the other FHE schemes.
In a nutshell, all existing solutions are not applicable in our setting where SMC is
to be performed on data encrypted under multiple unrelated keys, except for one [85]
which lacks in eﬃciency and relies on an interactive user decryption.
7.1. Our Construction
From now on, any occurance of encryption is with respect to the BCP scheme as
deﬁned in Deﬁnition 19. If the context is clear, we omit the public parameters PP in
the algorithms of BCP, e.g., we write Encpk(m) instead of Enc(PP,pk)(m) for a given
message m.
Recall that we are considering a scenario with n (mutually distrusting) clients,
denoted by P1, . . . , Pn, each having its own pair of public and private keys (pki, ski),
i = 1, . . . , n.1 Each client Pi (i = 1, . . . , n) stores private data mi encrypted under
its respective public key pki on an untrusted server C.
Now, C is assigned to compute an arbitrary n-input function f on the clients’
inputs, while keeping the inputs and intermediate results private. We represent such
functions f by means of arithmetic circuits, i.e., the computation of a given function
amounts to the evaluation of addition and multiplication gates over encrypted inputs.
More details on this and other means of representing a function f can be found
in [75].
Our basic idea to realize this functionality can be summarized as follows (illus-
trated in Figure 7.1):
1. We assume the existence of a second untrusted server S that acts semi-honestly
and that does not collude with any of the other parties.
2. Initially, this second server S runs a setup Init that sets up the system and
distributes the system’s public parameters.
3. After this initial setup, clients can use the cryptosystem’s KeyGen (indepen-
dently of any further party) to generate their respective pair of public and
private keys, and to upload encryptions of their private data to the ﬁrst server
C.
1Fixing the number n initially is for reasons of readability only. In fact, in our construction, this
number is allowed to change over time. More importantly, clients are able to generate their own
pair of public and private keys without communicating to some trusted third party. Therefore,
participation in the system is a dynamic process.
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4. Once an (arbitrary) function f is to be evaluated on the, say, n inputsm1, . . . ,mn
of clients P1, . . . , Pn, the server C runs a cryptographic protocol with the sec-
ond server S that consists of only four building blocks: KeyProd,Add,Mult
and TransDec. KeyProd tranforms all ciphertexts to encryptions under a single
public key (whose corresponding secret key is unknown), Add and Mult eval-
uate addition and multiplication gates on encrypted inputs, respectively, and
TransDec transforms the encrypted result f(m1, . . . ,mn) back to n encryptions
each under a diﬀerent client’s public key.
The overall protocol is run with no interaction of the clients whatsoever. Recall
that the inputs m1, . . . ,mn are encrypted under diﬀerent public keys.
5. After all computations are done, each client retrieves the encrypted output of
the server C which it decrypts locally with its respective private key in order
to get the result f(m1, . . . ,mn).
Server SClients P1, . . . , Pn Server C
P1 : (pk1, sk1),m1










f(m1, . . . ,mn)
y =
Pi : recover y as
Decski(Encpki(y))
Encpki(y)
Initpublic params PPpublic params PP
Figure 7.1.: The basic concept of our construction.
In the following, we explain the individual steps of our protocols:
Initialization. Initially, a setup process initializes the BCP cryptosystem and dis-
tributes the system’s public parameters. This setup is run by the second server S
(since S is semi-honest and needs the master secret). We denote this algorithm by
Init, which simply runs the algorithm Setup of the BCP cryptosystem and sends its
public parameters PP = (N, k, g) to the server C (see Figure 7.2).
Data Upload. In order to upload private data to the server C, a client P ﬁrst needs
to receive the system’s public parameters PP = (N, k, g) to be able to generate its
own pair of public and private keys. After these keys are generated, the client P
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Server C
PP = (N, k, g)←−−−−−−−−−−−
Server S
(PP,MK) ←− Setup(κ)
Figure 7.2.: Init(κ). The initial setup algorithm, where κ is the security parameter for the
BCP scheme.
can encrypt its private data using Enc and upload it together with its public key to
the server C. The details of this procedure can be found in Figure 7.3.
Client Pi (for i = 1, . . . , n)
(pki, ski) ←− KeyGen(PP)
(Ai, Bi) ←− Enc(PP,pki)(mi)
where mi is Pi’s private data
PP = (N, k, g)←−−−−−−−−−−−
((Ai, Bi), pki)−−−−−−−−−−−→
Server C
Figure 7.3.: Steps that have to be taken by a client Pi (for i = 1, . . . , n) which wants to
participate in computations made on the server C.
Cryptographic Protocol between Servers C and S. Assume that the server C
wants to compute an encryption of f(m1, . . . ,mn) for an n-input function f where
m1, . . . ,mn are the private inputs of the clients P1, . . . , Pn. Recall that during the
data upload phase, C retrieved only encryptions of the inputs m1, . . . ,mn. C does
its computations by means of a cryptographic protocol between C and S consisting
of the 4 subprotocols: KeyProd, Add, Mult and TransDec.
Recall that we represent the function f by an arithmetic circuit, meaning that
we have to be able to securely evaluate addition and multiplication gates. Addition
gates seem to be easy to deal with since the underlying cryptosystem is additively
homomorphic. Unfortunately though, the clients’ inputs are encrypted under dif-
ferent public keys and the additive property of the BCP cryptosystem only works
for encryptions under the same public key. Therefore, the server C ﬁrst runs the
algorithm KeyProd which transforms all involved ciphertexts to encryptions under
a single key. This single key is the product of all involved public keys and so C
remains unable to decrypt the ciphertexts as it does not know the corresponding
secret key. In fact, the secret key needed to decrypt encryptions under the product
of all clients’ public keys is the sum of all clients’ secret keys. Of course, decryption
still works by using the master secret which is only known to the second server S
and not to C. We stress that S never gets to see encryptions of the clients’ original
inputs but only blinded versions of them, so it does not learn these inputs although
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having the master secret.
After this key-transformation of ciphertexts, the additive property of the underly-
ing cryptosystem can be exploited to securely evaluate addition gates. This step is
denoted by Add in our construction. Multiplication gates can be securely evaluated
by (an adapted version of) the well-known protocol of [28], essentially relying on
“blinding-the-plaintext” techniques. This is done by our protocol Mult.
Finally, once the complete arithmetic circuit representing the function f is suc-
cessfully evaluated by using Add and Mult, C runs the protocol TransDec in order
to transform the results (encrypted under the product of all public keys) back to
encryptions of the individual clients’ public keys without changing the underlying
plaintext.
In the following, we describe the individual building blocks for this protocol be-
tween C and S.
The Subprotocol KeyProd. The purpose of this protocol is to transform the encryp-
tions of all participating clients P1, . . . , Pn into encryptions under a single public key,
namely the product Prod.pk :=
∏n
i=1 pki mod N
2 of all involved public keys without
changing the underlying plaintexts. Using the product key here ensures that it is
not a key of C’s choosing. In fact, the corresponding secret key required to success-
fully decrypt an encryption under Prod.pk is the sum
∑n
i=1 ski of all clients’ secret
keys. This subprotocol needs to be run only once per ﬁxed set of encrypted inputs
and does not depend on the actual function C wants to evaluate. This means that
after the execution of KeyProd, any function can be computed on the transformed
ciphertexts.
For a given ciphertext (Ai, Bi) encrypted under the public key pki of the client Pi
(i = 1, . . . , n), C blinds the ciphertext with a random message τi and sends it to S.
Since S knows the master secretMK, it uses it to decrypt this blinded ciphertext and
re-encrypt it under the product of all clients’ public keys. The result of this is then
sent back to C who can remove the blinding τi again, achieving an encryption under
the product key without changing the underlying plaintext. A detailed description
of these steps can be seen in Figure 7.4.
The Subprotocols Add and Mult. Recall that the server C wants to compute the
function f , which we consider to be represented as an arithmetic circuit over the
ring ZN (note that hitting on a value in ZN which is not invertible modulo N
happens with negligible probability only). Therefore, we have to deal with addition-
and multiplication-gates in ZN . Without loss of generality, we consider these as
2-input-1-output gates. The algorithm Add deals with an addition-gate, while the
subprotocol Mult deals with a multiplication-gate. We start with the former and
stress that it is a non-interactive protocol which does not need the server S. This is
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Server C, stores ((Ai, Bi), pki), i = 1, . . . , n
On input ciphertexts (A1, B1), . . . , (An, Bn):
Prod.pk ←−∏ni=1 pki mod N2
for all i = 1, . . . , n:
Pick random τi
U←− ZN
(Ci, Di) ←− Add((Ai, Bi),Encpki (τi))
for all i = 1, . . . , n:
(Ai, Bi) ←− Add((Wi, Zi),EncProd.pk(−τ))
output the ciphertexts (A1, B1), . . . , (An, Bn)
∀i = 1, . . . , n :−−−−−−−−−−−→
(pki, (Ci,Di))
∀i = 1, . . . , n :←−−−−−−−−−−−
(Wi, Zi)
Server S, stores MK = (p′, q′)
Prod.pk ←−∏ni=1 pki mod N2
for all i = 1, . . . , n:
zi ←− mDec(pki,MK)(Ci, Di)
(Wi, Zi) ←− EncProd.pk(zi)
Figure 7.4.: KeyProd. Transforms encryptions under pk1, . . . , pkn into encryptions under
Prod.pk =
∏n
i=1 pki mod N
2 without changing the underlying plaintexts.
due to the fact that the underlying BCP cryptosystem is additively homomorphic
for encryptions under the same public key. We recall that this is exactly what the
subprotocol KeyProd achieved by computing encryptions under the product Prod.pk,
so all clients’ private inputs m1, . . . ,mn are now encrypted under the same public
key. The algorithm to perform the addition is depicted in Figure 7.5.
Server C stores encryptions
of the form (A,B) encrypted under Prod.pk
On input two ciphertexts (A,B) and (A′, B′):
(A,B) ←− (A ·A′ mod N2, B · B′ mod N2)
output the ciphertext (A,B)
Figure 7.5.: Add. Given two ciphertexts (A,B) and (A′, B′) encrypted under Prod.pk, it
computes an encryption of the sum of the underlying plaintexts.
A multiplication-gate, however, has to be computed interactively with the server
S. In fact, the protocol we use is an adaptation of the well-known multiplication
protocol of [28] which sends blinded version of the original ciphertexts (that are to
be multiplied) to S that in turn uses the master secret to decrypt. Then, S performs
the multiplication in the clear and re-encrypts. The (encrypted) result is sent back
to C, which can remove the blinding again. Details are given in Figure 7.6.
The Subprotocol TransDec. Finally, the task of subprotocol TransDec is to take
the encrypted result of f(m1, . . . ,mn), encrypted under Prod.pk, and to transform
it back to n encryptions of the same plaintext f(m1, . . . ,mn), each under a diﬀerent
client’s public key pk1, . . . , pkn, respectively.
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Server C, stores Prod.pk and pk1, . . . , pkn
On input ciphertexts (A,B) and (A′, B′) under Prod.pk:
Pick random σ, σ′ U←− ZN
(C,D) ←− Add((A,B),EncProd.pk(−σ))
(C′,D′) ←− Add((A′, B′),EncProd.pk(−σ′))
(T1, T2) ←− EncProd.pk(−σσ′)




Server S, stores MK,Prod.pk,
and pk1, . . . , pkn
z ←− mDec(Prod.pk,MK)(C,D)
z′ ←− mDec(Prod.pk,MK)(C′, D′)
(Z1, Z2) ←− EncProd.pk(z · z′)
Figure 7.6.: Mult. Given two ciphertexts (A,B) and (A′, B′) encrypted under Prod.pk, it
computes an encryption of the multiplication of the underlying plaintexts.
Again, the idea is to blind the original ciphertext and send it to S, which in turn
decrypts using the master secret and then creates n encryptions for each client’s
public key. The created ciphertexts are returned to C which removes the blindings.
The precise steps of this protocol are summarized in Figure 7.7.
Server C, stores Prod.pk and pk1, . . . , pkn




for all i = 1, . . . , n:
(Ai, Bi) ←− Add((Wi, Zi),Encpki(−τ))
output the ciphertexts (A1, B1), . . . , (An, Bn)
(C,D)−−−−−→
∀i = 1, . . . , n : (Wi, Zi)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Server S, stores MK,Prod.pk
and pk1, . . . , pkn
z ←− mDec(Prod.pk,MK)(C,D)
for all i = 1, . . . , n:
(Wi, Zi) ←− Encpki (z)
Figure 7.7.: TransDec. Given a ciphertext (A,B), it computes n ciphertexts
(A1, B1), . . . , (A1, B1) of the same plaintext, encrypted under pk1, . . . , pkn, respectively.
Data Retrieval. Each client Pi, i = 1, . . . , n, can get the result of the computation
by ﬁrst retrieving (from C) the encryption of f(m1, . . . ,mn) under its public key pki
that has been computed during the subprotocol TransDec, and then decrypting this
ciphertext by using its corresponding private key ski.
7.1.1. Correctness
We assume that all participants follow our protocol decriptions. Furthermore, we
assume that the initial setup Init has been performed as decribed in Figure 7.2, and
that all clients (wishing to participate) sent their encrypted private data to the server
C as depicted in Figure 7.3. Under these assumptions, we show that the remaining
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protocols KeyProd,Add,Mult and TransDec produce the desired outputs correctly.
KeyProd: Observe that for i = 1, . . . , n, the values (Ci,Di) are just blinded versions
(using τi) of the original input ciphertexts (Ai, Bi), which are then decrypted (using
the master secret MK) and re-encrypted under the product key Prod.pk. The re-
sulting values (Wi, Zi) can then be transformed back to encryptions of the original
underlying plaintexts by using the additively homomorphic property of the BCP
scheme, and substracting the blinding value τi again.
Add: The correctness of this algorithm follows immediately from the additively
homomorphic property and we refer to [20] for details.
Mult: We show that the output ciphertext (A,B) of algorithm Mult is indeed an
encryption (under Prod.pk) of the multiplication of the underlying plaintexts m,m′
of the two input ciphertexts (A,B), (A′, B′) (encrypted under Prod.pk), respectively.
Observe that the decryption of (A,B) under the secret key corresponding to Prod.pk
(as mention before, if Prod.pk =
∏n
i=1 pki the corresponding secret key is
∑n
i=1 ski)
yields z · z′ + σ′m + σm′ + (−σσ′) where z = m − σ, z′ = m′ − σ′, and σ, σ′ are
random blinding values (cf. Figure 7.6). The expansion of this term gives mm′ −
σ′m− σm′ + σσ′ + σ′m+ σm′ + (−σσ′) = mm′, which is the desired result.
TransDec: Recall that this protocol takes an encryption (A,B) under Prod.pk of a
message m as input and outputs ciphertexts (Ai, Bi), which are encryptions of the
same message m but under the diﬀerent public keys pki, for all i = 1, . . . , n. In this
protocol, essentially, C blinds the ciphertext (A,B) by adding a random message τ
to the underlying plaintext m, which S decrypts and encrypts again under pki, for
all i = 1, . . . , n. It is obvious that once C subtracted τ again, the resulting ciphertext
will be an encryption of m under pki, for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Since KeyProd is independent of the actual function f that is to be computed,
we see that once the underlying message f(m1, . . . ,mn) has been computed in the
encrypted domain (using Add and Mult), the correctness of TransDec yields that
each client Pi can retrieve its dedicated encryption of f(m1, . . . ,mn), which it can
successfully decrypt by using its corresponding private key ski, i = 1, . . . , n.
7.2. Security Analysis
The following security analysis considers the semi-honest model only, meaning that
all parties follow the protocol description but try to gather information about other
parties’ inputs, intermediate results, or overall outputs just by looking at the pro-
tocol’s transcripts. As usual, security in this model is proven in the “real-vs.-ideal”
framework [62, Ch. 7]: there is an ideal model where all computations are performed
via an additional trusted party and it is then shown that all adversarial behavior
in the real model (where there is no trusted party) can be simulated in the ideal
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model. We deal with each subprotocol individually which is possible due to the
Composition Theorem for the semi-honest model [62, Theorem 7.3.3]. Note that
the security of all our protocols is essentially based on the well-known concept of
“blinding” the plaintext: Given an encryption of a message, we use the additively
homomorphic property of the cryptosystem to add a random message to it, which
blinds the original plaintext.
Recall that before the actual computations (i.e., the cryptographic protocol) are
performed between servers C and S, there is only the initial setup of the BCP
cryptosystem and the step where clients P1, . . . , Pn store their encrypted private
inputs m1, . . . ,mn on the server C – for these two steps, the security follows from
the semantic security of the BCP cryptosystem. Since we assume no collusion at
all between any of the participating parties, it remains to show that neither C nor
S learn anything from the cryptographic protocol (consisting of KeyProd,Add,Mult
and TransDec) computing the n encryptions of f(m1, . . . ,mn) under the clients’
public keys pk1, . . . , pkn, respectively.
KeyProd: The only data sent is fresh ciphertexts. Due to the blinding values τi,
i = 1, . . . , n, and the semantic security of the BCP cryptosystem, these encryptions
are indistinguishable from random ciphertexts and are therefore easily simulatable
by encryption of, say, 1. Hence, both servers C and S do not learn anything at all
from these ciphertexts.
Add: This algorithm is non-interactive and does not involve the server S at all, so we
are only concerned about C. For C, however, no information leakage is assured by the
semantic security of the BCP scheme since Add just uses the additively homomorphic
property of the cryptosystem.
Mult: Again, the only data sent is fresh ciphertexts of blinded messages and due
to the semantic security of the underlying cryptosystem, we can simulate these by
random encryptions.
TransDec: Basically, the security argument here is the same as for the protocol
KeyProd. The ﬁrst step of TransDec is for C to blind the underlying message of
the ciphertext (A,B) (which is encrypted under Prod.pk) with the random message
τ . This ensures that S does not learn any information about the original plaintext
when receiving the “blinded” ciphertext (C,D). On the other hand, since C receives
fresh encryptions under the public keys of the clients, he gets no information about
the underlying plaintext whatsoever. In the language of simulations, a formal proof
would amount to simulating the views which again is possible by using random
encryptions due to the semantic security of the BCP scheme.
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7.3. Variants
Recall that the main goal of our construction was to get rid of any interaction with
the users. At the same time, our solution is very eﬃcient compared to other existing
work in similar scenarios. There are certain application scenarios, however, where
the interaction with users is explicitly wanted, e.g., when the server is allowed to
learn the result upon the approval of all participating users. In this section, we give
a few variants of our original proposal that allow leveraging our eﬃcient solution to
such applications as well:
1. Intermediate Key Aggregation. If the (encrypted) private data from a client Q
is not sent to the server C directly but goes through a chain of intermediate
clients, this variant allows for the secure aggregation of intermediate public
keys to Q’s encrypted data and hence reduces work that otherwise needs to
be done by the protocol KeyProd.
2. Disclosure by Clients’ Approval. This variant achieves a solution to the fol-
lowing scenario: Assume that clients are not supposed to see the result of C’s
computation. However, if all participating clients give their approval, C is able
to read the result (while clients stay oblivious to this result).
3. Interactive Decryption by all Clients. If clients should learn the result only if
all participating clients get together (and not each client independently as in
our original construction), this variant can be run instead of protocol TransDec
in order to make the decryption interactive between all clients. Decryption is
successful if and only if all clients participate in this interaction (again in the
semi-honest model).
Intermediate Key Aggregation. Assume that the (encrypted) private data of a
client Q participating in our protocol is not sent to the server C directly (as depicted
in Figure 7.3), but goes through other clients Q1, . . . , Q (a subset of all clients
P1, . . . , Pn). The protocol presented here optimizes KeyProd in this scenario: Recall,
that KeyProd takes all the participating clients’ ciphertexts (Ai, Bi) as input and
transforms these to encryptions under the product Prod.pk of all participating public
keys. The optimization we aim for does the aggregation of the public keys of the
clients Q,Q1, . . . , Q before the ciphertexts end up at the server C. More precisely,
let (A,B) be a ciphertext of a message m encrypted under a public key pk which
arrives at client Qi, i = 1, . . . , . This client can then use its own public key pki
in order generate an encryption of the same message m but encrypted under the
product pk · pki mod N2. This “key aggregation” is one step that otherwise had to
be done by the second server S in the original algorithm KeyProd. Since Qi knows
its own private key, it can use the ﬁrst component A and raise it to the power of its
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private key. The result of this can then be multiplied with the second component
B which transforms the ciphertext (A,B) to an encryption under pk · pki mod N2.
Details of this are described in Figure 7.8.
Client Qi has private key ski
Upon retrieval of ciphertext (A,B) (encrypted under pk):
B ←− Aski ·B mod N2
output ciphertext (A,B)
Figure 7.8.: Upon retrieval of a ciphertext (A,B) of m under pk, client Qi produces an
encryption of m under pk · pki mod N2, i = 1, . . . , .
The correctness of this algorithm is immediately seen, since when (A,B) =
(gr mod N2, pkr(1 + mN) mod N2), we have that B = Aski+sk(1 + mN) mod N2
since pkr = grsk = Ask mod N2.
The security of this variant is implied by the security of the BCP cryptosystem.
This is because the ﬁrst client Q in the chain of clients is simply giving away a fresh
encryption under its own public key.
Disclosure by Clients’ Approval. Assume that the clients are not allowed to see the
actual result f(m1, . . . ,mn) of the computation done by the server C, but if all clients
approve it, C should be able to retrieve the result (while all clients stay oblivious).
More precisely, let (A,B) denote the encrypted result of the computation done by
the server C before applying algorithm TransDec to it (so (A,B) is an encryption
under the public key Prod.pk). We assume that the participating clients P1, . . . , Pn
are not supposed to see the (encrypted) result, but on their approval (from all of
them), the server C should be able to decrypt (A,B) in order to see the result of
the computation. To achieve this, we can run protocol ODApproval of Figure 7.9
instead of TransDec. The basic idea of this protocol is to run the “key aggregation”
in reversed order, meaning that C blinds the ﬁrst component A of the encrypted
result and sends it to the clients. By using their respective private keys, each client
returns a modiﬁed version of A. Now, recall that the result is encrypted under the
product Prod.pk of all clients’ public keys. Therefore, these modiﬁed versions of A
can be used by C to “divide out” the public keys of each individual client seperately,
ending up with a encryption under the public key 1 which simply is the plaintext
itself.
The correctness of this protocol is shown by proving that if (A,B) is an encryption
of m′ under the public key Prod.pk, then the output m of ODApproval equals this
message m′. If (A,B) was encrypted by using randomness r, then
(A,B) = (gτ mod N2,Prod.pkτ (1 +m′N) mod N2), (7.1)
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Clients P1, . . . , Pn with
secret keys sk1, . . . , skn
Client Pi (i = 1, . . . , n):
Xi ←− Aski mod N2
A to all clients←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Xi−−→
Server C, stores Prod.pk and pk1, . . . , pkn
On input ciphertext (A,B) (encrypted under Prod.pk):
Pick random ρ
U←− ZN
(A,B) ←− (A · gρ mod N2, B · Prod.pkρ mod N2)
Upon retrieval of X1, . . . , Xn:
K ←−∏ni=1Xi mod N2
m ←− B/K−1 mod N2
N
Output plaintext m
Figure 7.9.: ODApproval: Server C asks all participating clients for their approval to disclose
the encrypted result to C while all clients stay oblivious to this result.
where τ = r + ρ. But K =
∏n
i=1A
ski mod N2 = Prod.pkτ mod N2 and so
m =
(1 +m′N)− 1 mod N2
N
= m′. (7.2)
As for the security, we note that the clients do not learn anything at all since the
plaintext is encoded in the second component of the ciphertext (A,B) which is never
sent to any of the clients. So the plaintext remains information theoretically secure.
Concerning the server C, we recall that due to the semantic security of the BCP
cryptosystem, C is not able to compute the randomness used to encrypt (A,B)
and so the clients’ messages Xi are indistinguishable from random elements in 〈g〉.
This also implies that as long as one of the messages Xi is missing, C is not able
to decrypt: Assume that the ﬁnal message Xn is missing and C already computed
K ′ =
∏n−1
i=1 Xi mod N
2. Trying to decrypt (A,B) = (gr mod N2,Prod.pkr(1 +
mN) mod N2) usingK ′ results in the ciphertext (gr mod N2, pkrn(1+mN) mod N2),
i.e., an encryption under the public key of Pn which is the client from whom the
message Xn is still missing.
Interactive Decryption by all Clients. Assume that we want all participating
clients to decrypt the result of C’s computation together (in an interactive pro-
tocol) so that neither the server C nor the server S learn the result, but all clients
do (if and only if all clients participate). Essentially, this can be achieved by using
the protocol ODApproval (cf. Figure 7.9). Server C sends the re-randomized encryp-
tion (A,B) to all clients and then, instead of sending the values X1, . . . ,Xn to the
server C, for each i = 1, . . . , n, client Pi broadcasts its respective value Xi to all
other clients. Upon retrieval of all these values X1, . . . ,Xn, each client is now able
to decrypt (in the same way as C does in Figure 7.9) the ciphertext (A,B) to reveal
the underlying result of C’s computation. The correctness of this protocol follows
from the correctness of ODApproval.
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The same argument as for the previous variant shows that all messages X1, . . . ,Xn
need to be received in order to decrypt the ciphertext (A,B). So decryption is not
possible until all clients broadcasted their respective value Xi. Since the clients
never see the (encrypted) private inputs of other clients, they cannot learn more
than the decryption of (A,B) which is the result of the computation done by the
server C.
7.4. Performance
The performance of our contribution depends on the security parameter κ, the
number of clients n, the number of additions and multiplications performed, and
the network performance (bandwidth and latency). All algorithms, except Init are
solely based on arithmetic operations (addition, subtraction, multiplication, expo-
nentiation, inversion, division, comparison) modulo N or N2 and random number
generation. The size of N grows linearly with κ. A full overview of the complex-
ity of each protocol step is given in Figure 7.10 (a). To show that our system can
be used in practice, we implemented a proof-of-concept version of all protocols in
python. Because the speed of the implementation depends mainly on the speed of
the bignum library, we used the GMP library though pythons gmpy module. The
GMP library is known to be asymptotically faster than pythons native bignum li-
brary, when it comes to processing bigger numbers. GMP oﬀers all basic operations
we need, except for the generation of safe primes numbers. Therefore, we also used
the OpenSSL library through a custom C-binding, but solely for generating safe
prime numbers. We used a TCP network connection over the loopback interface for
transferring data between the two servers.
The runtime of our code is heavily inﬂuenced by the size of N . We recommend a
size of N of at least 1024 bit, while 1536 or 2048 bit are better choices for security
reasons. Therefore, we performed all benchmarks with these three security param-
eters. We performed all tests on a Lenovo Thinkpad T410s with an Intel Core i5
M560 running at 2.67 GHz with Debian Sid, Python 2.7.3rc2 and gmpy 1.15-1. We
ran all clients and both servers on the same host, so that network latency can be
ignored. Algorithm Init has the worst time complexity due to the generation of two
safe primes. Its runtime is expected to vary, because the number of instructions it
needs to execute in order to ﬁnd two suitable primes depends on the random num-
bers generated by the algorithm. Figure 7.10 (b) shows the runtime distribution of
Init, depending on κ. 20 tests were performed for each choice of κ, and it is clearly
visible that the runtime varies a lot. In the next step, we determined how long it
takes to encrypt all client’s inputs, transcode them at the server and hand the result
back to the clients (omitting the initialization step). Figure 7.10 (c) shows that
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(a) Complexity of the protocol
Traﬃc Round
Algorithm Time in bits trips
Init O(κ5/ log(κ)2) on S 4κ 0
Data Upload O(κ3) on each client 6nκ 0.5
O(nκ2) on C
KeyEval O(nκ3) on S 8κ 1
O(nκ2) on C
Add O(κ2) on C 0 0
Mult O(κ3) on C 12κ 1
O(κ3) on S
TransDec O(nκ3) on C 4(n+ 1)κ 1
O(nκ3) on S





















































(d) Time to perform a single operation
addition
multiplication
Figure 7.10.: Complexity and runtime analysis of the protocol.
our implementation scales linearly with the number of clients. Without any arith-
metic operations, we can perform a full protocol run with 16 clients in 1.7 seconds,
using a 1536 bit modulus. Finally, we were interested in the runtime of Add and
Mult. Figure 7.10 (d) shows that an addition is much faster than a multiplication.
With a 1536 bit modulus, about 25,000 additions, but only 5 multiplications can
be performed per second. The results show that our scheme is really useable in
practice.
7.5. Applications
Finally, we present two applications of our general-purpose construction, namely
privacy-preserving face recognition and private smart metering, which beneﬁt from
the non-interactive nature of our protocols. In order to demonstrate the practicabil-
ity of our approach, we decided to implement the much more complex application
of these two, namely privacy-preserving face recognition.
Privacy-Preserving Face Recognition
Face recognition is a widely-used tool in many areas of modern everyday life, among
which social networks probably is one of the most important. Many social networks
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use face recognition tools for things like automatic photo tagging [5] or in order to
help law enforcement agencies to prosecute suspected persons [3] (to name just a
few). This is usually being done without the explicit consent of users, raising impor-
tant privacy concerns, as convincingly demonstrated in [37] and [102]. Therefore,
Erkin et al. [37] proposed the ﬁrst privacy-preserving protocol for face recognition
which, however, heavily relies on user interaction. Unfortunately, their solution gen-
erally does not work in the social network setting where users access their proﬁles
by using resource-constrained mobile devices which are not always online. There-
fore, having a completely non-interactive (with the users) solution is crucial in such
scenarios. Additionally, users typically want to use their own public keys to encrypt
their private images (which, again, is not possible in previous solutions).
Similarly to Erkin et al. [37], the database of “known images” (i.e., when given a
face image, we want to ﬁnd out whether it is in the database or not) is unencrypted
in our setting. For instance, in the scenario of helping with the prosecution of
suspected persons, the database of known images consists of the suspected persons
and is therefore known by the social network provider in plaintext (unencrypted).
On the other hand, it is desirable to have all users’ proﬁle pictures (or images of
users’ holidays etc.) encrypted, so that the social network provider is only able to
recognize faces that are found in the database while all other faces remain hidden.2
To achieve this goal, we adapt the privacy-preserving protocol by Erkin et al. [37] to
our framework and hence rely on the standard eigenfaces recognition algorithm [108,
109], which can be summarized as follows:
Enrolment. This is the ﬁrst phase, in which a “face space” is determined on the
basis of a set of M training images Θ1, . . . ,ΘM (represented as a vector of length
L). Later on, in the recognition phase, face images will be projected onto this “face
space” and matched against the training images. Creating the “face space” is done
by
1. computing the “average face” Ψ = 1M
∑M
i=1Θi,
2. computing the “diﬀerence vectors” Φi = Θi −Ψ for all i = 1, . . . ,M ,
3. applying the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to the covariance matrix
C = 1MAA
T where A is the matrix [Θ1 Θ2 . . . ΘM ] (see [109] for details).
3
This yields orthonormal eigenvectors with associated eigenvalues of C,
4. selecting K  M eigenvectors u1, . . . , uK (the “eigenfaces”) associated to the
K largest eigenvalues,
2Note that the correct recognition is only assured with a certain probability, since the tool of face
recognition is error-prone. In the implementation that we use (cf. [37]), the correct classification
rate is approximately 96%.
3Actually, PCA is applied to the much smaller matrix ATA with appropriate post-processing [109].
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5. and projecting Θ1, . . . ,ΘM to the “face space” spanned by u1, . . . , uK to get
their “feature vectors” Ω1, . . . ,ΩM where Ωi = (ωi1, . . . , ωiK)
T with ωij =
uTj (Θi −Ψ) for all j = 1, . . . ,K and i = 1, . . . ,M .
Recognition. Given a face image Γ, recognition is done by
1. (“Projection” step) projecting Γ onto the face space by computing its “feature
vector” V = (v1, . . . , vK)
T with vj = u
T
j (Γ−Ψ) for all j = 1, . . . ,K,
2. (“Distance” step) computing the squares D1, . . . ,DM of the Euclidean dis-
tances between V and Ω1, . . . ,ΩM as Dj = ‖V − Ωj‖2 for j = 1, . . . ,M ,
3. (“Minimum” step) and reporting a match if the smallest distance Dmin =
min{D1, . . . ,DM} is smaller than a given threshold τ .
We stress that since the database of “known images” is known by the social network
provider, all steps of the enrolment phase can be done in the clear, without using any
form of encryption. Hence, we only have to transform the steps of the recognition
phase into the encrypted domain. We do this by a rather straight-forward adaption
of the protocols in [37] to our framework:
Encrypting Images. Assume that a user U wants to upload an encryption of a
private face image Γ under its respective public key pk to the server C (here, C is
the social network provider). Recall that we represent images as vectors of length
L, i.e., Γ = (Γ1, . . . ,ΓL)
T . User U encrypts the image Γ component-wise, which we
denote by EncImgpk(Γ), i.e., EncImgpk(Γ) = (Encpk(Γ1), . . . ,Encpk(ΓL))
T .
Projection. Given an image encryption EncImgpk(Γ) = (c1, . . . , cL)
T of a face image











where uij denotes the j-th component of the i-th eigenface ui and Ψj denotes the
j-th component of the average face Ψ. This way, C obtains the encrypted feature
vector V = (v1, . . . , vK)
T corresponding to Γ.
Distance. Given the projected face vector V = (v1, . . . , vK)
T from the “projection”
step, C computes the Euclidean distances to the feature vectors Ωi = (ωi1, . . . , ωiK)T
for i = 1, . . . ,M , with the help of server S as follows: First, C computes for all









(−2ωij ). Note that C
can perform these computations without interacting with S. Second, C computes
σ3 :=
∏M
i=1Mult(vi, vi). Note that Mult runs interactively with server S. Finally,
for all i = 1, . . . ,M , C computes the results δi := σi1 · σi2 · σ3, which are encryptions
of the squares of the Euclidean distances of V with Ω1, . . . ,ΩM .
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Minimum. In this ﬁnal step, C performs a joint computation with S in order to
determine the minimum of the encrypted distances δ1, . . . , δM together with an en-
cryption of its index id ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and to check whether this minimum is smaller
than a given threshold τ . This is done by encrypting τ (under pk) and treating it as
an additional (encrypted) distance with the special index 0 (which we encrypt under
pk as well). The distances as well as the indices have to be stored encrypted since
only the user U should be able to see the ﬁnal result of this minimum-ﬁnding. The
protocol to perform this step in a privacy-preserving manner is exactly as in [37] and
we refer the reader to this reference for details since the protocol is rather complex
and would go beyond the scope of this paper. We stress that one simply has to
replace the parties Alice and Bob in [37] by servers S and C, respectively, and the
Paillier cryptosystem [93] by the BCP cryptosystem [20]. Also, we note that in our
implementation we solely used the BCP cryptosystem, while [37] switches to the
homomorphic encryption scheme DGK by Damg˚ard, Geisler, and Krøigaard [31] for
eﬃciency reasons.
We stress that we deliberately implemented all protocols only by using our general-
purpose construction as is, without any tricks to optimize the performance, such as
switching to the much more eﬃcient DGK cryptosystem for computing the minimal
distance, or treating the fact that most computations can be done in an oﬄine
pre-computation phase. Note, however, that all such tricks can be applied to our
protocols in exactly the same way as it is done in [37]. We did not implement these
tricks in order to show the performance of our general-purpose construction in its
plain as-is state without tweaking it to speciﬁc application scenarios.
Performance Analysis. We implemented the complete protocol for privacy-preserving
face recognition, as described above, in python while basing it on our implementa-
tion of our general-purpose construction described in Section 7.4. This means that
we used the GMP and OpenSSL libraries, while all tests were performed on a Lenovo
Thinkpad T410s with an Intel Core i5 M560 running at 2.67 GHz, running Debian
Sid with Python 2.7.3rc2 and gmpy 1.15-1. The security parameter of our general-
purpose construction was ﬁxed to κ = 1024, i.e., the size of the RSA-modulus N is
1024 bits.
In order to avoid confusion, we used the same set of parameters for the privacy-
preserving face recognition protocol as [37]. This also ensures the same reliability
results as in [37] (achieving a correct classiﬁcation rate of approximately 96%). In
particular, we used the “ORL Database of Faces” from AT&T Laboratories Cam-
bridge [1] containing 10 images of 40 diﬀerent subjects, yielding a total amount of
400 images.4 These images are of size 92 × 112 pixels, which we represented as
4We actually use a subset of these which is determined through the size M of the database of
“known images”.
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Traﬃc Traﬃc Runtime w/
Database Runtime C to S S to C remote S
size M in sec. in MB in MB in sec.
10 106 0.6 0.7 100
50 297 4 4.2 294
100 533 8 8.5 506
150 761 12 13 744
200 1004 16 17 970
Table 7.1.: Complexity of performing privacy-preserving face recognition with our general-
purpose construction.
vectors of length L = 92 · 112 = 10304. It is demonstrated in [37] that K > 12
eigenfaces in the enrolment phase do not signiﬁcantly increase the correct classi-
ﬁcation rate, which is why we used their suggestion of K = 12 (for M = 10, we
used K = 5 instead). Table 7.1 depicts the results of our performance analysis of
the complete privacy-preserving face recognition protocol (containing both C’s and
S’s costs). The ﬁrst column shows the amount M of feature vectors stored in the
database, while the second column shows the runtime (wall clock time in seconds)
of the full protocol per invocation with one face image (that is to be matched with
the database). The runtime shown in the second column contains the enrolment
phase which in each case took less than 1% time of the shown overall runtime. We
therefore included the enrolment phase here, since it does not signiﬁcantly change
the overall performance. The communication complexity (measured with iptables)
is summarized in the other two columns: the third column shows the amount of
data (in megabytes) sent from server C to server S, while the fourth column shows
the total traﬃc from S back to C.
Finally, the ﬁfth column shows the runtime (in seconds) of the full protocol (per
single query) when using a remote server S over the Internet. For this remote setup,
we connected our Lenovo Thinkpad T410s (server C) with a 20 Mbit/s consumers
cable connection to the Internet and started our server S implementation on a
remote system equipped with a 3.2 GHz AMD Phenom II X6 1090T processor in a
datacenter connected to the Internet with a Gigabit Ethernet adapter. The average
round trip time to that system was 32 ms, measured with the linux “ping” utility.
Observe that the overall runtime when running server S remotely is less than when
running S locally. This is due to the fact that the remote system that we used has
higher performance than the local one.
In summary, for a database of size M = 200, a full protocol run requires approxi-
mately 16 minutes (both when running S locally or remotely) for checking whether
a given encrypted image is contained in the database or not. This demonstrates
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that our general-purpose construction can really be used in practice for performing
facial recognition in a privacy-preserving manner in the social network setting, even
without any eﬃciency optimizations. Again, we stress that we can apply the same
performance tweaks to our protocol as Erkin et al. [37], which would yield a sig-
niﬁcant eﬃciency boost. Also, we note that we did not use explicit parallelism in
our implementation, so that the performance can moreover be improved by using
multiple CPU cores. We leave the elaboration of such possibilities as interesting
future work.
Private Smart Metering
Another interesting application domain, actively promoted by many governments,
concerns the deployment of smart grids for modernizing the distribution networks
of electricity, gas or water. For such services, smart meters record the consump-
tion of individual consumers on a ﬁne-grained basis and send all collected data to
a central authority (the supplier), which in turn uses these inputs to compute over-
all consumptions, bills (by using dynamic pricing schemes), usage patterns, or to
detect fraud or leakage in other utilities. Due to the collection of massive amount
of sensitive data, privacy concerns have been raised in the past years, and various
solutions protecting the consumers’ privacy have been proposed for diﬀerent com-
puting tasks of the supplier. Current solutions either only consider eavesdropping
outsiders (and not the supplier) [82], require interaction and high computational
overhead at the smart meters [50,77] or rely on trusted components alongside each
smart meter [71,90].
Our construction of Section 7.1 oﬀers a non-interactive protocol with very low
computational costs at the smart meters. The smart meters would act as the clients
in our protocol description of Section 7.1, sending their encrypted private data to
the supplier C. With our cryptographic protocol between C and a second server S,
the supplier C can essentially compute any function on the consumers’ inputs in a
privacy-preserving way. Furthermore, concerning private information aggregation,
we can extend the distributed incremental data aggregation approach of [82] in order
to protect the consumers’ privacy from the supplier C as well. In [82], the idea is to
encrypt each consumer’s private data with an additively homomorphic encryption
scheme under the public key of the supplier C and then send this encrypted infor-
mation through other households in the neighbourhood (this is due to the use of
short-range communication networks) in order to ﬁnally reach the supplier. Inter-
mediate households aggregate their private data to the one they receive by using the
additive property of the cryptosystem. Once the supplier received the data from all
these chains of households, it aggregates these encryptions together to get the ag-
gregation of all consumers’ inputs. In [82], only eavesdropping adversaries (such as
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the intermediate households) are considered. By employing our construction variant
“Intermediate Key Aggregation”, we can protect the consumers’ privacy from inter-
mediate households as well as from the supplier: Consumer P1 encrypts its private
data by using its own public key pk1 and sends it to the next consumer P2 which in
turn uses the “Intermediate Key Aggregation” algorithm to transform the encryp-
tion into an encryption under the product pk1pk2 mod N
2 of the two consumers’
public keys. Furthermore, P2 encrypts its own private input under this product
pk1pk2 mod N
2 as well and uses the additively homomorphic property of the BCP
cryptosystem to aggregate its encrypted input to the encrypted input of the ﬁrst
consumer P1. These steps continue through the whole chain of consumers until the
supplier C is reached. C can now aggregate all the remaining consumers’ encrypted
inputs (similar to [82]) but still is unable to see any of the underlying plaintexts.
Depending on the application, we can continue in three ways:
1. C decrypts the result jointly with the second server S (recall that S still has
the master secret).
2. We use the variant “Disclosure by Clients’ Approval” which means that C can
only decrypt if all consumers approve it.
3. C sends the encrypted result of the aggregation (or any other evaluation on
the basis of this aggregation) back to the consumers for local decryption.
We stress that due to the high eﬃciency of our solution, it is particularly interesting




The contributions of this dissertation have a strong impact on both the theoret-
ical understanding and the practical implementation of homomorphic encryption
schemes. From a theoretical perspective, our universal characterization results
(Chapters 4–6) round oﬀ the topic of GHE and identiﬁes similarities with the re-
laxed notion of SWHE, paving the way for the study on FHE schemes. By deﬁnition,
GHE schemes are less powerful (in terms of operations that can be performed in the
encrypted domain) than most SWHE and FHE schemes, but compared to current
instantiations, they are still more eﬃcient. To make up for this less powerfulness,
our result on the secure outsourcing of multiparty computation (Chapter 7) shows
that by relying on interactivity, GHE schemes can nevertheless be used to tackle
important problems that previously could only be solved using FHE. From a prac-
tical perspective, this gives rise to eﬃcient solutions for real-world problems, such
as the secure outsourcing of private data to a cloud provider, bridging our strong
foundational work with practice.
In the following, we summarize the major contributions of this dissertation with
respect to the impact on their respective research areas and conclude each summary
with directions for future work.
Security Foundations of GHE and Links to FHE
The encryption algorithms of all existing IND-CPA secure HE schemes (GHE,
SWHE, and FHE) follow the shift-type approach: ﬁrst, the plaintext is embed-
ded into the ciphertext space and then randomly shifted inside of this space (e.g.,
“plaintext” + “noise”). For these shift-type schemes, we show in Chapter 4 that
we can characterize their IND-CPA security via SMP. For GHE schemes, we also
achieved a similar characterization for their IND-CCA1 security (via SOAP).
As it turns out, once an HE scheme is plugged into our framework, our IND-CPA
(IND-CCA1, resp.) characterization outputs the corresponding underlying hardness
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assumption in terms of an instance of SMP (SOAP, resp.). This helps in assessing
the security of a given HE scheme and allows to show the Paillier cryptosystem
provably secure in terms of IND-CCA1 under a reasonable assumption.
We see the development of a similar IND-CCA1 characterization for more general
SWHE schemes as an interesting future work. In particular, it would be worthwhile
studying the possibilities of constructing an IND-CCA1 secure FHE scheme. Such
schemes do not exist yet. This is due to the fact that the bootstrapping technique
is the only way to construct FHE schemes that we are currently aware of. Unfor-
tunately, boostrapping is not designed to give you IND-CCA1 security. In fact, it
is trivial to break the IND-CCA1 security of FHE scheme by simply decrypting the
encrypted secret key bits in the decryption phase.
New Constructions with Unique Features
Additionally to our security characterizations, we give a characterization of shift-
type GHE schemes in terms of their design. More precisely, Chapter 5 gives a
universal blueprint (a generic scheme) for such cryptosystems, meaning that every
scheme is an instance of the generic scheme. With this result, we are able to construct
new GHE scheme with unique features. As the main contribution, we give the
ﬁrst GHE scheme that is provably IND-CCA1 secure in the generic group model
and instantiable in bilinear groups. Moreover, we construct the ﬁrst additively HE
scheme on elliptic curves that has two independent decryption mechanisms. Such
schemes have interesting applications in the secure outsourcing of computations to
a cloud provider as we show in Chapter 7.
While our additively HE scheme is based on elliptic curves over rings, it is still an
open question whether we can construct an additively HE scheme (with plaintext
space exponentially large in the security parameter) that is based on elliptic curves
over ﬁelds. Such a scheme would be very desirable for implementations on resource-
constrained devices such as smart cards for which elliptic curves over ﬁelds are very
suitable.
Impossibility Results
The main consequence of our IND-CPA security characterization is the general (in
the Abelian case) impossibility of GHE in the quantum world (Chapter 6). Further-
more, we deduce the impossibility of using a linear code as the ciphertext space of an
IND-CPA secure GHE scheme. Our result in the quantum world is quite strong and
literally brings the topic of GHE to an end once eﬃcient quantum computers exist.
It additionally has the corollary that every new encryption scheme whose security is
based on a quantum-resistant hardness assumption should be checked for the group
homomorphic property. This is because our impossibility result shows that if the
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new scheme is group homomorphic it cannot be secure in the quantum world and
so, the underlying hardness assumption cannot be quantum-resistant.
We consider the extension of our quantum impossibility result to general solvable
groups (non-Abelian) as interesting future work. Although, this does not seem to
be practically relevant (as some form of commutativity is always needed in practical
applications), it is at least of great theoretical interest.
Eﬃcient and Secure Outsourcing of Multiparty Computations
In Chapter 7, we show that additively HE schemes with a double decryption mecha-
nism (such as the one we propose in Chapter 5) have a strong impact on the secure
outsourcing of arbitrary computations. In fact, we give the ﬁrst construction that
allows multiple clients to send encryptions of their private data under their own
public key to a distrusted server that can then, on behalf of the clients, compute
any dynamically chosen function on these inputs in the encrypted domain (even
across encryptions under diﬀerent public keys) without learning anything at all, and
non-interactively with the clients.
The main contribution of this result is in practical applications where interaction
with clients should be minimal, as in privacy-preserving face recognition or private
smart metering. Our general-purpose solution runs very eﬃciently in such settings,
but is only secure against semi-honest adversaries. The extension to malicious ad-
versaries is treated as future work. We further want to evaluate the performance
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